Emissions taxes vs. intensity standards revisited: a general equilibrium analysis by Antonio, Katherine  M. & NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
ANTONIO, KATHERINE M., Ph.D. Emissions Taxes vs. Intensity Standards Revis-
ited: A General Equilibrium Analysis. (2021)
Directed by Dr. Stephen P. Holland. 186 pp.
This dissertation applies general equilibrium techniques to the comparison of
two applied environmental policies that are designed to reduce CO2 emissions:
the cap and trade regulatory mechanism and the emissions per output regulatory
mechanism. The main objective of this research is to analyze whether one
regulation performs better in terms of maximizing overall welfare, applying a
general equilibrium framework. Previous research on the effectiveness of
environmental policies is inconclusive. The application of general equilibrium
analysis contributes to the current literature on the effectiveness of
environmental policies, particularly in circumstances in which emissions can leak
into other economic sectors or countries.
I conclude that under certain conditions – the separability of inputs in a concave
production function and emissions leakage – the optimal policy should regulate
emissions per unit of output instead of imposing a cap on emissions. In the main
model of this dissertation unilateral cap and trade policies are unable to replicate
the first best, and, more importantly, can be an inferior instrument for regulating
emissions than a unilateral intensity standard policy. This finding might explain
why local policies that regulate emissions per output are in place when there is
leakage and a lack of coordination among agents. The results suggest important
general equilibrium effects on labor and capital markets.
The hypothetical case of regulating the fossil fuel industry unilaterally in the U.S.
shows that a country that regulates will implicitly pay higher endogenous carbon
prices than with harmonized cases. Unilateral and incomplete regulation is
costly, both in terms of facing larger endogenous carbon prices and in terms of
factor reallocation of capital and labor to unregulated industries and regions.
Harmonization of policies across regions and sectors is always preferred, as such
policies elicit larger overall welfare. Furthermore, the choice of the regulatory
instrument determines the size of the effects. I find evidence that intensity
standards are superior to cap and trade mechanisms for incomplete and
unilateral regulation cases.
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Various countries have implemented policies to reduce carbon emissions
to achieve long-term goals for emissions reductions and to avoid unwanted
consequences of climate change. Research is needed to determine the
circumstances in which such environmental policies are effective. Identifying
cases in which some policies may be more effective than others could serve to
reduce the cost of the implementation of environmental regulations and alleviate
the unintended consequences of the regulation, such as the transfer of emissions
and production factors to unregulated sectors. Cap and trade mechanisms (or
emissions taxes) are the preferred strategy for cutting carbon emissions, mainly
because cap and trade can achieve the best possible outcome and restore market
efficiency. However, cap and trade requires coordination among participating
agents and policymakers to be successfully implemented. Research is needed
regarding the general equilibrium effects of implementing unilateral and
uncoordinated policies. This dissertation endeavors to illustrate cases in which
applying alternative mechanisms, such as emissions per output regulations (or
intensity standards), could be superior to using emissions taxes or implementing
cap and trade systems.
This dissertation consists of seven chapters and an introduction and a
conclusion. In the chapters, I present the economic implications of
environmental regulations for the overall economy in different general
equilibrium settings. The first chapter presents the introduction, and the second
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chapter is the literature review. The third chapter examines environmental
regulations in practice. In the following two chapters, I present the theory of the
general equilibrium model to study the economic implications of carbon
emissions regulations under two differing regulatory schemes: cap and trade and
intensity standards. I present simulations of this theoretical model and the
conditions under which one regulatory scheme is superior to the other. A simple
standard general equilibrium model is applied to two countries. Following
Fullerton and Heutel (2010), firms in each country produce two goods: one clean
good and one dirty good. The production of the dirty good generates emissions as
an output that competes for traditional inputs, such as capital and labor. The
model is presented in Chapter IV and Chapter V. Chapter IV analytically presents
the economic relationships in the model, and Chapter V presents the numerical
simulation supporting the analysis as well as a sensitivity analysis. I conclude
that under certain conditions – the separability of inputs in a concave production
function and emissions leakage – the optimal policy would regulate emissions
per unit of output, rather than imposing a cap on emissions.
Chapter VI and Chapter VII expand the analysis by presenting the results
of a canonical model analyzing the real world implementation of environmental
policies. To do so, the standard general equilibrium model and the Global Trade
Analysis Project database (GTAP-Power v10) are used to validate the conclusions
presented in the previous chapters.
Chapter VIII takes a complementary approach, comparing welfare under
two distinct environmental regulations in the power sector that aim to achieve
net-zero emissions targets. To take advantage of the empirical tools in the
economic analysis, I present a recursive dynamic multi-country applied general
2
equilibrium exercise, which benefits from using the disaggregation of the power
sector in the GTAP-Power 10 database, with a base year of 2014 (Aguiar et al.,
2019a). Chapter VIII focuses the analysis of the environmental regulations of
greenhouse gasses in carbon dioxide equivalent units (CO2eq) in the production
of energy goods that are carbon intensive, such as electricity generation derived
from fossil fuels. Emissions are embedded in the production, import and export
of goods. GTAP data presents the trade flows and economic indicators of 76 goods
in 141 geographic regions. CO2 emissions are modeled as a production function
employing the production factors listed in GTAP (labor, capital, natural
resources, and land) to produce goods. Emissions are also linked to consumer
demand. The main focus of this exercise is to analyze the overall welfare effects
under various emissions regulatory frameworks of cap and trade regulations and
intensity standards regulations. Special attention is paid to the implications of
embedded CO2 on the trade of goods in energy-intensive industries. In addition,
goods are imported from labor-intensive countries. The results show that
harmonized regulatory approaches are associated to a higher values of overall
welfare are also associated to lower endogenous carbon prices. Finally, Chapter




Many papers analyze the effects of environmental taxes and other
environmental regulations in a general equilibrium (GE) context. In this chapter,
I summarize the literature that focuses on comparing environmental regulations
in different settings. Instruments to regulate emissions include emissions cap
and trade, performance or intensity standards, emissions taxes, and subsidies for
cleaner technologies (Kolstad, 2009).
I focus on two policies in this dissertation: cap and trade and intensity
standards. A cap and trade is a regulatory mechanism that sets an overall limit on
emissions and regulated entities trade allowances. Intensity standards are a form
of regulation of emissions per unit of output. Intensity standards come in
different forms, for example, setting a percentage of clean energy in the total
electricity generation mix, or setting the ratio of emissions that a country can
produce as a percentage of their gross domestic product (GDP). These two
policies are adopted in practice and can achieve high welfare outcomes, and these
welfare outcomes are extremely important to consider when setting climate
policy. However, in practice, there are complexities in designing a proper
comparison of instruments. For example, the instruments should be compared by
keeping the quantity of emissions they abate equal, or they should be compared
on their emissions abatement potential or welfare-maximizing potential.
This chapter contains five sections and includes the main elements for
conceptualizing the analysis presented in the dissertation. Section II.1 presents a
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discussion of global and unilateral policies for reducing carbon emissions, and
how these policies are related to leakage. Section II.2 presents the literature
review on the limitations of partial equilibrium analysis. Section II.3 discusses
the implications of ignoring general equilibrium effects. Section II.4 presents a
comparison of cap and trade and intensity standards. Section II.5 presents a
discussion about Computable General Equilibrium models and provides an
explanation for why these models may be suitable for the analysis of
environmental regulations.
II.1. Global v. Unilateral Policies and Leakage
In this section, I discuss the implementation of global and unilateral
policies. Global policies may be enablers for achieving an optimal solution for
climate change. A cap and trade program is optimal when the cap is set correctly,
for example, the limit of emissions can replicate the exact amount of emissions
reductions from all parties. In this case, a cap and trade mechanism can emulate
the first best. When the cap fully captures the marginal damage of emissions, the
cap and trade mechanism sets the correct price and quantity of emissions, that is,
fully internalizes the externality of emissions. Thus, regulatory policies require
an enormous amount of coordination to achieve the first best.
The marginal damage of emissions is the marginal cost of producing
emissions for a society. This marginal social cost represents the marginal external
cost to the society, for example, health effects as a results of bad air quality or the
effects of pollutants on agriculture. Similarly, the marginal abatement cost of
emissions is the associated cost per unit of emissions reductions, which, for
example, can be the cost of installing equipment for pollution control.
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Leakage of emissions occurs when emissions increase in unregulated
regions or industries as a result of the regulation of emissions in another region
or industry. When leakage occurs, a cap and trade mechanism may not be an
optimal policy. International leakage is a concern because of the difficulty to tax
carbon content in foreign goods without violating international trade
agreements. Another problem is the difficulty to estimate the amount of CO2
content in each product that is imported or exported precisely (Shapiro, 2016).
Emissions taxes and cap and trade policies can replicate the first best only
if they are set to the optimal level. An intensity standard cannot attain the first
best because it cannot both efficiently encourage substitution towards less
emissions-intensive sources and reduce consumption. Intensity standards can
only attain the first best under very stringent conditions, for example, under
perfectly inelastic supply or demand.
Studies focusing on assessing CO2 regulations at the national or global
level have aimed to find the optimal global policy. For example, Sims et al. (2003)
emphasize that countries need to migrate to technologies that emit less carbon
when generating electricity. The authors found that apart from CO2 sequestration
and power plant technologies, other CO2 emissions-reduction technologies, such
as nuclear and other green energy power plants, were able to lower both the cost
of carbon emissions and electricity generation by the present year, 2020 .
One of the challenges of implementing environmental protections
unilaterally is that other countries do not share the same regulations, and firms
can relocate industrial activities to non-regulated areas. Leakage and incomplete
regulation has been explored in various settings, such as implementing the
regulation of drilling activities on federal land in the energy sector (Fowlie et al.,
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2012). Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are harmful even if emitted outside of
the policy country/region because they are global pollutants. Leakage of
emissions sources to unregulated countries/regions is therefore problematic for
regulated countries/regions.
II.2. Limitations of Partial Equilibrium Analysis
This section presents the literature that uses partial equilibrium models to
compare environmental regulations. According to the United States
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) Economic Guidelines, the economic
model of partial equilibrium accounts for demand and supply responses in a
regulated sector, and partial equilibrium results “may apply to a small number of
closely related markets” (EPA, 2014, p.8). For example, partial equilibrium
ignores the effects on intermediate products that supply goods and services to
upstream markets in regulated areas. The guideline stated that “partial
equilibrium analysis is usually appropriate when the scope of a regulation is
limited to a single sector, or to a small number of sectors” (EPA, 2014, p.8).
Hence, when analyzing the effects of a policy on a particular market, a partial
equilibrium analysis will effectively “capture the social cost of the regulation”
(EPA, 2014, p. 8) .
Partial equilibrium is often applied to estimate the social cost of emissions
when the effects of regulating emissions are related to a small number of markets
or a single market. The assumption in partial equilibrium models is that the
impacts of regulating pollution in most markets do not affect other markets and
can therefore be ignored or assessed using partial equilibrium analysis.
Nonetheless, some authors argue that partial equilibrium conclusions are biased
when analyzing climate policies. For instance, the results of partial equilibrium
7
studies consistently ignore the effects of a policy on factor prices and the direct
or indirect effects on other markets or industries (Goulder and Williams, 2003).
The literature provides estimates of the magnitude of the second-order
general equilibrium effects. The second-order effects are mainly in factor prices
and factor mobility across industries. Goulder and Williams (2003) explored the
bias that results from ignoring general equilibrium (GE) effects, and show that
doing so when analyzing taxes on commodities “underestimates the excess
burden of commodity taxes, in some cases by a factor of 10 or more”; the authors
explain that partial equilibrium is biased “because it ignores general equilibrium
interactions—most important, interactions between the taxed commodity and
the labor market" (Goulder and Williams, 2003).
Different sectors are expected to experience critical economic effects
because of either indirect or direct regulations; thus, a cost-benefit analysis that
focuses mainly on how impacts in the directly controlled sector can substantially
underestimate the social cost of the regulations. Kokoski and Smith (1987) show
that partial equilibrium models lead to significant errors in welfare estimations
even when analyzing small policy shocks that affect more than one sector (EPA,
2014). Pizer et al. (2006) also show that implicit biases lead to important
differences between general and partial equilibrium estimates of welfare when
analyzing carbon pricing for different sectors (Pizer et al., 2006). Hence, as Hahn
and Hird (1991) has stated, the critical question to ask is under what conditions it
is realistic to ignore these second-order effects. The authors noted that it is
difficult to generalize the implications of second-order effects because these vary
across regulations and industries (Hahn and Hird, 1991).
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II.3. General Equilibrium Effects
In this section, I review the literature that develops theoretical general
equilibrium models of emissions and leakage. I also present several applied
general equilibrium models of environmental regulations. When determining the
best regulatory instrument for environmental regulation, policymakers evaluate
a standard set of parameters, such as the cost-effectiveness, distributional equity,
uncertainties, and political feasibility (Goulder and Parry, 2008, p. 152) .
However, as Goulder and Parry (2008) importantly note, there is no one
instrument that is superior along all dimensions that are relevant when choosing
between policies (Goulder and Parry, 2008) . General equilibrium effects and
economic technicalities are generally overlooked when selecting optimal
environmental policies.
General equilibrium effects are important, especially when estimating
inter-industry interactions and cumulative effects of changes in investments,
factor utilization, and payments. Crucially, they will manifest as indirect effects,
reallocating factors across industries or regions. The belief is that the overall
social cost of regulations may exceed the compliance cost of regulations when
including general equilibrium effects (Jaffe et al., 1995), even though this
conclusion is not widely supported. For instance, some studies have found that
general equilibrium effects are represented as welfare improvements when
accounting for the overall effects of a policy such as tax interactions. Effects on
factor prices are overlooked by partial equilibrium (PE) analysis, and so GE is
particularly appropriate when there is a reason to believe that a given policy
would affect wages or factor payments.
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Some of the previous literature regarding the effectiveness of
environmental policies under general equilibrium underestimate the importance
of general equilibrium analysis. However, the assumptions may vary significantly,
and the conclusions may be conditional on certain assumptions and functional
forms chosen in the modeling exercise. Some studies have identified small carbon
leakages (Burniaux and Oliveira Martins, 2012), the results of which may be
driven by the specification of the theoretical model and the method used to solve
the model. Fullerton and Heutel (2010); Lemoine (2017) and Fell et al. (2017) all
applied numerical exercises, and their conclusions are conditional on the
specification of the model, the choice of functional forms, and on the
parametrization. When the elements are carefully chosen such that they
represent the economy well, the conclusions of GE models are robust and can
reveal the economy-wide effects of a given policy.
II.4. Comparisons of Cap and Trade and Intensity Standards
In this section, I present a comparison of cap and trade and intensity
standards, and discuss the findings and the tools utilized to analyze
environmental regulations. Some economic studies evaluate the effectiveness of
policies focusing on unilateral or incomplete environmental regulations. For
example, Holland (2012) compared emissions taxes versus intensity standards
and examined “second-best environmental policies under incomplete regulation
(leakage) or market power in partial equilibrium” (Holland, 2009, p. 1) ,
concluding that tax regulations on emissions “may not be the best instrument for
correcting an environmental externality in the presence of incomplete regulation
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(leakage)” (Holland, 2012)1. The author found that under conditions of
incomplete regulation and market power, emissions intensity standards may
produce higher welfare benefits compared to any emissions tax. It is unclear
whether the results of Holland (2012) still hold under general equilibrium, which
may provide more conclusive results of the effects of different regulations under
leakage both with and without market power 2.
When comparing auctioned permits with performance standards in the
electricity sector in a partial equilibrium analysis, Burtraw et al. (2001) found that
the cost of lowering power plant emission of CO2 with auctioned permits is a
third of the cost under performance standards. Auctioned permits have a more
significant effect on consumer electricity prices because companies must pay
under auctioned permits for the remaining emissions. Thus, auctioned permits
help to bring marginal social costs closer to electricity generation prices. In
contrast, for performance standards, the regulated utilities cannot pass on the
cost of emissions abatement to the consumer, since the utilities do not pay for
emissions allowances. Consumers are better off in terms of electricity
consumption under performance standards because performance standards yield
the lowest electricity price.
Fischer and Newell (2008) evaluated reductions of CO2 through the
implementation of renewable energy technology innovation and diffusion. Using
partial equilibrium analysis, Fischer and Newell (2008) found that pricing
1Working paper version (unpublished) in http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/uncg/f/S_Hol
land_Emissions_2012.pdf
2Other authors found that an intensity standard can dominate the cap and trade instrument
because standards encourage substitution towards less emissions-intensive sources but also subsi-
dize output, and are therefore considered to be inferior to the first best solution of a Pigouvian tax
or a cap and trade system (Annicchiarico and Dio, 2015; Dissou and Karnizova, 2016; Fischer and
Springborn, 2011; Fullerton and Heutel, 2010; Helfand, 1991; Holland, 2012; Holland et al., 2009).
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emissions is the most efficient policy to reduce emissions, with the exception of
when carbon prices are applied to “ very small emission reduction targets”
(Fischer and Newell, 2008, p. 160). Additionally, a combination of regulations,
instead of a unique regulation, can reduce the costs significantly, especially when
‘R&D subsidies are included’ (Fischer and Newell, 2008).
Fullerton and Heutel (2010) used a general equilibrium approach and a
Harberger GE model in a closed economy. In their model, pollution was included
as an input in the production function “that can be a complement or substitute
for labor or capital” (Fullerton and Heutel, 2010, p. 64) . The results of their
simulations show that stricter regulation does not necessarily favor the
utilization of the factor that is a substitute for pollution. Fullerton and Heutel
(2010) described that intensity standards create an “output-subsidy effect”; that
is, there is an implicit subsidy on factor prices that may offset the traditional
output and substitution effects . Capital utilization may increase production of
the dirty good. The authors found that strict regulation does not always allocate
the burden to a better substitute of pollution and may instead represent an
implicit subsidy on the prices of capital and labor “that can reverse the output
and substitution effects” (Fullerton and Heutel, 2010).
Burniaux and Oliveira Martins (2012) analyzed the effectiveness of
unilateral action to regulate carbon emissions under a GE framework, focusing on
estimating the size of carbon leakages in a two-region, two-goods model in the
energy sector. They found that “coal supply elasticity plays a critical role, while
substitution elasticities between traded goods and international capital mobility
appear relatively less influential” (Burniaux and Oliveira Martins, 2012, p.473) .
In their model, the “unilateral carbon abatement action” (adopted by some
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developed countries) was offset by significant carbon leakages to the
non-participants’ regions (Burniaux and Oliveira Martins, 2012). However, their
conclusion should be interpreted with caution. The specification of the
production function and the method used to solve the GE model also plays a large
role in determining the leakage amount (Burniaux and Oliveira Martins, 2012).
Burniaux and Oliveira Martins (2012) claimed that the parametrization of the
model played a critical role in informing their conclusions, and that small
leakages can favor the formation of a worldwide coalition to stabilize climate
change.
Karp (2012) analyzed the general equilibrium effects of unilateral
environmental regulations, and established that “the general equilibrium effects
of stricter environmental policy might reinforce or moderate the policy’s partial
equilibrium effects” (Karp, 2012, p.1). He concluded that the effect is ambiguous
in trading patterns and pollution levels, resulting in both positive and negative
leakage (Karp, 2012). However, he also concluded that unilaterally stricter
policies lead to a reallocation of the factors of production, creating an income
and a production effect (Karp, 2012).
Most recent research on the optimal environmental regulatory policy
adopts the macroeconomic perspective. For example, Annicchiarico and Dio
(2015) studied the “dynamic behavior of an economy under different
environmental policy regimes in a New Keynesian model with nominal and real
uncertainty” (Annicchiarico and Dio, 2015, p.1). The authors found that an
emissions cap policy probably reduces macroeconomic fluctuations, and price
adjustment significantly alters the results of the environmental policy
(Annicchiarico and Dio, 2015). Other authors have used a “multi-sector business
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cycle model to analyze the stochastic implications of reducing CO2 emissions
with carbon permits or with carbon taxes in the presence of multiple sources of
macroeconomic uncertainty” 3. Dissou and Karnizova (2016) found that cap
regulation reduces the volatility of real variables more than tax regulation does.
The authors found that welfare is higher when using a tax than when using a cap
and is more sensitive when the shocks are applied to the energy sector (Dissou
and Karnizova, 2016).
Lemoine (2017) examined third-best policies in general equilibrium, and
found that an instrument that “regulates the carbon intensity of transportation
and electricity markets” by maximizing welfare is not optimal (Lemoine, 2017).
The author argues that “the regulator can achieve a higher level of welfare by
manipulating the emission ratings than by manipulating the level of the
standard” (Lemoine, 2017).
II.5. Computable General Equilibrium Analysis and Environmental Regula-
tions
In this section, I present the concept of Computable General Equilibrium
(CGE) models and how they are applied to the analysis of environmental
regulations. CGE models are a class of models that rely on computational
capabilities to solve economic problems. As opposed to purely theoretical
economic GE models and concomitant simulations, CGE models are built to
replicate the economic relationships in an economy; the models are based on
actual economic aggregates combined with other data sources. CGE models rely
on computational optimizers to solve a system of equations or perform
3Using a real business cycle model in 2011, Fischer and Springborn (2011) found that the cap
hinders the effects of productivity shocks in the economy, while some intensity targets are associ-
ated with higher levels of labor, capital, and output.
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constrained optimization. They generally solve problems complex in nature, with
multiple interactions and have no analytical solution.
CGE models have been employed by both national and international
institutions to the assess economic and environmental impacts of policies that
aim to control carbon emissions, among other greenhouse gases (Döll, 2009;
Fullerton and Heutel, 2010). These policies may include introducing taxes to the
emitters. Döll (2009) and Bhattacharyya (1996) present a survey of CGE models
that were used to evaluate the impact of environmental and energy policies in the
United States. CGE models are especially useful for quantifying the effects of a
policy, or for estimating the effect of a percentage increase/decrease on other
economic variables. Furthermore, they are also useful for approximating the
dollar value of an economic aggregate since they are calibrated to real-life
economic aggregates.
Economy-wide models are applied in long-run sustainability analysis. The
fundamentals of economy-wide models are a set of national accounts that capture
“a complete set of inter-industry and inter-regional relationships in the global
economy in a consistent manner” (Peters and Hertel, 2016, p. 11). Economy-wide
models are used to assess the effects of real-life environmental policies.
Dozens of economy-wide models are currently employed to analyze
dynamic economic projections and emissions in the United States, including
ADAGE, AIM, ARIMAX, DART, EC-MSMR, ENGAGE, ENVISAGE, ENV-Linkages,
EPPA, EU-EMS, EXIOMOD, FARM, GAPS-EnVISAGE, GDYN, GEM-E3, GLOBIOM,
GNET, ICES, IGEM, IMACLIM-R, ISSA, JRC-GEM, MAGNET, MESSAGE,
MIRAGE-e, MIRAGRODEP, MONASH, PACE, REMIND, TEA, USAGE, etc. A recent
effort led by economists has attempted to compare the macro assumptions,
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parameters, and trade relationships of these models (Bekkers et al., 2018, p. 11).
Several papers focus on the effects of emissions reduction targets resulting
from international cooperation agreements, such as the United Nations
International Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) where countries compromised on
emissions reductions targets, either a percentage emissions reduction from a
baseline, or a limit to emissions with respect to the country’s GDP.
Increased renewable sources for generating electricity “requires distinct
electricity generating technologies in a CGE database” (Peters, 2016a). In
practice, CGE models are useful for quantifying the effects of energy and
environmental policies. For example, the U.S. EPA applies CGE models to conduct
cost-benefit analysis for all economically significant4 policies. The use of CGE
provides an assessment of the overall effect of the policies and quantifies the
social benefits and costs of environmental regulations with respect to a
benchmark5.
CGE models are capable of simulating relevant policy issues on climate,
such as budgetary concerns and the accumulation of public debt, which is similar
to most traditional models (Nordhaus and Yang, 1996). CGE models are a flexible
tool for the analysis of climate policies, and some models include spatial and
regional analysis to better assess the heterogeneity across regions and variations
in climate (Jahn, 2014). Dynamic CGE models present features such as
endogenous economic growth paths and are applied to real-life economic
analysis. Dynamic CGE models, in combination with the TIMES6 model and the
4Economically significant is defined by the EPA as those regulations with “costs and/or benefits





CGE model, are used to examine subsidies on renewable energy and the taxation
of CO2 by regulators.
One requirement to construct a CGE model is having a database that
represents the main aggregates of the economy. The data from CGE models
should consist of a consistent database contained in the Social Accounting Matrix
(SAM), combined with alternative sources of information to construct a baseline
that represents the steady state in the economy. For the analysis of
environmental policies, economy-wide CGE models focus on the linkages of
emissions to the main economic sectors in a country and the interactions of the
gains and losses of environmental policies among countries. For example,
researchers from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) at Purdue University
have developed a variety of data sets that are used as the primary data for the
analysis of global policies. The GTAP project provides a variety of models and
data7. One of the GTAP’s databases contains “a disaggregation of the electricity
sector into electricity-generating technologies”, which is called the GTAP-Power
Data Base. The GTAP-Power data is an extension of the standard GTAP data
providing an electricity-detailed disaggregation to include transmission and
distribution, nuclear, coal, gas, hydroelectric, wind, oil, solar, and other
technologies. Some of the technologies are further disaggregated by base and
peak load. The disaggregation is based on information about electricity
generation and the levelized cost of electricity (Chepeliev, 2020c).
With the increased use of renewable technologies, electric power
substitution has acquired more relevance in the literature. The substitution of
fuels is modeled as a nested structure in CGE. For example, the production of
7https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/about/data_models.asp
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electricity will be represented as a nest with capital, labor, and energy sources as
inputs. A nest will assume some form for the elasticity of substitution, for
example, Peters (2016a) assumes an “additive constant elasticity of substitution”
arguing that this form “ensures that the sum of demands for generation from
each technology is equal to total demand for electricity generation” (Peters,
2016a, p.156) .
II.6. Conclusions
This literature review presents the relevant concepts related to the
comparison of environmental regulations and the setting in which these
regulations are compared. To compare cap and trade and intensity standards,
several factors should be considered, particularly the fact that regulating
emissions and imposing other environmental regulations will affect labor
markets, capital, and trade. Different regulatory instruments will have different
impacts on overall welfare, economic growth, trade, and labor markets, and the
various linkages and outcomes must be considered when crafting any public
policies designed to reduce CO2 emissions.
This literature review has also shown that the differences between partial
and general equilibrium modeling are significant. For example, in the partial
equilibrium model, the assessment of a policy shock affecting two or more
interconnected markets assumes that the rest of the economy remains fixed (the
ceteris-paribus condition). Thus, partial equilibrium analysis ignores the effects of
a policy on other markets, including markets that constitute intermediate inputs
of the market being analyzed. On the other hand, CGE models aim to simulate
and assess policies with economic consequences that may affect several markets.
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CHAPTER III
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS IN PRACTICE
This chapter discusses a wide range of policy options for regulating
emissions, including cap and trade or carbon taxes, and intensity standards, in
addition to command and control policies. Countries have implemented a
number of different approaches to regulate emissions. In addition to cap and
trade and intensity standards, which are the focus of this dissertation, I also
discuss command and control and market based policies.
Among the policy tools that regulators can apply are command and control
(CAC) policies and market-based policies. Command and control policies imply
that the regulator sets the method and distributes the abatement among emitters.
However, in market-based policies, the regulation is based on incentives, where
the emitters can perform transactions and trade pollution permits.
This chapter contains five sections. First, I present the applications of a
cap and trade scheme. Second, I present a brief discussion and examples of
carbon taxes. Third, I discuss different applications of intensity standards.
Fourth, I discuss command and control policies. Fifth, I present a brief discussion
of international climate agreements.
III.1. Cap and Trade
In this section, I present examples of the application of the concept of cap
and trade to current regulations. Emissions targets are emissions reductions with
respect to a historical baseline. Regulatory policies were adopted in the United
States to regulate emissions using the market through trading. For example, the
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Acid Rain Program established by the Clean Air Act (Title IV) is the most
extensive cap and trade program in the United States. The U.S. EPA manages the
Acid Rain Program using a cap and trade system to reduce emissions from power
generation and coal power plants. The program has the objective of reducing
emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx).
Another example of an emissions trading policy in the United States is the
Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM), which allows an emissions
trading scheme in Southern California (EPA, 2019). The RECLAIM program,
which “was adopted by the South Coast Air Quality Management District
(SCAQMD) in 1993” (EPA, 2019), sets limits on NOx and sulfur oxides (SOx) in the
South Coast Air Basin (EPA, 2019). There were around 258 RECLAIM participants
in 2018 (Fowlie et al., 2012). The U.S. EPA report shows that emissions fell by
approximately 18% under the program (EPA, 2019)1. Fowlie et al. (2012)
compared facilities in locations where the RECLAIM program was implemented
with equivalent facilities in California and estimated a 20% reduction in
emissions in the participating facilities.
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) was implemented in the
United States as a mandatory policy with the objective to reduce emissions from
the electricity sector2 The RGGI program cap was set to 91 million short tons in
2014, and the target reduced by 2.5 percent each year from 2015 to 2020 (RGGI,




2The states participating in RGGI are Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont
3https://www.rggi.org/
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2019 is $258.68 million (see Table III.1)4.
The Western Climate Initiative (WCI) has the objective “to reduce regional
GHG emissions to 15% below 2005 levels by 2020” (Western Climate Initiative,
2019). Among its goals, the WCI has “to spur investment and development of
clean-energy technologies, create green jobs, and protect public health” (Western
Climate Initiative, 2019). The WCI is a regional cap and trade program in the
power sector. The program is composed of three Canadian states, British
Columbia, Quebec, and Nova Scotia, along with California5. The Cross-State Air
Pollution Rule (CSAPR) is an example of a policy in place that limits SO2 and NOx
emissions for around 22 mostly Eastern states. States can exceed their budget by
trading with other states subject to variability limits (EPA, 2020b). In the United
States, local regulations are applied and are reviewed on a regular basis. The rule
is aimed to limit power plant emissions that cause leakage of pollution across
states (EPA, 2020b)6.
Internationally, the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading System (ETS)
applies cap and trade policies (European Commission, 2020). A limit on the total
amount of emissions that can be emitted is set and reduced over time so that
total emissions fall over time. Companies trade emissions allowances. After each
year, companies are required to have allowances of at least the amount used in
the year; otherwise, they pay a fine (European Commission, 2020). If a company
has a surplus of allowances, the company can keep them for future needs or sell
4The associated government revenue for the RGGI programwas $239.36million from January to
November 2019. The year when RGGI reached the maximum associated government revenue was





them to another company. The EU ETS operates in all EU countries, along with
Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway. The target includes “emissions from more
than 11,000 heavy emitters energy-using installations” (European Comission,
2015), such as power plants, industrial plants, and airlines, and it is estimated to
cover “around 45% of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions” (European Comission,
2015)7. A recent study of the EU ETS has found “no evidence of carbon leakage in
European manufacturing” (European Commission, 2020).
The overall value of the global carbon markets closed at around $214.5
billion by the end of 2019 (Global and Platts, 2020)8. The EU ETS is currently “the
world’s biggest emissions trading market, accounting for over three-quarters of
international carbon trading” (European Commission, 2020)9. The average
carbon price in the EU ETS increased to 25 Euros per metric ton in 2019 from 16
Euros per metric ton in 2018, as a result of the tightened supply of allowances
(World Bank, 2020).
Carbon markets are expected to grow in 2020 with the start of China’s
national ETS, which will initially cover the electricity sector (International
Carbon Action Partnership, 2020)10. China has implemented eight regional pilot
emissions trading systems since 2013, reaching an approximate value of $0.56
billion as of November 2019 (World Bank, 2020). This is expected to cover 4.4
billion metric tons of CO2 equivalent.








pricing initiatives covered 11 gigatons of CO2 equivalent globally in 2019,
representing 20.1% of the global GHG emissions for the same year. ETS initiatives
on their own have covered eight gigatons of CO2 equivalent emissions, which is
15.0% of global GHG emissions.
Table III.1 shows the emissions trading policies that are currently
implemented around the globe and that have been formally adopted through
legislation. If realized this year, China would take the lead in terms of GHG
emissions covered. The Chinese market is expected to cover around 6% of global
CO2 emissions, which represents more than three thousand million metric tons
of CO2 equivalent. North America’s ETS markets are relatively smaller compared
to Europe or China if realized. California cap and trade (C&T)11 covers the largest
amount of emissions. In terms of GHG emissions covered, the California C&T
program is about three times larger than the entire RGGI initiative. In terms of
value, California C&T traded around $5 billion in 2019, while the entire RGGI
only traded $0.26 billion. California C&T is a comprehensive initiative that
encompasses “electricity generators (within California), electricity importers,
industrial facility operators and fuel distributors” (RGGI, 2020). In the case of
Australia, the ETS mechanisms is not similar to a cap and trade system, but to a



























East Asia & Pacific
China national ETS 2020 3,231.90 5.94% – China national ETS 440.8
Guangdong pilot ETS 2013 366.30 0.67% 1.23 China national ETS 128.2
Fujian pilot ETS 2016 200.00 0.37% 0.30 China national ETS 70.0
Shanghai pilot ETS 2013 169.69 0.31% 0.71 China national ETS 59.4
Hubei pilot ETS 2014 162.09 0.30% 1.06 China national ETS 56.7
Tianjin pilot ETS 2013 118.25 0.22% 0.33 China national ETS 41.4
Chongqing pilot ETS 2014 97.24 0.18% 0.06 China national ETS 34.0
Beijing pilot ETS 2013 84.65 0.16% 0.56 China national ETS 29.6
Shenzhen pilot ETS 2013 61.20 0.11% 0.02 China national ETS 21.4
Tokyo C&T 2010 13.92 0.03% 0.01 Japan carbon tax 13.9
Saitama ETS 2011 7.91 0.01% 0.01 Japan carbon tax 7.9
Korea ETS 2015 468.29 0.86% 12.30 Korea ETS
Australia ERF 2016 380.84 0.70% – Australia
New Zealand ETS 2008 39.85 0.07% 0.49 New Zealand
Europe and Central Asia






Kazakhstan ETS 2013 183.25 0.34% – Kazakhstan
Switzerland ETS 2008 5.95 0.01% 0.03 Switzerland
North America
California C&T 2012 377.69 0.69% 5.46 California
Alberta CCIR 2007 124.80 0.23% 0.34 Alberta
RGGI 2009 103.14 0.19% 0.26 Massachusetts ETS 10.2
Canada federal OBPS 2019 82.09 0.15% – Canada
Quebec C&T 2013 68.85 0.13% 0.90 Quebec
Washington CAR 2017 57.81 0.11% – Washington
Virginia ETS* 2020 36.93 0.07% – Virginia
Nova Scotia C&T 2019 15.20 0.03% – Nova Scotia
Massachusetts ETS 2018 14.27 0.03% – RGGI 14.3
Saskatchewan OBPS 2019 8.64 0.02% – Saskatchewan
Newfoundland and
Labrador PSS
2019 4.26 0.01% – Newfoundland
and Labrador
Source: Own elaboration based on the information of the Carbon Pricing Dashboard published by theWorld Bank, 2019
Abbreviations
GHG: Grenhouse gases, MtCO2Eq: Metric Tons of Carbon Dioxide Equivalent. C&T: Cap and Trade, CCIR: The Car-
bon Competitiveness Incentive Regulation, RGGI: The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, OBPS: OutputBased Pricing
System, CAR: Clean Air Rule, PSS: Price Support Scheme.
III.2. Carbon Taxes
In this section, I discuss the implementation of carbon taxes and how the
concept is related to carbon price. In practice, emissions taxes are implemented
to tax carbon directly by establishing an explicit carbon price. Carbon taxes are
currently operating in different countries and economic sectors. Under carbon
24
taxes, companies are charged a monetary value for the amount of emissions they
produce. Companies have to pay the tax and cannot trade with other entities to
increase or reduce their allowances. Both emissions taxes and the cap can
replicate the first best when they are set to fully capture the marginal social
damage of emissions, and if this is the case, regulating with a cap is equivalent to
imposing a carbon tax and vice-versa12.
Table III.2 shows the regions where carbon taxes are currently in place, the
amount of GHG emissions covered, and the monetary value. As compared with
ETS, carbon tax initiatives cover smaller amounts of GHG emissions and are
smaller in terms of monetary value. Japan is the leader in terms of carbon
taxation, covering around a thousand metric tons of CO2 with an equivalent
monetary value of more that $2 billion. The carbon pricing initiatives are
categorized into either ETSs or carbon taxes according to how they operate
technically (WB, 2020). The initiatives do not follow the two categories strictly in
terms of design or sector coverage (WB, 2020); the principal objective of the table
is to provide a sense of the quantity of emissions and trade covered by the current
initiatives.
12The main difference between the two is that with a carbon tax, the carbon price is determined
exogenously (i.e., by the government). However, with emissions trading the carbon price is deter-
mined endogenously (i.e., by the market).
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Table III.2. Carbon pricing initiatives: January to November 2019





















East Asia & Pacific
Japan carbon tax 2012 999.43 1.84% 2.36 Tokyo C&T,
Saitama ETS
22.71
Singapore carbon tax 2019 42.02 0.08% 0.15
Europe and Central Asia
Ukraine carbon tax 2011 287.01 0.53% 0.10
France carbon tax 2014 175.63 0.32% 8.14 EU ETS
UK carbon price floor 2013 136.45 0.25% 0.98 EU ETS 136.45
Norway carbon tax 1991 39.56 0.07% 1.71 EU ETS 11.78
Ireland carbon tax 2010 30.79 0.06% 0.49 EU ETS 12.32
Sweden carbon tax 1991 26.14 0.05% 2.49 EU ETS –
Finland carbon tax 1990 25.09 0.05% 1.46 EU ETS 9.28
Denmark carbon tax 1992 21.59 0.04% 0.55 EU ETS –
Portugal carbon tax 2015 20.80 0.04% 0.29
Switzerland carbon tax 2008 17.98 0.03% 1.20
Poland carbon tax 1990 15.54 0.03% 0.00
Spain carbon tax 2014 9.02 0.02% 0.10
Slovenia carbon tax 1996 4.96 0.01% 0.08 –
Latvia carbon tax 2004 2.06 0.00% 0.01 EU ETS –
Iceland carbon tax 2010 1.59 0.00% 0.05 EU ETS –
Estonia carbon tax 2000 0.76 0.00% 0.00 EU ETS –
Liechtenstein carbon
tax
2008 0.06 0.00% 0.00
Latin America
Mexico carbon tax 2014 307.33 0.56% 0.32
Argentina carbon tax 2018 79.25 0.15% 0.18
Chile carbon tax 2017 46.67 0.09% 0.17




2019 0.92 0.00% 0.01
Newfoundland and
Labrador
2019 4.51 0.01% 0.05
British Columbia
carbon tax
2008 42.70 0.08% 1.24 –
Canada federal fuel
charge
2019 179.73 0.33% 1.99
Sub-Saharan Africa
South Africa carbon tax 2019 412.87 0.76% 0.17
Source: Own elaboration based on the information of the Carbon Pricing Dashboard published by the World Bank , 2019
Abbreviations
GHG: Grenhouse gases, MtCO2Eq: Metric Tons of Carbon Dioxide Equivalent. C&T: Cap and Trade, ETS: Emissions
Trading System.
III.3. Intensity Standards
In this section, I discuss a wide variety of intensity standards that are
applied locally to different sectors and regions. Emissions intensity targets are
policies that specify emissions reductions relative to output (i.e., tons of CO2 per
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million dollars of GDP ). Emissions reductions targets, on the other hand, specify
reductions measured in metric tons, relative to a baseline (WRI, 2006).
Examples of emissions standards are the Low Carbon Fuel Standard
(LCFS), the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) and the Renewable Fuel Standard
(RFS), which are implemented by amendments of the Clean Air Act (CAA).
California established the LCFS program with the goal of reducing
emissions by 20% in the average carbon intensity of fuel by 2030. The LCFS
program started in 2011 and determines an average carbon content for fuels and
sets annual reductions. To comply, “companies need to either change the balance
of fuels they sell or buy credits to offset emissions” (Board, 2020, p.1) .
A study of the LCFS program shows that “the standard implicitly subsidizes
all fuel sources” (relative to the first best solution), while it decreases the carbon
intensity of transportation fuels, and as a result the overall consumption of
energy may increase (Holland et al., 2009). With the help of a numerical exercise,
Fell et al. (2017) analytically show and that intensity standards can replicate the
first best when incorporating energy efficiency in rate-based emissions intensity
standards. Their claim is based on a perfectly inelastic energy demand.
Under the RPS, companies have to generate a portion of their electricity
using renewable electricity sources (EIA, 2020a). By December 2018, 29 states
and the District of Columbia have implemented RPS. The states of California,
Hawaii, Maine, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Washington, and the District of
Columbia set a target of 100% of electricity from clean sources by 2050 (EIA,
2020a). Each state decides on the standards differently under the RPS. Most
differences across states are in the characterization of renewable electricity,
“perhaps due to the ambiguity of the externality associated” with the standard
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(Holland, 2012). Figure III.1 shows the states in which RPS policies are applied,
the percentage, and the year of the target for each state.
Figure III.1. Renewable Portfolio Standards
Source: Extracted from North Carolina Clean Energy and Technology Center -DSIRE
https://www.dsireusa.org/resources/detailed-summary-maps/
The RFS program sets the minimum levels of renewable energy in motor
fuel so that companies have to produce a percentage of renewable energy in their
composition, thereby allowing trading of the emissions among companies. The
RFS program is a national policy implemented in 2005 and reformulated in 2007
under the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) (EPA, 2020c).
Another intensity standard in the United States is the Corporate Average
Fuel Economy Standard (CAFE), which is set to reduce the per-unit fuel
consumption of vehicles. Administered by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, among other targets, CAFE standards set the penetration of
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clean technologies in gasoline engines, and the current absolute standard is set
to 54% for 2025 (of Transportation, 2016).
In June 2019, the EPA repealed the Clean Power Plan initiative and issued
the final Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) rule13. The ACE rule establishes
emissions guidelines for states to implement plans to improve the heat rates of
their coal-fired power plants with the aim of reducing CO2 emissions.
Prior to the ACE rule under the Clean Power Plan rule, the regulator set
goals for CO2 emissions rate reductions by 2030. States were to choose the
regulatory mechanism that they would use to reduce emissions, and participation
was voluntary. With the help of a numerical exercise, Bushnell et al. (2017) show
the conditions under which companies may adopt standards or an emissions
limit, and claim that choosing standards may be an optimal strategy for both
consumers and electricity generators, especially when “uncoordinated policies
that lower welfare and increase emissions relative to coordination” exist
(Bushnell et al., 2017, p.57).
A clean energy standard (CES) is a policy that would require certain
percentage of utility sales associated to clean energy sources to generate
electricity, such as renewables and nuclear. Other sources, such as coal or natural
gas, are considered part of the standard when using carbon capture technologies.
A percentage of the electricity generated by the utility would receive credits that
can be traded. Currently, CESs are included in the draft of the Climate Leadership
and Environmental Action for our Nation’s (CLEANs) Future Act, a piece of




States by 2050 at the “lowest cost to electric energy consumers” (Energy and
Commerce, 2020). In the bill, “carbon intensity” refers to the “carbon dioxide
equivalent emissions associated with the generation of 1 megawatt hour of
electric energy” for electric companies (Energy and Commerce, 2020). The bill
includes the determination of clean energy credits that represent the total
quantity of electric energy, in megawatt-hours, consumed during the year, “that
is provided by the retail electricity supplier or by a behind-the-meter generation
system” (Energy and Commerce, 2020).
III.4. Command and Control
This section presents a brief discussion of command and control (CAC)
regulations. Among the policy tools that regulators can apply are CAC policies
and market-based policies. CAC policies imply that the regulator sets the method
and distributes the abatement among emitters. In contrast to market-oriented
policies, CAC regulation is not based on incentives, and emitters cannot perform
transactions or trade pollution permits.
CAC regulations are applied in two forms: 1) performance standards
and/or technology standards, and/or 2) technology restrictions (e.g., installation
of scrubbers on electric power plants or catalytic converters in automobiles).
Much of the literature argues that incentives are more cost-effective than CAC
restrictions, since market-based regulations equate the marginal abatement cost
across firms (Fullerton, 2001; Tietenberg, 2006).
In 1990, the Clean Air Act (CAA) was amended from the 1955 original
version, including the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and the
Acid Rain Program. Air quality regulations are mainly targeting the electricity
and transportation sectors. The U.S. transportation sector is the primary source
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of ozone emissions. The U.S. electricity sector is the primary source of NOx and
SO2 emissions. The EPA definition of criteria pollutants includes the following
pollutants: particulate matter, photochemical oxidants and ground-level ozone,
carbon monoxide, sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, and lead (EPA, 2020a). These
are all regulated under the CAA through NAAQS, which regulates emissions of
pollutants that harm human health and cause damage to animals, crops, and
vegetation (EPA, 2020a). The NAAQS are set as a limit of pollutants, such as parts
per million/billion of in relation to volume, and micrograms per cubic meter of
air. Geographical areas are tested in terms of air quality, and if an area is “in
compliance with the National Ambient Air Quality Standards”, the area is
classified as an attainment area. Areas that are not in compliance are classified as
nonattainment areas (EPA, 2020a).
III.5. International Climate Policies
This section presents a discussion of how the lack of agreement in favor of
global and more coordinated policies can have consequences for the efficiency of
the policies. Policymakers across the globe have become increasingly aware of
the need to control the adverse effects of climate externalities. In the past, there
were two important attempts to implement coordinated global policies to reduce
carbon emissions: the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 followed by the Paris Agreement of
2015. The current lack of consensus could be because these previous policies
could not deliver the desired results in terms of emissions reduction, and because
of the lack of agreement among participants; local policies were significantly
spread out, as documented in the previous section. This lack of coordination
came at significant cost, and in some cases it will require countries to rethink the
effectiveness of their preferred regulations.
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The requirement to lower CO2 emissions to reduce global warming has
gradually been accepted as a global policy goal. The International Panel for
Climate Change (IPCC) effort to reach a global agreement started in Rio de
Janeiro as part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) in 1993, and 25 United Nations Climate Change Conferences (UNCCC)
have been held all over the world since. The Conference of Parties (COP) is the
institution that represents all parties at the Convention. Countries are called
Parties to the Convention and are represented at the COP. The purpose of the
COP is to agree on the policies to reduce carbon emissions.
The Kyoto Protocol aimed to reduce emissions in developed countries. The
fundamental principle of the protocol was the “common but differentiated
responsibility and respective capabilities” of countries. The principle recognized
the fact that developed countries produced higher levels of emissions in the
atmosphere as compared to developing countries. The initial target was set to
achieve a 5% emissions reduction by 2012, as compared to 1990 levels. Thirty-six
industrialized countries committed to this target.
The Paris Climate Agreement of 2015 mainly focuses on limiting global
warming to below 3.6◦F by 2100, which is expected to be achieved if states set
their targets for lowering CO2 emissions. Several countries have signed this
agreement in documents called National Determined Contributions (NDCs)14.
The NDCs are a variety of policies determined by countries to reduce emissions,
mostly from electricity generation, industry, and transportation sectors. Some of
the NDCs take the form of a cap on emissions, and others are intensity standards.
Most of the countries have a combination of policies and targets. For example, in
14https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx
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their first pledge, China’s NDCs included the pledge to install 200 gigawatts of
wind power and 100 gigawatts of solar power by 2020 (of Climate Change and
of China, 2015)15. This includes a percentage of renewable energy sources in the
country’s generation mix. India, for instance, “pledged to reduce the emissions
intensity of its GDP by 33 to 35 percent by 2030 from 2005 level”, combined with
measures to achieve energy efficiency (of Environment and of India, 2016)16,
which, in other words, means that the country will specify emissions reductions
relative to productivity or economic output (measured in tons of CO2 per million
dollars of GDP).
Lack of coordination of environmental regulations have significant costs.
Some regions are implementing their own schemes to reduce carbon emissions.
Research documents how unilateral policies were implemented in the absence of
coordinated action, and what the consequences of this uncoordinated action have
been. For example, Bushnell et al. (2017) compared different regulatory policies
in the electricity sector as a result of the application of the Clean Power Plan.
They find that, in some cases, they found that trade and environmental
regulations interacted in such a way that they undermined the efficiency of the
policies Bushnell et al. (2017). For instance, when a cap and trade regulation is
combined with rate standards for generation, the ranking of preferred generating
technologies deviates from the efficient choice. Their findings show that
consumers and producers may have different preferences over the regulation






reduction targets, the lack of coordination leads to large inefficiencies (Bushnell
et al., 2017). Thus, in practice the theoretical prescriptions about the optimality
and efficiency of environmental regulations is constantly challenged by the
complexity of implementing such policies.
III.6. Conclusion
Based on the review of environmental regulations applied in practice,
there is no consensus on which policy or policies might be optimal. In theory, a
cap and trade program is optimal when the cap is set correctly; however, the
coordination and information required to set the target correctly makes it very
difficult to implement an appropriate cap. The dynamics of the economy may
also require frequent revisions of the targets to ensure that they are binding. For
this dissertation, it is important to consider real-life cases where there are no
harmonized regulatory policies, and also explore leakage, in both unilateral and
harmonized cases. A cap and trade mechanism may not be an optimal policy from
the review of the instruments in place. Under the current circumstances of
leakage and unilateral regulation, a suboptimal policy, namely intensity
standards, is believed to dominate the cap and trade mechanism.
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CHAPTER IV
A THEORETICAL MODEL OF EMISSIONS TRADING
AND INTENSITY STANDARDS
This chapter aims to present the main model of the dissertation. First, I
describe the model set-up, the business as usual and first best scenarios, and
define functions and parameters. Second, I formalize the Business as Usual and
First Best equilibria. Third, I present the implementation of policies to reduce
carbon emissions, namely cap and trade and intensity standards. Finally, I
present the conclusions.
The theoretical model aims to explore the cases in which second-best
policies could dominate the cap and trade mechanism in terms of maximizing
overall welfare. I use a simple static general equilibrium model for an open
economy to compare intensity standard regulations (the limit of emissions per
unit of output) with the cap and trade mechanism.
In this model, there are two countries producing two different final goods:
a relatively cleaner good and a relatively dirtier good. The clean and dirty goods
are substitutes in consumption, and a representative consumer in each country
with identical preferences consumes both goods. To measure overall welfare, I
use a representation of aggregated utility as the summation of the utility for each
individual country.
Both countries produce the final homogeneous goods under perfect
competition with identical production technologies, and both goods use capital
and labor as production factors. The dirty good involves producing carbon
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emissions, which can be thought of as an intermediate good, an input, or an
output.
In this chapter, I assume the two countries have identical input
endowments and trade both Good 1 and Good 2. The environmental damage
associated with a given trade policy is well defined. Other approaches can be
followed as in Bohringer and Rutherford (2008) who impose an endogenous
utility transfer between countries to eliminate rent-seeking strategic behavior, so
that one country cannot use environmental regulations to extract rents from the
other country.
The environmental externality is analyzed by allowing countries to either
regulate or not regulate the production of the dirty good. The purpose of this is to
allow countries to differ only in their effort to reduce carbon emissions while
producing both clean and dirty goods. To isolate the effect of the environmental
regulation in the analysis requires exploring the circumstances under which
countries can achieve maximum welfare while regulating and trading the dirty
good. I analyze two regulation possibilities to cut emissions on the production of
the dirty good: cap and trade and intensity standards. To simplify the analysis, I
assume the same damage function for both countries; however, the construction
of the model allows for testing different combinations of our assumptions.
Allowing the countries to differ in initial endowments, behavioral parameters, or
combinations of regulations is straightforward.
IV.1. Business as Usual and First Best
The theoretical model consists of two countries indexed by c ∈ {A,B},
namely Country A and Country B. Decisions are made by individuals, consumers,
firms, or industries acting in their own self-interest. Consumers maximize utility,
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and firms maximize profits. There are two production sectors indexed by
i ∈ {1, 2}. Each country produces two goods, denoted by qic; the clean good is
Good 1 and the dirty good is Good 2, and the two goods are substitutes in
consumption. Consumption goods in each country are denoted by qDic . Good 1 and
Good 2 are both tradable. Let P1 and P2, be the market prices of Good 1 and Good 2
respectively.
Let Uc(qD1c, qD2c) be the utility function of the representative agent that
consumes both goods in each country. Uc is a globally concave continuously
differentiable function on an open, convex subset in R2. The marginal utilities
are diminishing in Good 1 and Good 2, that is, the utility of consuming one
additional unit declines.






ic ), taking as given all market prices P1 and P2. Where Ic is
income, and Pi is the price of good i. In the model, consumers owns the firms and
receive rents of endowments, capital and labor. An alternative formulation of the
model with the explicit solution for the consumer and producer problems is
presented in the Appendix A yielding identical results for the cases presented in
this chapter1. The first-order condition (FOC) equalizes the marginal rate of






. The solution guarantees that the
critical points, q∗D1c and q∗D2c , represent the optimal solution to the consumer
problem2.
Countries are endowed with two production factors, capital and labor. The





Kic, whereKic is the capital
1See Appendix A for the analogous formulation of the consumer and producer problem
2See Theorem 21.6 and Theorem 21.7 of Simon and Blume (1994, p. 517)
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used by sector i in country c. Capital is mobile across countries and as per the law
of one price, the rent of capital is the same for both countries. Let r be the rent of
capital for the economy. Let L̄c be the endowment of labor for country c. Labor is
a country specific production factor but is mobile between sectors. The resource
constraint for labor is L̄c =
∑
i
Lic, where Lic is the labor used by sector i in
country c. Wages are specific for each country because of the immobility of labor
across countries. Let wc be the price of labor in country c. The input prices, wc and
r, clear the factor markets.
The production function of good i is defined as a function of capital and
labor, qic = qic(Kic,Lic). The representative firm in sector i in country cmaximizes
profits, Piqic − wcLic − rKic, taking all prices as given. The marginal product of
capital is given by the partial derivative of the profit function with respect to
capital. The marginal product of labor is given by the partial derivative of the
profit function with respect to labor.
The production of Good 2 implies producing emissions, but the firms do
not consider emissions as a production factor that they have to pay for. In this
model, emissions are produced using production factors while producing Good 2.
Both countries produce emissions exclusively when producing Good 2. Let
e2c = e2c(K2c,L2c) represent the production function of emissions, defined as a
function of the capital and labor in sector 2. Thus, for different combinations of
capital and labor it would be possible to get the same level of emissions. The total
emissions in the economy is equal to
∑
c
e2c and represents the amount of
emissions produced by both countries when producing Good 2. D represents the





e2c(K2c,L2c). D is assumed to be positive and the same for both
countries.
Trade is determined by market equilibrium conditions, and because goods
are tradable, trade will adjust to equalize the prices between countries. Let(
qic − qDic
)
be the exports of good i in country c. If this is positive, it implies that
country c is an exporter of Good i, and if it is negative, the country is an importer
of Good i. Under these conditions, the balance of trade will determine the prices
of goods. A market equilibrium condition states that the exports of good i in





qic(Kic, Lic). The market clearing condition, which equalizes supply to
demand for each good across countries, implies that all production is consumed.
This Chapter’s model has the objective to present a simplified version of
the typical formulation of a general equilibrium model. The typical general
equilibrium model would present the zero profit, market clearance, and income
balance conditions. The zero-profit and market clearance are reflected in the
capital, labor, and trade constraints in my model. The income balance condition
establishes the factors from which households earn income. In this model, the
households are the firms’ owners and receive rents from capital and labor. This
simplification aims to understand the workings of the policy in the simplest
general equilibrium framework.
Equation (1) defines the overall welfare function for the global economy.
W is the summation of the utilities of the representative agent for each country















In equation (1), D represents the marginal damage per unit of emissions,
and the overall cost of pollution for the society isD ·
∑
c
e2c(K2c,L2c). D is assumed
to be positive and the same for both countries3.
Business as Usual
The business as usual scenario ignores regulations on emissions, and
ignores the global damages caused by emissions to the environment. The



























qic (Kic, Lic) for each good i.







qic(Kic, Lic) represents the trade constraint, and
the supply and demand of Good 1 and Good 2 are equalized across countries,
allowing countries to import the good with excess demand and to export the good
with excess supply.
When solving the welfare maximization problem, maximization of
equation (2) subject to the constraints yields the same results as solving the
3The overall welfare function ranks utility for the society. Equation (1) is an Arrow social welfare
function, which aggregates across individual utilities and ranks overall welfare.
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system of equations consisting of the FOCs for the consumer and producer
problems described above. The multipliers (λ) represent the shadow values
associated with a particular constraint in the welfare maximization problem.
These shadow prices tell us what the optimal value of the objective function is in
relation to a specific constraint and are likely to increase as a per unit increase in
the resources of available capital and labor. λK is the multiplier associated with
the capital constraint, and is equivalent to the rent of capital. λLc is the
multiplier associated with the labor constraint, and is equivalent to wages in
country c. λqi is the multiplier associated to the trade constraint, and is
equivalent to the prices of Good 1 and Good 2.
The solution of equation (2) is given by the FOCs of the maximization
problem. Taking the derivatives of (2) and setting equal to zero with respect to
qDic ,Kic, Lic yields the following FOCs:
The marginal utility is equal to the shadow price for both goods.
∂Uc
∂qDic
= λqi ∀i, c (3)
The marginal products of capital and labor are equal to the relative shadow
























Combining equations (4) and (5), I get the Marginal Rate of







Lemma 1 The BAU equilibrium is characterized by the optimization in equation (2).
Proof - Lemma 1 (See Appendix A)
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Social Optimum - "First Best"
A first best regulatory policy can improve overall welfare; however, the
optimum conditions are not always satisfied in an economic model. For instance,
there may be cases were a standard competitive equilibrium model is not
guaranteed because one of the conditions for achieving such an equilibrium is
infeasible. For example, output prices might not be equal to the marginal cost of
the firms, or the ratio of prices between two goods may not be equal to each
consumer’s marginal rate of substitution between goods, or markets do not clear.
Thus, when the optimum is not satisfied for whatever reason, even lack of
coordination between agents or the presence of environmental externalities, all
other equilibrium conditions will change such that the equilibrium is altered.
This ability to account for all potential changes is an advantage of analyzing
policies in a general equilibrium setting.
The social optimum is defined by the solution to the program
max












D · (e2c (K2c, L2c)) ∀c (8)
















qic(Kic, Lic) for each good i. Note that equation (8) is
different than equation (2) because emissions damages are subtracted from
overall welfare.
The FOCs for qDic are shown in equation (6) for both goods and are also
valid here. Equation (7) for qic is valid for Good 1, but for Good 2, the FOCs of the
first best program will change with respect to the BAU case. Equations (4) and (5)
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When combining the previous FOCs, equation (6) and equation (7) remain
unaltered for Good 1. Equation (6) will remain for Good 2, but the Marginal Rate
of Transformation of labor and capital for Good 2, equation (7), will change to:
∂q2c (K2c, L2c) /∂K2c
∂q2c (K2c, L2c) /∂L2c
=
λK + D (∂e2c (K2c, L2c) /∂K2c)
λLc + D (∂e2c (K2c, L2c) /∂L2c)
∀c. (11)
Proposition 1 The business as usual scenario is not the first best.
Proof - The overall welfare of the BAU case is smaller than the overall welfare of
the first best case. Production, consumption, factor utilization, and emissions are
also different. The program described in equation (2) ignores the environmental
damages represented in equation (8). See Table V.3 columns 2 and 3.
IV.2. Cap and Trade and Intensity Standards
In this section, I present harmonized and unilateral regulations. In the
harmonized cases, both countries regulate emissions by applying a coordinated
regulatory policy. In the unilateral case, both countries have different regulations
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of emissions; Country A regulates the quantity of emissions e2A, but Country B
does not regulate its quantity of emissions, e2B. The cases in which
environmental regulations will improve overall welfare are determined by the
maximization of a combined welfare function while changing the policy variables
(i.e., the sum of the welfare of Country A and Country B), subject to the factor
constraints and an emissions policy constraint.
The policies to consider are a standard cap and trade mechanism and
emissions intensity standards. A cap and trade mechanism is usually a preferred
policy instrument to regulate environmental externalities, because the correct
implementation of the cap can create a market for emissions and impose the
correct price on a missing market. An intensity standard is a regulation which
limits the amount of emissions per unit of output. Emissions intensity standards
are a second-best policy because while they tax emissions, they also introduce an
output subsidy. However, when there is market failure and leakage of emissions,
intensity standard regulations could dominate the cap and trade mechanism
because the output effects from cap and trade may be offset by leakage. With
leakage, the production of the dirty good may increase total emissions (Fischer
and Newell, 2008; Fullerton and Heutel, 2010; Holland, 2012).
A cap and trade mechanism is a regulation which limits the total amount
of emissions. This is usually preferred as an environmental regulatory policy. It is
important to note that a harmonized C&T regulation is capable of emulating the
first best only for a single value of the cap. The social optimum in this model
refers to the scenario where an international agreement is set by the countries,
and the regulator chooses the cap in each country such that the net social
benefits are maximized. A key aspect of the policy simulations in this exercise is
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that they are all optimized. Even though all values are optimized in terms of
maximizing overall welfare, only one policy choice, the optimal one, achieves the
first best. Even for the simple model proposed in this exercise, the coordination
that a cap and trade mechanism requires to emulate the first best is substantial.
Harmonized Cap and Trade Equilibrium
Through an intervention, a second-best equilibrium can be attained4, but
the economy cannot be restored to its first best welfare status if the regulation is
incomplete, that is, achieving a first best equilibrium requires the complete
removal of the conditions under which a first best equilibrium is not feasible.
For example, in trade policy, the main criticism of second-best policies is
that the policy choice is not set to achieve the first best economic optimum but
the second-best optimum. This is because first best policies are set at the
domestic level and are therefore not global policies. This applies to the case of
environmental policies too. Local policies are easier to implement because they
require less information and less coordination effort. Even when the conditions
are pro-environment, global policies are much more difficult to implement as
there is lack of coordination, and dynamics of the industry make it difficult or
impossible for countries and industries to synchronize regulatory policies.
In this exercise, to show that a second-best policy can attain the first best
outcome, I impose a cap on emissions for the production of the dirty good in both
countries. This is the harmonized case when regulation is imposed identically in
both countries. Companies could trade emissions at the price of permission
permits. Thus, the harmonized C&T equilibria are defined as

























qic(Kic, Lic), and iii) the policy constraint,
e2A(K2A,L2A) + e2B(K2B,L2B) ≤ ē. Thus, the total quantity of emissions that
Country A and Country B can produce is restricted to ē. λe is the multiplier
associated to the constraint of emissions, and λe is equivalent to the global price
of emissions. Note that the program in equation (12) is different to the program
in equation (8) because of the emissions constraint.
The solution to the harmonized C&T scenario is obtain by solving the
























Similar to the previous case, equations (6) and (7) are valid for Good 1.
When combining the previous FOCs, equation (6) remains unaltered for Good 2,
but the Marginal Rate of Transformation of labor and capital for Good 2, equation
(7), will change to:
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∂q2c (K2c, L2c) /∂K2c
∂q2c (K2c, L2c) /∂L2c
=
λK + λe (∂e2c (K2c, L2c) /∂K2c)
λLc + λe (∂e2c (K2c, L2c) /∂L2c)
∀c. (15)
If the cap is set such that λe is equivalent to D, then the FOCs in equation
(15) are equivalent to the FOCs in equation (11).
Lemma 2 The harmonized C&T equilibrium is characterized by the optimization in
equation (12).
Proof - Lemma 2 (See Appendix A)
Unilateral Cap and Trade Equilibrium
The unilateral case in the theoretical model assumes that only Country A
regulates emissions, while Country B does not. A second-best unilateral policy
consists in setting a cap on emissions unilaterally, on the production of the dirty

























qic(Kic, Lic), and iii) the policy constraint, e2A(K2A,L2A) ≤ ē2A. In this
case, the total quantity of emissions that Country A can produce is restricted to
ē2A. λeA is the multiplier associated with the emissions constraint for Country A,
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and λeA is equivalent to an implicit price on emissions for Country A. Note that
the program in equation (16) is different to the program in equation (12) because
of the emissions constraint.
The FOC of the maximization problem for Country B is the same as
equations (6) and (7) for the BAU case. For Country A that regulates emissions,
the main difference is the derivative with respect toK2A and L2A of the























The Marginal Rate of Transformation of labor and capital for Good 2,
equation (7), will change to:
∂q2A (K2A, L2A) /∂K2A
∂q2A (K2A, L2A) /∂L2A
=
λK + λeA (∂e2A (K2A, L2A) /∂K2A)
λLA + λeA (∂e2A (K2A, L2A) /∂L2A)
. (19)
Lemma 3 The unilateral C&T equilibrium is characterized by the optimization in
equation (16).
Proof - Lemma 3 (See Appendix A)
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Cap and Trade and First Best
If all countries regulate emissions and emissions are set to the optimal
level for each country, then the C&T mechanism can be the first best policy.
However, for global policies, the C&T mechanism is not guaranteed to be the first








ēc represents the total amount of emissions, and
if the emissions cap is not set optimally, then the C&T mechanism will not be
first best. In practice, calculating the optimal amount of emissions, ec, per
country can be extremely difficult. There are several factors to consider in the
calculation. It is even more difficult for countries to pledge to reduce the correct
amount of emissions to reach a global target.
The social optimum can be attained if both countries have caps such that







2c), where Country A and
Country B choose capital and labor such that the global damage of emissions is
set to the optimal overall target. The social optimum is described in equations (8)
to (11). The values ofK∗2c and L∗2c are the solutions to the program above. The
optimal cap is set equal to the damage function of emissions evaluated at the






Proposition 2 The harmonized C&T equilibrium can attain the first best outcome.
The unilateral C&T equilibrium cannot attain the first best outcome due to leakage.
Proof - Proposition 2 (See Figure V.1 and analytical proof in Appendix A)
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Harmonized Intensity Standards Equilibrium
In the case of intensity standards, the objective function is the same as
that in the C&T case but has a different constraint on emissions determined by
IS. The harmonized intensity standard (IS) equilibrium is characterized by the


























qic(Kic, Lic), and iii) the policy constraint, e2A+e2Bq2A+q2B ≤ IS. The IS
constraint represents the ratio of total emissions associated with the total
production of Good 2. The smaller the IS, the smaller the emissions produced
from the production of Good 2. Note that the program in equation (20) is
different to the program in equation (16) because of the emissions constraint.
λIS is the multiplier associated with the IS constraint of emissions. The
FOC of the consumer maximization problem for Country A and Country B are the
same as equation (6). The main difference is the inclusion of partial derivatives of

























When combining the previous FOCs, equation (6) remains unaltered, but
the Marginal Rate of Transformation of labor and capital for Good 2 is similar to
equation (15):
∂q2c (K2c, L2c) /∂K2c
∂q2c (K2c, L2c) /∂L2c
=
λK + λIS (∂e2c (K2c, L2c) /∂K2c)
λLc + λIS (∂e2c (K2c, L2c) /∂L2c)
∀c. (23)
The main difference between equation (23) and equation (15) is the
multiplier on the constraint λIS. Only if the shadow price of emissions λIS, is
equal to the shadow price of emissions, λe, will the IS replicate the first best. If
λIS is equal toD, then equation (23) is the same as equation (11). In that case,
equation (21) and equation (22) are not the same as equation (9) and equation
(10) because λIS is not equal than zero. By construction, this case will not be
possible since the constraint on emissions is always different for both cases, even
when assuming symmetry. The C&T case constraint applies to total emissions in
the program of equation (12), whereas the constraint of the IS applies to total
emissions relative to total production of Good 2 in the program for equation (20),
and therefore the shadow prices of emissions are not equal. However they will be
equal when the total output of the BAU case and the total production of Good 2
are equal.
Lemma 4 The harmonized IS equilibrium is characterized by the optimization shown
in (20).
Proof - Lemma 4 (See Appendix A)
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Unilateral Intensity Standards Equilibrium
The unilateral intensity standards (IS) equilibrium is characterized by the


























qic(Kic, Lic), and iii) the policy constraints e2A(K2A, L2A)q2A(K2A,L2A) ≤ IS2A. λISA is
the multiplier associated with the IS constraint of emissions only for Country A.
Recall that Country B does not regulate emissions in the unilateral cases. The
FOC of the consumer maximization problem for Country A and Country B are the
same as equation (6). The program in equation (24) is different to the program in
equations (12), (16), and (20) because of the emissions constraint.
The fundamental difference in the cases above is the constraint on
emissions. In the present case, the shadow price of emissions is determined by
the multiplier λISA. The price of emissions for the unilateral IS case will be
similar to the price of emissions in the harmonized IS case, only if emissions for
the production of Good 2 in Country B are close to zero or negligible in affecting
the price.
The FOCs of the maximization problem for Country A are the same as
equations (2) to (9). The main difference is in the derivatives of the production

























When combining the previous FOCs, equation (6) remains unaltered, but
the Marginal Rate of Transformation of labor and capital for Good 2 is similar to
equation (19).
∂q2A (K2A, L2A) /∂K2A
∂q2A (K2A, L2A) /∂L2A
=
λK + λISA (∂e2A (K2A, L2A) /∂K2A)
λLA + λISA (∂e2A (K2A, L2A) /∂L2A)
(27)
The main difference between equation (27) and equation (19) is the
multiplier on the constraint λISA. Similar to the previous cases, the shadow price
of emissions, λISA, is the fundamental difference between the present case and
the cases presented above.
Lemma 5 The unilateral IS equilibrium is characterized by the optimization shown
in (23).
Proof - Lemma 5 (See Appendix A)
Intensity Standards and First Best
In the real world, second-best policies are implemented through
alternative approaches. For example, federal programs in the United States set
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Renewable Fuel Standards in an attempt to incorporate renewable fuels in the
transportation sector fuel mix through annual volume obligations. Such
obligations constrain the percentage use of fossil fuels in relation to the total
amount of fuel used in the transportation sector.
The second-best unilateral intensity standard policy used here will set the
percentage of emissions per output that can be produced by the dirty good in
Country A. The main difference between the C&T and the IS regulatory
instruments, is that the cap can attain the first best when it is set optimally. The
IS will not attain the first best, but it may be a preferred regulatory instrument
under unilateral regulation mainly because it does better for relatively smaller
percentages of emissions reductions. In Chapter V, I show that an IS regulation
can reduce an equal amount of emissions as a C&T regulation can, and an IS
regulation does better in terms of overall welfare.
Proposition 3 The harmonized IS equilibrium and the unilateral IS equilibrium
cannot attain first best.
Proof - Proposition 3 (See Figure V.1 and the analytical proof in Appendix A)
A solution for the above programs is not generalized. Besides the fact that
the theoretical properties of the utility and production functions should hold, the
program works best for utility functions that meet the condition of additive
separability, so that welfare across countries can be aggregated and maximized.
The optimization of the previous model will rely on the mathematical properties







2c) is globally concave, then an equilibrium allocation
exists for BAU, CAT, and IS. If strictly, then unique.
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Proof - Proposition 4 (See Appendix A)
IV.3. Which Policies are Optimal under Incomplete Regulation and Leakage?
It is not straightforward to understand what policies are the best when
incomplete regulation and leakage exist, since I cannot provide an analytical
solution even with the simplest analytical model. Thus, the use of numerical
optimization is useful in this regard. In the next chapter, with the help of a
numerical exercise, I present the optimal values of the C&T and IS policies, in
both the harmonized and the unilateral cases, to compare maximum welfare
across scenarios (See Table V.7). I explore all cases when overall welfare is
maximized to learn under what circumstances the second-best policies are
optimal and report the maximum welfare.
Proposition 5 Under incomplete regulation and leakage, the IS regulation is
capable of dominating the C&T regulation.
Proof - Proposition 5 (See Table V.7 in Chapter V)
IV.4. Conclusion
In this chapter, I compared two environmental regulations and their
effects in terms of maximizing overall welfare. A policy when both countries
regulate emissions is always preferred in terms of maximizing overall welfare. If
the two countries coordinate on a policy to reduce emissions, the harmonization
of policies can lead to welfare improvements over unilateral policies, regardless
of whether the countries use cap and trade or intensity standards as the
regulatory mechanism. The case of no regulation sees the smallest aggregate
welfare as compared with harmonized policies or complete regulation. It is
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possible to explore the practicability of this conclusion with the help of a
numerical simulation.
More importantly, if the two countries implement a cap and trade
mechanism and choose the cap as being equal to the marginal damage of
emissions, the economy can reach the first best outcome. However, it is not
sufficient that the values are optimized, and it is very important to note that the
cap and trade mechanism has to be set at the ‘right’ level to attain the first best.
The cap and trade mechanism can attain the first best only for a single value of
the policy. The advantage of using a simple model such as the one presented in
this chapter is that it helps to make clear that the implementation of a cap and
trade mechanism will not necessarily achieve the first best and may be a
sub-optimal instrument when the policy is not set to capture the full marginal
damage. Furthermore, it highlights the importance of coordination across
countries and sectors to implement successful policies.
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CHAPTER V
MODEL CALIBRATION AND RESULTS
The objective of this chapter is to present the results of a numerical
exercise that support the model proposed in the previous chapter. First, section
V.1 presents the calibration of the model, the main assumptions about functional
forms for the equations, and the values of the parameters. Then, section V.2
presents the results of the numerical simulations. Section V.3 presents the
comparison across cases, and section V.4 presents the sensitivity analysis.
Finally, I present the conclusions.
V.1. Model Calibration
In the model in Chapter IV, for each endogenous variable in the model,
there is an associated equation that represents an equilibrium condition. The
equations are grouped by demand, production, capital and labor, and trade
equations. Table V.1 presents the functional forms and their corresponding
variables in the system.
The preferred functional form for all cases is the Constant Elasticity of
Substitution (CES) function. The CES function is characterized by additive
separability across goods and production factors, which makes it possible to solve
the system. The CES specification is also general enough to allow for the
calibration of more specific values for the elasticity of substitution, such as for
the Cobb Douglas and Leontief functions.
The parameters for calibration were chosen to guarantee that the system
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Case Specific Regulatory Constraints
Harmonized Cap and Trade e2A(K2A,L2A) + e2B(K2B ,L2B) ≤ ē2
Harmonized Intensity Standard e2A+e2Bq2A+q2B ≤ IS
Unilateral Cap and Trade e2A(K2A,L2A) ≤ ē2A
Unilateral Intensity Standard e2Aq2A ≤ ISA
encounters a feasible solution. Although the model was built to allow for
different parameters across countries and goods, the parametrization was done to
compare the effects of the environmental regulations in two identical countries.
The selection of parameters for the baseline is presented in Table V.2.
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Table V.2. Parameters and Equations of the Model
Parameter Description Value
Utility function
αc Weight of Good 1 0.50
ρc Elasticity of substitution parameter 0.25
Production
γc Technology parameter 0.85
βc Weight of capital in the production of goods 0.30
φc Elasticity of substitution parameter 0.60
Emissions
µ2c Weight of capital in the production of emissions 0.45
δ2c Elasticity of substitution parameter 0.90
D Marginal damage per unit of emissions 0.30
Returns to scale
θc Returns to scale parameter 0.99
L̄c Endowment of labor in country c 50.00
K̄ Total capital in the economy 200.00
V.2. Results of the Numerical Simulations
This section contains the results of the numerical exercise that allow us to
check the hypotheses presented in the previous chapter. These results are
presented in Table V.3 to Table V.6. Each table presents the effects of a specific
regulatory scenario and the effects of the regulation on the main variables are
discussed.
The solution to the model requires solving the optimization problem
described in the previous chapter. The welfare maximization problem is
equivalent to solving a system of numerical equations, which in a typical general
equilibrium formulation.
The results of the numerical simulations are presented in Table V.3
through Table V.7. For this exercise, symmetry between countries is assumed,
that is, Country A and Country B have the same parameters1.
When there is no regulation, both countries A and B produce as much
1It is straightforward to rely on the symmetry assumption.
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emission as they need to maximize their profits and utility. This scenario is
referred to as Business as Usual (BAU). Firms could obtain higher profits from the
utilization of inputs in countries that set no regulations or do not have strict
regulations on emissions. Because emissions are considered a ‘free’ variable with
its associated production function, the resulting value of the BAU case’s
emissions was stored to apply the later cases of regulatory policies.
Harmonized C&T
Table V.3 presents the results of the harmonized C&T scenario. The upper
part of Table V.3 presents the results for Country A and the bottom part presents
the results for Country B. The first column contains a description of the variables,
the second column shows the first best results, and the third column shows the
results of the BAU case. Under BAU and under harmonized regulation, Country A
and Country B are identical and they will have identical outcomes. Outcomes only
differ in the cases of unilateral regulations where the countries are regulated
differently. The remaining columns correspond to the harmonized C&T scenario
for different percentages of global emissions reductions in the production of
Good 2 (See policy parameter ē2 listed in the last row of Table V.3).
Overall welfare is maximized in the first best case and the lowest welfare
corresponds to the BAU scenario. As the cap tightens, overall welfare increases
up to certain level and then starts to decrease (See Figure V.1). In this model and
with the proposed parameters, maximum welfare is obtained with a larger
percentage of global emissions reductions relative to other cases. It is important
to note that the harmonized C&T case is capable of replicating the results of the
first best, but only for one value of the percentage of emissions reductions. As it
is represented in Table V.3, this value corresponds to 75%; the other values of the
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policy parameter will return optimized solutions, but they do not achieve the first
best.
In the harmonized C&T case, the production of the clean good, Good 1
(q1), increases in both countries with the stringency of the cap and trade
mechanism. The production of the dirty good, Good 2 (q2), decreases in both
countries as the cap tightens. This is because Good 1 is a substitute for Good 2,
and so the cap represents an implicit tax on the production of the dirty good.
To produce more of the clean good, both countries use more capital and
less labor. Labor is relatively expensive in relation to capital in the production of
the clean good. The relative factor prices or the wage to rent ratio increases. The
marginal productivity of capital decreases, whereas the marginal productivity of
labor increases. The converse is true for the production of the dirty good. Labor
shifts to the production of the dirty good, Good 2, causing the capital-labor ratio
to become smaller as the cap tightens. Wages are lower in the production of the
dirty good and the marginal productivity of capital increase relative to labor.
Overall, the harmonized C&T regulation has the effect of decreasing
consumption of the good that is regulated. As the cap tightens, the consumption
of Good 2 decreases relative to Good 1, whereas the demand of the clean good,
Good 1, increases in both countries.
The assumption of the model is that only the production of Good 2 is
associated with the production of emissions. Emissions are produced by using
capital and labor in the production of Good 2. Because there is less production of
Good 2, emissions decreases with the stringency of the cap (See Figure V.2).
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Table V.3. Harmonized Cap and Trade: Countries A & B regulate emissions
First
Best BAU
a. Increasingly Stringent Policies
Welfareb. W 43.67 37.86 38.48 39.07 40.17 41.16 42.02 42.74 43.29 43.62 43.67 43.61 42.97 41.93
Total damagesc. 3.14 12.64 12.01 11.38 10.12 8.85 7.59 6.32 5.06 3.79 3.14 2.53 1.26 0.63
Policyd. 1% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 74% 80% 90% 95%
Country A
Utility UA 23.40 25.25 25.25 25.23 25.14 25.00 24.80 24.53 24.17 23.70 23.40 23.07 22.12 21.28
Production q1A 30.11 26.09 26.44 26.78 27.42 28.03 28.59 29.10 29.56 29.94 30.11 30.24 30.35 30.25
Production q2A 19.14 26.09 25.73 25.36 24.59 23.77 22.89 21.95 20.93 19.79 19.14 18.47 16.78 15.48
CapitalK1A 89.53 50.00 52.65 55.30 60.60 65.88 71.15 76.41 81.64 86.84 89.53 92.00 97.04 99.43
CapitalK2A 10.47 50.00 47.35 44.70 39.40 34.12 28.85 23.59 18.36 13.16 10.57 8.00 2.96 0.57
Labor L1A 20.13 25.00 24.70 24.41 23.81 23.20 22.58 21.94 21.26 20.53 20.13 19.72 18.73 18.08
Labor L2A 29.87 25.00 25.30 25.59 26.19 26.80 27.42 28.06 28.74 29.47 29.87 30.28 31.27 31.92
Consumption qD1A 30.11 26.09 26.44 26.78 27.42 28.03 28.59 29.10 29.56 29.94 30.11 30.24 30.35 30.25
Consumption qD2A 19.14 26.09 25.73 25.36 24.59 23.77 22.89 21.95 20.93 19.79 19.14 18.47 16.78 15.48
Emissions e2A 5.23 21.07 20.02 18.97 16.86 14.75 12.64 10.54 8.43 6.32 5.23 4.21 2.11 1.05
Country B
Utility UB 23.40 25.25 25.25 25.23 25.14 25.00 24.80 24.53 24.17 23.71 23.40 23.07 22.12 21.28
Production q1B 30.11 26.09 26.44 26.78 27.42 28.03 28.59 29.10 29.56 29.94 30.11 30.24 30.35 30.25
Production q2B 19.14 26.09 25.73 25.36 24.59 23.77 22.89 21.95 20.93 19.79 19.14 18.47 16.78 15.48
CapitalK1B 89.53 50.00 52.65 55.30 60.60 65.88 71.15 76.41 81.64 86.84 89.53 92.00 97.04 99.43
CapitalK2B 10.47 50.00 47.35 44.70 39.40 34.12 28.85 23.59 18.36 13.16 10.47 8.00 2.96 0.57
Labor L1B 20.13 25.00 24.70 24.41 23.81 23.20 22.58 21.94 21.26 20.53 20.13 19.72 18.73 18.08
Labor L2A 29.87 25.00 25.30 25.59 26.19 26.80 27.42 28.06 28.74 29.47 29.87 30.28 31.27 31.92
Consumption qD1B 30.11 26.09 26.44 26.78 27.42 28.03 28.59 29.10 29.56 29.94 30.11 30.24 30.35 30.25
Consumption qD2B 19.14 26.09 25.73 25.36 24.59 23.77 22.89 21.95 20.93 19.79 19.14 18.48 16.78 15.48
Emissions e2B 5.23 21.07 20.02 18.97 16.86 14.75 12.64 10.54 8.43 6.32 5.23 4.21 2.11 1.05
a. BAU - Business as Usual scenario. The values of the parameters for the calibration of the BAU are in Table V.2.
b.W = UA + UB −D ·
∑
c e2c.
c. The marginal damage of emissions isD = 0.3, which is the same value for both countries.
d. Policy refers to the % of emissions reductions with respect to the BAU scenario of both countries.






Table V.4 presents the case of unilateral C&T regulation. Only Country A
regulates emissions by imposing a cap on the production of the dirty good,
Good 2. The first best is not attained when applying a C&T unilateral regulation.
The results are not symmetric. The production of Good 1 increases in
Country A and decreases in Country B. The country that does not regulate
emissions increases the production of the dirty good, Good 2, and significantly
decreases the production of the clean good, Good 1.
To produce more of the clean good, Country A will use more capital and
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more labor. The utilization of capital and labor in the production of the clean
good will increase in Country A, and the utilization of capital and labor will
increase in the production of the dirty good in Country B.
The unilateral C&T regulation has the effect of decreasing consumption of
the dirty good that is regulated only in the country that regulates it, Country A. As
the cap tightens, consumption of Good 1 increases relative to Good 2 in Country A.
Consumption of Good 1 relative to Good 2 decreases in Country B. The demand for
the clean good increases only in Country A.
Emissions will decrease only in Country A and emissions will increase in
Country B.
Harmonized IS
In the harmonized IS case the regulatory mechanism reduces emissions
through both substitution and output effects. The substitution effect reduces
emissions by employing additional inputs (capital or labor, depending on which is
cheaper). The output effect reduces emissions by reducing the consumption of
the polluting good.
Table V.5 presents the case where both countries reduce emissions by
imposing standards in the production of the dirty good, Good 2. The regulation
targets the ratio of total global emissions of Good 2 as per the total global
production of Good 2. The higher the policy parameter (IS), the smaller the ratio
of emissions generated in the production of Good 2.
Table V.5 has the same format as Table V.3. The results show that overall
welfare increases as the regulation approaches to a ratio of one-third of
emissions reductions per output of Good 2, relative to the BAU case, after which
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Table V.4. Unilateral Cap and Trade: Country A regulates emissions
First
Best BAU
a. Increasingly Stringent Policies
Welfareb. W 43.67 37.86 37.88 37.91 37.94 37.96 37.98 37.97 37.95 37.93 37.87 37.80 37.68 37.61
Total damagesc. 3.14 12.64 12.62 12.60 12.55 12.52 12.50 12.50 12.49 12.49 12.50 12.53 12.58 12.61
Policyd. 1% 10% 20% 30% 38% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95%
Country A
Utility UA 23.40 25.25 25.25 25.25 25.25 25.24 25.23 25.23 25.22 25.21 25.19 25.16 25.13 25.11
Production q1A 30.11 26.09 27.21 28.34 30.63 32.97 34.89 35.37 37.82 40.33 42.91 45.59 48.37 49.78
Production q2A 19.14 26.09 24.88 23.66 21.20 18.69 16.66 16.15 13.55 10.89 8.16 5.33 2.36 0.83
CapitalK1A 89.53 50.00 52.19 54.41 58.87 63.40 67.05 67.97 72.58 77.21 81.84 86.42 90.81 92.76
CapitalK2A 10.47 50.00 47.36 44.73 39.46 34.22 30.03 28.98 23.77 18.59 13.45 8.37 3.43 1.13
Labor L1A 20.13 25.00 26.07 27.16 29.38 31.66 33.53 34.00 36.43 38.95 41.59 44.40 47.44 49.09
Labor L2A 29.87 25.00 23.93 22.84 20.62 18.34 16.47 16.00 13.57 11.05 8.41 5.60 2.56 0.91
Consumption qD1A 30.11 26.09 27.21 28.34 30.63 32.97 34.89 35.37 37.82 40.33 42.91 45.59 48.37 49.78
Consumption qD2A 19.14 26.09 26.07 26.06 26.02 25.98 25.95 25.94 25.89 25.83 25.76 25.67 25.54 25.46
Emissions e2A 5.23 21.07 20.02 18.97 16.86 14.75 13.07 12.64 10.54 8.43 6.32 4.21 2.11 1.05
Country B
Utility UB 23.40 25.25 25.25 25.25 25.25 25.24 25.23 25.23 25.22 25.21 25.19 25.16 25.13 25.11
Production q1B 30.11 26.09 25.00 23.90 21.66 19.37 17.50 17.03 14.63 12.18 9.66 7.06 4.40 3.08
Production q2B 19.14 26.09 27.27 28.45 30.85 33.27 35.24 35.73 38.23 40.77 43.36 46.01 48.72 50.08
CapitalK1B 89.53 50.00 48.02 46.00 41.85 37.55 33.99 33.09 28.49 23.74 18.84 13.77 8.57 5.98
CapitalK2B 10.47 50.00 52.42 54.86 59.81 64.84 68.92 69.95 75.16 80.46 85.88 91.44 97.19 100.12
Labor L1B 20.13 25.00 23.90 22.80 20.58 18.34 16.52 16.06 13.74 11.39 8.99 6.54 4.05 2.82
Labor L2A 29.87 25.00 26.10 27.20 29.42 31.66 33.48 33.94 36.26 38.61 41.01 43.46 45.95 47.18
Consumption qD1B 30.11 26.09 25.00 23.90 21.66 19.37 17.50 17.03 14.63 12.18 9.66 7.06 4.40 3.08
Consumption qD2B 19.14 26.09 26.07 26.06 26.02 25.98 25.95 25.94 25.89 25.83 25.76 25.67 25.54 25.45
Emissions e2B 5.23 21.07 22.04 23.02 24.99 26.99 28.61 29.02 31.09 33.19 35.34 37.54 39.81 40.97
a. The values of the parameters for the calibration of the BAU are in Table V.2.
b.W = UA + UB −D ·
∑
c e2c.
c. The marginal damage of emissions isD = 0.3, which is the same value for both countries.
d. Policy refers to the % of emissions reductions with respect to the BAU scenario of Country A.
Emissions reductions are calculated as ē2A = (1 − %reduction) ∗ eBAU2A .
overall welfare starts to decrease. It is important to note that the IS case will not
replicate the results of the first best, not even at the highest value of welfare that
can be attained with an IS regulatory policy (See Figure V.1).
In both countries, the production of the clean good will increase and the
production of the dirty good will decrease when the regulation tightens up.
Both countries will use more capital and less labor in the production of the
clean good, and less capital and more labor in the production of the dirty good.
Although capital is mobile across countries, in the harmonized cases, there is a
reallocation of the production factors across industries within each country.
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As the ratio of emissions per output of Good 2 decreases overall, the
consumption of Good 2 decreases, and the demand of the clean good, Good 1,
increases in both countries.
Table V.5. Harmonized Intensity Standard: Countries A & B regulate emissions
First
Best BAU
a. Increasingly Stringent Policies
Welfareb. W 43.67 37.86 38.48 39.09 40.27 41.33 42.23 42.93 43.38 43.54 43.53 43.27 42.29 39.12
Total damagesc. 3.14 12.64 12.01 11.34 9.93 8.48 7.02 5.59 4.24 3.10 2.98 1.83 0.83 0.47
Policyd. 1% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 69% 70% 80% 90% 95%
Country A
Utility UA 23.40 25.25 25.24 25.22 25.10 24.91 24.62 24.26 23.81 23.31 23.25 22.55 21.56 19.80
Production q1A 30.11 26.09 26.08 26.11 26.24 26.48 26.80 27.17 27.57 27.94 27.98 28.36 28.56 21.41
Production q2A 19.14 26.09 26.08 25.99 25.62 24.99 24.13 23.07 21.85 20.61 20.47 18.90 17.03 19.43
CapitalK1A 89.53 50.00 52.69 55.49 61.38 67.47 73.56 79.47 85.05 89.71 90.21 94.82 98.74 100.00
CapitalK2A 10.47 50.00 47.31 44.51 38.62 32.53 26.44 20.53 14.95 10.29 9.79 5.18 1.26 0.00
Labor L1A 20.13 25.00 24.13 23.31 21.79 20.47 19.36 18.43 17.68 17.13 17.07 16.58 16.01 7.33
Labor L2A 29.87 25.00 25.87 26.69 28.21 29.53 30.64 31.57 32.32 32.87 32.93 33.42 33.99 42.67
Consumption qD1A 30.11 26.09 26.08 26.11 26.24 26.48 26.80 27.17 27.57 27.94 27.98 28.36 28.56 21.41
Consumption qD2A 19.14 26.09 26.08 25.99 25.62 24.99 24.12 23.07 21.85 20.61 20.47 18.90 17.03 19.43
Emissions e2A 5.23 21.07 20.01 18.90 16.56 14.13 11.69 9.32 7.06 5.16 4.96 3.05 1.38 0.78
Country B
Utility UB 23.40 25.25 25.24 25.21 25.10 24.90 24.63 24.26 23.80 23.31 23.25 22.56 21.56 19.80
Production q1B 30.11 26.09 26.08 26.11 26.24 26.48 26.80 27.17 27.57 27.94 27.98 28.36 28.56 21.41
Production q2B 19.14 26.09 26.08 25.99 25.62 24.99 24.13 23.07 21.85 20.61 20.47 18.90 17.03 19.43
CapitalK1B 89.53 50.00 52.69 55.49 61.38 67.47 73.56 79.47 85.05 89.71 90.21 94.82 98.74 100.00
CapitalK2B 10.47 50.00 47.31 44.51 38.62 32.53 26.44 20.53 14.95 10.29 9.79 5.18 1.26 0.00
Labor L1B 20.13 25.00 24.13 23.31 21.79 20.47 19.35 18.43 17.68 17.13 17.07 16.58 16.01 7.33
Labor L2A 29.87 25.00 25.87 26.69 28.21 29.53 30.65 31.57 32.32 32.87 32.93 33.42 33.99 42.67
Consumption qD1B 30.11 26.09 26.08 26.11 26.24 26.48 26.80 27.17 27.57 27.94 27.98 28.36 28.56 21.41
Consumption qD2B 19.14 26.09 26.08 25.99 25.62 24.98 24.13 23.07 21.84 20.61 20.47 18.90 17.03 19.43
Emissions e2B 5.23 21.07 20.01 18.90 16.56 14.13 11.69 9.32 7.06 5.16 4.96 3.05 1.38 0.78
a. The values of the parameters for the calibration of the BAU are in Table V.2.
b.W = UA + UB −D ·
∑
c e2c.
c. The marginal damage of emissions isD = 0.3, which is the same value for both countries.
d. Policy refers to the % of emissions reductions per output with respect to the BAU scenario of both countries.










Table V.6 presents the case of unilateral IS regulation. Only Country A
regulates emissions by imposing a percentage reduction of emissions per output
of Good 2. Overall welfare is maximized with a reduction of 76% in the ratio of
emissions per output of Good 2 in Country A, relative to the BAU case. The
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unilateral IS policy does not replicate the first best.
Similar to the unilateral C&T scenario, the production of Good 1 increases
in Country A and decreases in Country B. The country that does not regulate
emissions increases the production of the dirty good, Good 2, and significantly
decreases the production of the clean good, Good 1.
To produce more of the clean good, the country who regulates will use
more capital and less labor for the production of Good 1. The productivity of
capital will be smaller in Country A relative to Country B. In the harmonized IS
case, both countries have almost identical distribution of production factors
across industries, but in the unilateral IS case, capital shifts to the production of
the dirty good in Country B.
Emissions are decreased more with harmonized policies than with
unilateral policies. The harmonized IS regulation has the effect of decreasing
consumption of the good that is regulated in both countries. In the unilateral IS
case, the effect of the regulation is to decrease consumption of the dirty good
only in Country A. In addition, the country that regulates will consume more of
the clean good. Similar to the unilateral C&T case, consumption of Good 1 is
smaller relative to Good 2 in Country B.
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Table V.6. Unilateral Intensity Standard: Country A regulates emissions
First
Best BAU
a. Increasingly Stringent Policies
Welfareb. W 43.67 37.86 38.06 38.24 38.45 38.47 38.42 38.22 37.97 37.81 37.72 37.63 37.40 36.84
Total damagesc. 3.14 12.64 12.43 12.23 11.96 11.91 11.89 11.99 12.15 12.22 12.17 11.99 11.32 9.44
Policyd. 1% 10% 20% 24% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 95%
Country A
Utility UA 23.40 25.25 25.25 25.24 25.20 25.19 25.16 25.11 25.06 25.01 24.95 24.81 24.36 23.14
Production q1A 30.11 26.09 25.67 26.08 29.07 30.88 33.99 39.47 43.80 45.45 45.12 42.95 34.14 10.00
Production q2A 19.14 26.09 25.90 24.88 20.86 18.78 15.42 9.86 5.62 3.85 3.72 4.75 9.20 19.49
CapitalK1A 89.53 50.00 50.09 51.70 58.78 62.60 68.81 78.84 85.95 88.53 88.39 85.92 73.85 26.79
CapitalK2A 10.47 50.00 46.98 42.48 30.98 26.13 19.18 9.57 3.60 1.27 0.50 0.18 0.04 0.00
Labor L1A 20.13 25.00 24.30 24.43 26.92 28.58 31.54 37.05 41.69 43.49 43.02 40.34 30.23 7.25
Labor L2A 29.87 25.00 25.70 25.57 23.08 21.42 18.46 12.95 8.31 6.51 6.98 9.66 19.77 42.75
Consumption qD1A 30.11 26.09 25.67 26.08 29.07 30.88 33.99 39.47 43.80 45.45 45.12 42.95 34.14 10.00
Consumption qD2A 19.14 26.09 26.09 26.07 25.99 25.94 25.87 25.73 25.60 25.51 25.44 25.35 25.00 23.93
Emissions e2A 5.23 21.07 19.88 18.09 13.48 11.53 8.72 4.78 2.27 1.24 0.90 0.77 0.74 0.79
Country B
Utility UB 23.40 25.25 25.25 25.24 25.21 25.19 25.16 25.11 25.06 25.01 24.94 24.81 24.36 23.14
Production q1B 30.11 26.09 26.50 26.09 23.12 21.32 18.23 12.82 8.56 6.90 7.08 8.88 16.48 37.68
Production q2B 19.14 26.09 26.27 27.26 31.11 33.11 36.32 41.61 45.58 47.16 47.17 45.94 40.81 28.38
CapitalK1B 89.53 50.00 51.69 51.74 46.91 43.47 37.26 26.05 17.22 13.83 14.26 18.20 36.04 98.92
CapitalK2B 10.47 50.00 51.24 54.08 63.32 67.80 74.75 85.55 93.23 96.37 96.86 95.71 90.07 74.28
Labor L1B 20.13 25.00 25.11 24.45 21.28 19.53 16.63 11.67 7.79 6.28 6.42 7.99 14.29 28.56
Labor L2A 29.87 25.00 24.89 25.55 28.72 30.47 33.37 38.33 42.21 43.72 43.58 42.01 35.71 21.44
Consumption qD1B 30.11 26.09 26.50 26.09 23.12 21.32 18.23 12.82 8.56 6.90 7.08 8.88 16.48 37.68
Consumption qD2B 19.14 26.09 26.09 26.07 25.99 25.95 25.87 25.73 25.60 25.51 25.44 25.35 25.00 23.93
Emissions e2B 5.23 21.07 21.57 22.70 26.38 28.16 30.92 35.20 38.24 39.48 39.67 39.22 36.97 30.68
a. The values of the parameters for the calibration of the BAU are in Table V.2.
b.W = UA + UB −D ·
∑
c e2c.
c. The marginal damage of emissions isD = 0.3, which is the same value for both countries.
d. Policy refers to the % of emissions reductions per output with respect to the BAU scenario of Country A.






V.3. Comparison across Cases
This section presents a comparison of the main variables across the cases.
Alongside the tables presented in the previous sections, I use plots to explore
how the main variables respond to changes in the regulation method and to
changes in the percentage of emissions reductions.
Figure V.1 presents a comparison of welfare across the cases. The vertical
axes show the optimized values of welfare associated with the percentage of
emissions reductions shown on the horizontal axes. For the C&T cases, the
horizontal axes show the percentage of reductions solely relative to emissions,
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and for the IS cases the percentage refers to emissions reductions relative to
output. Figure V.1 shows the following ranking: the harmonized cap is superior
to the harmonized intensity standard for large values of emissions reductions,
and only the harmonized cap and trade case can attain the first best (represented
by the green diamond).
In general, harmonized policies are superior in terms of welfare compared
to unilateral policies, suggesting that lack of coordination between countries is
costly in terms of welfare and that both countries would be better off if they
coordinated on climate policy. In any case some regulation is preferable to no
regulation, since the BAU case (represented by the red circle) reports the lowest
welfare level.
In this exercise, unilateral policies closely resemble what I currently
observe in several countries in the real world. The unilateral intensity standard is
superior to the unilateral cap for low levels of reductions of the ratio of emissions
per output imposed in Country A. As the cap tightens, the welfare level decreases,
and the welfare level in the unilateral intensity standard scenario is lower than
the rest of the cases.
Here, a second-best unilateral intensity standard policy will set the
percentage of emissions per output that the dirty good can use in Country A. The
main difference between the C&T and IS regulatory instruments is that the cap
can attain the first best when it is set optimally, but only in the harmonized case
and only for a single value of the cap. The IS instrument will not attain the first
best, but it may be a preferred regulatory instrument under the unilateral




Figure V.2 compares the emissions across the cases. The vertical axes show
total emissions. The horizontal axes are the same as in Figure V.1 for all
remaining figures in this chapter. Emissions decrease rapidly with harmonized
policies, and emissions decrease quicker in the harmonized cap case than in the
harmonized intensity standard case. It is interesting to note that emissions stay
almost the same for the unilateral C&T and unilateral IS cases, suggesting that
unilateral emissions reductions policies might be sub-optimal for reducing
emissions, although unilateral intensity standards do better than unilateral C&T,
at least for small values of the policy. As can be seen in Figure V.2, unilateral
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policies are not good enough for reducing emissions; the contribution of
unilateral policies to climate policy is marginal. An important policy
recommendation would be to not expect the results of harmonized policies in
terms of emissions reductions when applying unilateral policies. The graphical
analysis shows that coordination pay-offs of harmonized policies are much
higher.
Figure V.2. Emissions
Figure V.3 shows consumption of the clean good (Good 1) in the left
panels, and consumption of the dirty good (Good 2) in the right panels for both
countries. Consumption of the clean good is larger than consumption of the dirty
good in the harmonized cases. There are larger values of consumption of the
clean good for the harmonized C&T case than for the harmonized IS case, and
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smaller values of consumption of the dirty good. Unilateral policies do not alter
consumption much, and the unilateral cap leads to slightly less consumption of
the dirty good, especially for the country that regulates. Recall that unilateral
policies report lower welfare values than harmonized policies. The gap between
harmonized cases and unilateral cases is presented in V.1, where unilateral
policies do not report increased utility derived from consumption.
Figure V.3. Consumption
Figure V.4 shows capital usage for Good 1 in the left panel, and capital
usage for Good 2 in the right panel. The model has interesting implications for
the usage of capital. In the model, capital is mobile between countries and labor
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is fixed. For the case of harmonized intensity standards, the country that
regulates (Country A) invests much more capital in the production of the clean
good than in the dirty good. In the case of harmonized C&T, there are no
differences in investments between the clean and dirty good. The country that
regulates decreases its investments in the production of the clean and dirty good
as the regulation gets tighter, and the country that does not regulate increases its
investments in both goods as the regulation gets tighter. For the unilateral C&T
and unilateral intensity standards cases, investment decreases in the production
of the dirty good in Country A when the regulation tightens.
Figure V.4. Capital usage
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Figure V.5 shows labor utilization in the production of Good 1 in the left
panel, and labor utilization in the production of Good 2 in the right panel. Labor
usage behaves similarly to capital, even though is not mobile across countries.
For the case of harmonized intensity standards, Country A, the country that
regulates, employs much more labor in the production of the clean good
compared to the dirty good. For the harmonized cap case, there are no
differences in labor across goods; the country that regulates decreases
employment in the production of clean and dirty goods as the regulation
tightens, and the country that does not regulate increases employment.
Figure V.5. Labor usage
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V.4. Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, I present results of the sensitivity analysis. The purpose of
this exercise is to assess the robustness of the results to the selection of the
values of the parameters. I have divided the exposition into three subsections.
The first presents the changes in parameters for the utility function, the second
describes changes in production, and the final section presents changes in the
values of the of the parameters of the production function of emissions. I rely on
visual inspection of the welfare functions to draw conclusions about the effects of
parameter changes in the functions of the model. In each graphic the baseline is
plotted with lighter lines.
Table V.7 shows the results of different parameter changes with respect to
the baseline. It is important to clarify that when changing a parameter value, the
overall equilibrium is altered. To construct Table V.7, the model was solved for all
possible values of the policy. Each row shows the optimized results from
changing a single parameter. For simplicity’s sake, the same change was applied
to both countries and to both goods. For instance, a change in β in the production
function was applied to the production function of Good 1 and Good 2 in Country A
and in Country B. The corresponding value changes are from 0.3 to 0.10, and from
0.3 to 0.65 (see Table (V.1) where β affects the fourth equation). Columns two to
seven in Table V.7, show the maximum welfare values for different changes in the
value of the parameters for the cases described in Chapter IV.
The results show that in every case, the harmonized C&T is capable of
replicating the first best, since the maximum welfare value in the first best
column is equal to the maximum welfare value of the harmonized C&T scenario
column. The welfare values corresponding to the Business as Usual case are also
75
the lowest; that is, countries are better off with any regulation than with no
regulation at all, and thus even incomplete regulation is better than nothing.
In addition, Table V.7 shows that the harmonized C&T scenario is superior
in terms of welfare maximization to the harmonized IS scenario2. This
corroborates the hypothesis presented in Proposition 3 in Chapter IV. The IS case
(the higher welfare value for the IS) cannot attain the first best outcome.
The results of Table V.7 show that the unilateral IS scenario reports higher
welfare values than the unilateral C&T scenario. This shows that under
incomplete regulation and leakage, the IS regulation is capable of dominating the
C&T regulation (See Proposition 5 in Chapter IV).
The results of Table V.7 show that the unilateral IS regulation can reduce
as much emissions as the unilateral C&T regulation can, and can do better in
terms of overall welfare. Currently in the United States, the total renewable fuel
standards are not set higher than 30%3. This simulation exercise shows that
unilateral ISs can increase to around one-fifth of the ratio of emissions
reductions per output in the BAU. As most countries transition to cleaner sources
of energy, it is important to note that regulations of emissions that are not higher
as one-thrid will fall in this category under the current circumstances.
Table V.7 clearly shows that unilateral policies are sub-optimal in terms of
welfare. Both a unilateral cap and a unilateral intensity standard will not be
effective in terms of increasing welfare and reducing emissions as compared with
harmonized policies. This is simply because the regulation targets only 50% of
2Recall that even though all solutions are optimal, there is only one value of the policy that
reports the higher optimized welfare level.
3See epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standard-program/overview-renewable-fuel-standard.
76
Table V.7. Comparison of Welfare across Parameter Assumptions
Parameter change FB BAU C&T IS C&TCountry A
IS
Country A
Baselinea. 43.67 37.86 43.67 43.54 37.98 38.47
Utility
α=0.25 45.19 39.33 45.19 45.05 39.40 39.63
α=0.65 49.38 45.60 49.38 49.25 45.68 46.14
ρ=0.05 43.47 37.86 43.47 43.36 37.95 38.46
ρ=0.75 45.06 37.86 45.06 44.81 38.11 38.54
Production
γ=0.60 30.20 23.13 30.20 30.12 23.25 23.78
γ=0.99 51.34 46.09 51.34 51.17 46.19 46.68
β=0.10 40.47 30.70 40.47 40.46 31.13 34.75
β=0.65 53.80 51.38 53.80 52.97 51.41 51.62
φ=0.40 42.32 37.32 42.32 42.05 37.42 37.86
φ=0.80 43.67 37.86 43.67 43.53 37.97 38.47
Returns to scale
θ=0.85 18.09 12.98 18.09 18.06 13.78 14.05
θ=0.95 33.38 27.69 33.38 33.29 28.08 28.57
Emissions
µ=0.35 44.31 40.65 44.31 44.14 40.73 41.12
µ=0.55 43.23 35.01 43.23 43.13 35.15 35.75
δ = 0.70 42.78 38.33 42.78 42.50 38.50 38.94
δ = 0.95 43.70 37.49 43.70 43.58 37.60 38.11
a. Baseline parameter values: α=0.50, ρ=0.25, γ=0.85, β=0.30, φ=0.60, θ=0.99, µ=0.45, δ=0.90.
Policy: FB - First Best, BAU - Business as Usual, C&T - Cap and Trade, IS - Intensity Standard.
total emissions and not because these policies are ineffective. Extensions to
heterogeneous emissions targets and relaxing the assumption of symmetry are
straightforward and can be implemented easily.
The results shown in Table V.7 are extremely important for the purposes of
the dissertation, since the proof of the propositions presented in the previous
chapter cannot be done analytically, but with the help of a numerical exercise.
Furthermore, the complexities of general equilibrium make it difficult to test the
hypothesis of the superiority of the IS when there is unilateral regulation and
leakage, which is why it is important to use a simple model, as is the case in this
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chapter.
To understand how the value of the parameters affects the results of the
model, I have provided detailed descriptions of the influence of the values in
Table V.7 in the figures below. I have divided the parameters according to the
group descriptions in Table V.2. In each of the figures below, the vertical axes
show the optimized welfare values, and the horizontal axes show the value of the
policy, as in the previous figures. In general, the left panel shows a reduction in
the value of the parameter and the right panel shows an increase in the value of
the parameter. The baseline is graphed in its original colors (darker lines), and I
used transparent colors to represent the changes in the parameters.
Parameters in the Utility Function
Figure V.6 shows the effect of changing the weight of the clean good, α.
When this is increased in the production function, welfare increases
proportionally in all cases, and I do not observe any changes in the curvature or
shape of the lines.
Figure V.7 shows changes in the coefficient of the utility function, ρ. It is
interesting to note is that, as ρ increases, there is more room for larger values of
policy parameters that maximize overall welfare. Therefore, with larger values of
ρ, it is possible to reduce more emissions overall. This parameter is the
coefficient that determines the value of the elasticity of substitution, or how easy
it is to substitute between the clean and dirty good. For values of ρ close to zero, I
have the Cobb Douglas case.
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Figure V.6. Change in α - Weight of Good Q1 in the Utility Function
Figure V.7. Change in ρ - Coefficient in the Utility Function
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Parameters in the Production Function
The effects of changing the scale parameter in the production function, γ,
are presented in Figure V.8. The effects of changing γ are similar those from
changing α. Changing γ shifts the problem up or down and has no effect on the
ranking of the policies.
Figure V.8. Change in γ - Shift in the Production Function
The effect of changing the weight of capital in the production function is
represented in Figure V.9. Changing β changes the shape of the welfare function
and therefore re-scales the problem. As β gets larger, the welfare function
declines quicker with tighter policy values of the regulation. The unilateral
intensity standard welfare line cuts the unilateral cap at smaller values of the
cap. Thus, larger values of β would widen the gap between the C&T and IS cases.
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Figure V.9. Change in β - Weight of Capital in the Production Function
The effects of technological changes are presented in Figure V.10. Changes
in φ, the technology parameter in the production function, have the same effect
as changes in α and γ. The effect shifts the problem up or down the welfare lines
and does not alter its shape, thus preserving the rank of the policies.
Parameters in the Emissions Production Function
Figure V.11 shows the effect of changing the weight of capital in the
production function of emissions, µ. The larger µ is, the wider the gap between
the unilateral and harmonized cases. Thus, the maximum welfare values
correspond with a smaller reduction of emissions values in the unilateral cases.
See the results of Table V.7 and Figure V.11.
Figure V.12 shows the effect of changing the technology parameter of the
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Figure V.10. Change in φ - Technology Parameter in the Production Function
emissions production function, δ, which plays an important role in the solution
of the problem. The smaller the value of δ, the smaller the regulation policy value
tolerated by the problem. Similar to the case of µ, as I increase the value of δ, the
gap between harmonized and unilateral cases gets wider.
Returns to Scale Parameter
Figure V.13 shows the effect of changing the returns to scale parameter, θ,
which is used in all production functions. θ plays an important role in the
solution of the problem. The smaller the value of θ, the smaller the regulation
policy value tolerated by the problem. Similar to the case of µ and δ, as I increase
the value of δ, the gap between the harmonized and unilateral cases gets wider.
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Figure V.11. Change in µ - The Weight of Capital in the Emissions Function
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Figure V.12. Change in δ - The Technology Parameter in the Production of Emis-
sions Function
Figure V.13. Change in θ - The Coefficient of Inputs in the Production Function
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V.5. Conclusion
The main conclusions of the dissertation are presented in this chapter and
are summarized in Table V.7. The simple model proposed in the previous chapter
is useful to implement numerical simulations and compare across cases. In
addition, looking at two identical countries is useful since it allows one to isolate
the effects of the regulation. In practice, there are confounding factors that make
the comparison across cases a complex exercise. However, changing the
parameter values or functional forms to introduce heterogeneity across countries
and sectors is straightforward.
From the sensitivity analysis, I have observed that the values of the
parameters and elasticities of substitution influence the results in important
ways. Both consumption and production are important determinants of the
shape of the problem. It is important to note that changing the parameter values
does not affect the ranking of the policies; however, different parametrization for
each country certainly does, especially when comparing the weight of capital in
the production function, or altering the returns to scale parameters4. Equally
important is the weight of the clean good in the utility function, as its value will
determine the possibility of higher percentages of emissions regulations, and
more importantly how emissions behave in relation to capital and labor.
The results also highlight the importance of synchronizing substitution
possibilities with the percentage of emissions reduction targets, in both
unilateral and harmonized cases. However, coordination is more important for
the unilateral case because the C&T and IS lines intersect each other for certain
4The system will encounter infeasibilities for cases where the choice of the parameters does not
make sense.
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values of the policy, and there are movements of capital across countries and not
only industries.
For small values of emissions reductions, the intensity standard dominates
the cap and trade mechanism. When there is a unilateral regulation, it is not clear
what regulatory mechanism is preferred. For large values of emissions reductions
(around 50%) the cap and trade unilateral mechanism dominates the intensity
standard (see Figure V.1).
Even though these results are hypothetical, their implications for policy
are not minor. The results highlight the importance of taking the sensitivity of
customer preferences for cleaner goods into account, and the possibility of
substitution towards cleaner technologies.
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CHAPTER VI
CANONICAL MODELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS
With the increased presence in recent years of carbon policies at the
regional or global levels (World Bank, 2019), the data and tools available for the
analysis of environmental regulations have increased. Among the tools used for
the analysis of such policies are computable general equilibrium (CGE) models.
However, applied general equilibrium analysis is still challenging to implement
because of the difficulties involved in putting together a consistent dataset of all
national accounts and different economic variables for all regions and economic
sectors. Despite these difficulties, CGE models have become more frequently used
over the years (Babatunde et al., 2017) due to the need to measure the economic
impacts in different economic sectors and production factors (Dixon et al., 2013).
This chapter describes the main elements of the GTAP model used to
analyze environmental regulations. The canonical model is used to implement
illustrative comparisons of cap and trade and intensity standards in the next two
chapters with the aim of complementing the analysis presented in Chapter IV
and Chapter V1.
This chapter is organized as follows. The first section contains a
description of the main elements and variants of the GTAP model. The second
section presents the variables, sets, parameters, and main equations that I will
1The canonical model is based on the previous work developed at the Global Trade Analysis
Project (GTAP) from the Center for Global Trade Analysis at Purdue University’s Department of
Agricultural Economics. The GTAP project provides a variety of data suitable for the analysis of
general equilibrium policies (see notably Hertel, 1997)
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utilize in the subsequent chapters. The third section presents a detailed
description of the main data sources. Finally, the last section contains the
conclusions.
VI.1. Variants of the Environmental Canonical CGE Model
CGE models have come to play a greater role in environmental economics
because of the relationship between environmental and economic variables,
which is at the core of such models (Peters, 2016b, p. 11). This section describes a
canonical model called the GTAP model and its underlying databases (Aguiar
et al., 2019b). A variety of CGE models are used for the analysis of energy and
environmental policies, such as ADAGE, AIM, DART, EC-MSMR, ENGAGE,
ENVISAGE, ENV-Linkages, EPPA, EU-EMS, EXIOMOD, FARM, GDYN, GEM-E3,
GLOBIOM, GNET, ICES, IGEM, IMACLIM-R, ISSA, JRC-GEM, MAGNET, MESSAGE,
MIRAGE-e, MIRAGRODEP, MONASH-Green, OECD ENV-Linkages, PACE,
REMIND, TEA, USAGE, and WEG-Center (Adams and Parmenter, 2013; Chateau
et al., 2014; Nong, 2020; Peters, 2016a; Roson and Britz, 2018a; van der
Mensbrugghe, 2018). These models are broadly consistent in their theoretical
macroeconomic structures. A recent effort led by economists has attempted to
compare the macro assumptions, parameters, and trade relationships of these
models (Bekkers et al., 2018, p. 11).
One thing that the models have in common is that they use the GTAP
database (or at least some structure of the GTAP database) combined with
alternative data sources to construct a baseline that represents the steady state in
the economy. For the analysis of environmental policies, economy-wide CGE
models focus on the linkages of emissions to the main economic sectors in a
country and the interactions of the gains and losses of environmental policies
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among countries. Some of these models, however, belong to institutions or
universities and are not available to the public. Therefore, the main disadvantage
in the context of applied research is access to the data, models, and software that
are capable of solving large systems of nonlinear equation systems 2. Several CGE
models are employed to analyze dynamic economic projections and emissions.
Recently, an open-source set of tools has become available to the public:
CGEBox, one of the most advanced set of tools for the implementation of CGE
models (Britz and van der Mensbrugghe, 2018a). The main advantage of CGEBox
is that it makes the notation of a variety of models based on different versions of
the GTAP class models and databases uniform. It is open-source and coded in
GAMS, with the solvers capable of solving large systems of nonlinear equations
simultaneously. In Chapter VII and Chapter VIII, I use the canonical version of
GTAPINGAMS, a version formulated as MCP(Lanz and Rutherford, 2016).
VI.2. Main Elements and Structure of the Canonical CGE Model
Here, I describe the structure of the standard GTAP model that I will use in
the next two chapters. The standard GTAP model is documented in several papers
Aguiar et al. (2019a); Corong et al. (2017); Hertel (1997); McDougall (2005). CGE
models are used for the simulation of policies and to compare the economy’s
status under general conditions and the current economy with what the economy
will be like if certain conditions in it change. A CGE model is not a model of
statistical correlations. The results of the model rely on the foundations of the
2The standard GTAP model is expressed in percentage changes. The model is solved using the
programming language software General Equilibrium Modelling Package (GEMPACK) Dixon et al.
(2013). TheGAMS formulation is expressed in levels. Themodel is solved using the GAMS software.
In GAMS, the model can be solved with constrained nonlinear optimization or with a system of
nonlinear equations using a mixed complementarity problem (mcp)
89
underlying economics. The solution represents the relationship of real variables
where only relative price matters. The model will reproduce the economy’s
interactions; the impact of prices is significant and the economy operates under
the usual macroeconomic constraints, such as the balance of national accounts
and trade balances.
The standard GTAP model assumes perfect competition, and constant
returns to scale, and household preferences, which are given by a constant
demand elasticity formulation (van der Mensbrugghe, 2018). GTAP is based on
the Walras principle of competitive general equilibrium. In GTAP, the budget
constraint is applied to all individuals, and the sum of the income is the same as
the sum of the expenditures. The rationality principle applies to economic
transactions; agents will have optimizing behavior, and the supply and demand
will be equalized because of the role of prices. The sum of all the expenditures is
the same as the sum of all the revenues; and expenditures equals income.
The basics of the model are the circular flow of the economy. A more
simplified version does not include a government (as in the previous chapters)
but shows the factor markets, the goods markets, and the demand and supply of
all the production factors. This simple schema resembles the typical economic
circular flow, where the production factors are the linkages of economic
activities. The productive sectors demand factors of production such as capital
and labor; the factors belong to the households that supply their work on a labor
market to produce commodities. The households receive wages and rent the
capital in exchange for their participation in the production process. The agents
purchase local or imported services, and the demand for commodities equals the
total supply. That is the basic setup of a canonical economic general equilibrium
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model.
A CGE model departs from a baseline that resembles the social accounting
matrix (SAM). A SAM is a database that contains the economic transactions of
regions or countries and economic sectors at a given point in time. The model
parameters are the same as in SAM and are used to calibrate a baseline. The
results look at the impact of prices, quantities, factor demands, macroeconomic
balances, investments, and gross domestic product (GDP). The more equations in
the CGE, the harder it gets to understand a given economic policy’s transmission
mechanism. The model is used to simulate exogenous shocks, structural changes
(productivity or endowment), and economic policies such as trade restrictions or
sectorial regulations. In the standard canonical GTAP model, income comes from
production and is distributed between public and private agents and investments
(the standard setup of the circular flow model).
The model assumes a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production
function with a nested structure for the intermediate goods. Production factors
have a CES and include factor inputs or endowments such as capital, agricultural
land, and natural resources (forest, minerals, and fossil fuels). Labor is
differentiated by skill level and occupation type.
Usually, the modeler will decide how to aggregate or disaggregate regions,
industries, and production factors depending on the version of the GTAP
database used and the modeler definitions. The standard GTAP setup can be
defined as a single country or a multi-region, as a partial or general equilibrium
model, or as a comparative static or recursive dynamic model, depending on the
definitions. In Chapter VII, I will use the standard general equilibrium
comparative static version, and in Chapter VIII, I will use the recursive dynamic
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formulation. The CGEBox tool includes dynamic sets that the modeler can use to
select regions, industries, activities, and dynamics (Britz and van der
Mensbrugghe, 2018a). There are three main dimensions or sets: industries, i,
regions, r, and factors, f as defined in the table below. Table VI.1 presents the set
definitions and sector identifiers for the 76 GTAP-Power 10 sectors, including the
government and investments in their most disaggregated form.
Table VI.1. Definitions of Sets
Set Definition
r Regions: r could represent an aggregation of the 141 regions in the GTAP-Power 10
dataset
a, i Production sectors: origin and destination
aa Armington aggregate: production activities, households, government, investments
f Aggregated factors: Land, Natural resources, Capital, Skilled labor, Unskilled labor
ff Dissagregated production factors
Skilled labor: officials, managers, legislators, technicians and associated professionals
Unskilled labor: clerks, service, and market sales workers
Capital
Land: sector-specific agricultural land
Natural resources: forest, mineral reserves, and fossil fuels
h Household
t Time
Source: Own elaboration based on GTAP 10 database.
CES is a standard for all the equations. The shared parameters are
multiplied by the total quantity and are distributed among sectors (Britz and







where xi is the aggregate demand per industry i, P̄ is the average price, and Pi
represents the industry prices, and the exponent σ is the elasticity substitution
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parameter 3. αi is the baseline shared parameter, and λ represents the total factor
productivity and can be interpreted as technical progress.









The calculation of the average price allows the model to solve. It is a
nonlinear dual-price aggregator for CES equations (see Britz and van der
Mensbrugghe (2018b, p. 14)). The resulting share of the total is calculated by
multiplying the share by the average price exponent in the elasticity of
substitution. An elasticity of substitution set to zero yields the Leontief case
(commonly called a fixed factor), where the original shares remain constant.
Because demands are homothetic, it is common to use a shifter variable “to
update the preferences or cost structure to reflect non-Hicksian neutral technical
progress” when needed (Britz and van der Mensbrugghe, 2018a).
The standard equations of the GTAP model follow the CES formulation
(van der Mensbrugghe, 2018)4. The equations in GTAP represent a nest 5.
Associated with each CES set of n equations are the n+1 equations in the model
(van der Mensbrugghe, 2018). Therefore, n equations define demand or supply
quantities and one equation that clears the markets through the average price
(Britz and van der Mensbrugghe, 2018a). An example is the production nest
represented in Figure VI.1.
3As in the standard CES case, σ = 1 is the Cobb-Douglas case
4The homothetic case where average costs or average revenue equals marginal costs or marginal
benefits.
5CGE models are formulated in a nested structure (a nest contains a set of equations by eco-
nomic activity). For example, the production will be represented by an equation that ensures that












xfa,f − pfaa,f xaa,i − paa,i
xtnest− ptnest
Figure VI.1. Production Nest in GTAP
Source: Extracted from Britz and van der Mensbrugghe (2018a)
The basic model equations contained in CGEBox are identical to van der
Mensbrugghe (2018) for the GTAP standard formulation. Each production sector
has a top-level nest and an associated expenditure share of domestic and
imported goods (see Figure VI.1). The down-level nest has identical shares across
all agents for import.
The standard GTAP model represents exchanges as an Armington
commodity. The GTAP model uses an Armington formulation for the
intermediate demand of commodities, and a value-added bundle for the factor
demand. The Armington approach relies on a CES function to distribute domestic
supply across industries. The production functions are CES type with
substitution between the primary factors. The elasticities of substitution are
defined as σ and are differentiated by nest.
In the GTAP model, there is a representative household with income to
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distribute between consumption of goods and savings. The demand specification
has the structure of a constant difference in elasticity6 (CDE) utility function,
which resembles a CES function in the production sector (Hertel and Van der
Mensbrugghe, 2016). The CDE demand specification is weighted by the ratio of
vector prices relative to the minimum expenditure to attain a specific utility level
(Liu et al., 2001).
The formulation of the household demand will determine the equivalent
variation. Equation (30) was modified from the standard formulation to aggregate
utility across regions and to subtract the damages of emissions (social cost of
carbon). The objective of modifying the equivalent variation equation is to have
an analogous formulation of the overall welfare function presented in Chapter IV.






















where C is the expenditure function, P is the price vector defined in (29), and
co = C(Po,u) is the benchmark condition for the implicit Hicksian demand. v is
the indirect utility, D is the marginal damage of emissions7, αi is the scale
parameter, βi is the substitution parameter, and emis are the emissions.
Equation (30) can be normalized setting C(Po
co
,u) = 1. Equation (30)
becomes:
6https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/4184.pdf













v in this setting, is the utility that has no reduced form representation. The
change in indirect utility minus the total damages of emissions, vr − D · emisr, at
the price Pi, will have the same effect on overall welfare as would the change in
prices.
Table VI.2 defines the activity levels that characterize an equilibrium. The
variables are expressed in dollar values.
The government sector is accounted for in the Armington commodity and
uses taxes to provide services and for its consumption. The allocation of these
two follows a CES preference function; the default elasticities are 1 for
expenditures and 0 for government investments.
Trade flows in the GTAP model are based on an Armington representation
of bilateral trade and on the standard assumption that production and
consumption decisions have an effect on world prices depending on the value of
the trade elasticities that are exogenous in the model. The regional aggregation
of the model allows regions not considered in the analysis to be treated as a
group with a perfectly elastic supply and without the ability to influence world
prices. The model rules out the possibility of corner solutions by imposing the
usual constraint that “outputs destined for the domestic and export markets are
differentiated products” (see De Melo and Robinson, 1989; van der Mensbrugghe,
2018).
All GTAP datasets follow the same structure in terms of the dimensions.
However, the GTAP-Power 10 version includes a disaggregation of the electricity
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u Indirect utility level
EV equivalent variation






nd Intermediate demand composite






pva Price for the valued added
pnd Price for the intermediate composite
pfa Sector-specific factor price




yi Gross investment expenditures
Emissions
emis Emissions
emisp Price of emissions
The time dimension can be included for a dynamic setting for
all the variables.
Source: Own elaboration based on (Britz and van derMensbrug-
ghe, 2018a, p. 32).
sector. The next two sections contain a description of the database that I will use
in the next two chapters, and the emissions accounting.
VI.3. GTAP-Power Database
This section describes the dataset used in the subsequent chapters. As
discussed in Chapter III, one important source of emissions is electric power
generation. The use of fossil fuels represents an important portion of the global
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emissions. Fossil fuels are associated with different sources of electricity
generation, and environmental policies target different fuel types in the
electricity sector. Thus, modeling the electricity sector requires data on distinct
power generation technologies in a single database with a disaggregated
electricity sector into power generation technologies (Peters, 2016b). Version 10
of the GTAP-Power database is the primary data source for the following chapters.
The GTAP 10 database “represents global production and trade for 141
countries or regions, 76 commodities, and eight primary factors” (Aguiar et al.,
2019b). The most recent available database is for 2014 and was released in 2019.
The standard GTAP database represents about 98% of the global GDP and 92% of
the global population (Aguiar et al., 2019b, p. 1). The dataset also provides trade
and Armington elasticities for the previous versions that were estimated for the
2004 vintage (Aguiar et al., 2016). The elasticities determine the response of the
model to trade dynamics and are determinants of the final demand8.
The standard GTAP database is combined with data from the European
Commission Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR)
project (The European Commission Joint Research Center, 2019). The database
contains the parameters needed to calibrate the equations in the GTAP model
described in the previous section in a consistent database that resembles the
equilibrium of national accounts (Chepeliev, 2020a). Variables such as
production, intermediate demand, final demand, imports and exports, and taxes
and subsidies are represented in the database. Such variables are common to
almost all applied general equilibrium models (Aguiar et al., 2019b).
8See Aguiar et al. (2019b) for a comprehensive description of the key features of the GTAP 10
database; see Appendix B for estimates of trade elasticities that correspond to the aggregations
used in this dissertation.
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The GTAP-Power database represents the following technologies: coal,
gas, hydro, nuclear, oil, solar, wind, and other renewable technologies (Chepeliev,
2020a,b). Peters (2016b) described the procedure for disaggregating the
electricity sector in the GTAP Power database using the International Energy
Agency (IEA) energy balances. This involves allocating the base and peak load
power generation to each technology based on the minimized operation and
maintenance and fuel costs. The data disaggregation allows for the analysis of
environmental regulations that target specific electricity generation sources,
such as coal, gas, and oil.
The GTAP-Power database is a good example of how emissions interact
with economic variables. Using the GTAP Power database, one can analyze how
clean and dirty technologies substitute for each other within an economic sector,
as well as the linkages of an essential economic sector with the rest of the
economy. This is possible because electric power generation in the data is
represented with a nested additive constant elasticity of substitution (Chepeliev,
2020a; Chepeliev et al., 2020a) to achieve equilibrium between the demand for
generation from each technology and the aggregate demand for electricity
generation.
The underlying data for the disaggregation of the electricity sector are the
levelized costs for each technology and region available through the energy
balances published by the IEA (IEA, 2020). Two important limitations in
constructing a representative dataset are the availability and quality of the data
for some of the regions (Peters, 2016b). The disaggregation of the GTAP-Power
database focuses mainly on supply-side disaggregation. Figure VI.2 shows the
two stages of disaggregation originally performed by Peters (2016c): the
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disaggregation of generating technologies in the base and peak loads and the
allocation of the total power generation data in the IEA energy balances to the
technologies already available in the GTAP database. The original database
contained an aggregated power sector representing hydro, oil, and gas generation
(Peters, 2016b).
VI.4. CO2 and non-CO2 Emissions Accounting
The GTAP-Power data are utilized to construct the database, which
includes the CO2 emissions attached to the production sectors. The other gases
are included in terms of CO2 equivalents. To account for the emissions from
power plants, the emissions from sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and
methane (CH4) are included as CO2 equivalent units. The emissions data were
obtained from the Joint Research Data Centre of the European Commission 9,
which reports the emissions from diverse sources and sectors for most of the
countries included in GTAP. A representation of the resulting electricity sector in
GTAP-Power is presented in Figure VI.2. The standard GTAP models use the CES
approach for nesting the demand to identify the cross-price effects (e.g., for the
substitution for different electricity types)10. The CO2 and non-CO2 emissions
accounting is included in the model. Recently, GTAP made data on the emissions
of a variety of pollutants in the air available. In this dissertation, however, I
limited the analysis to three: CH4, NOx, and SO2. Such pollutants were chosen
because information on them is available and because of their relative
importance in the electricity sector.
9See edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu. EDGAR version 5 database).
10See Appendix C for an estimation of the emissions’ elasticities
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(a)
Figure VI.2. Electricity disaggregation in GTAP
Own elaboration based on GTAP database and (Peters, 2016b)
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Table VI.3. Aggregate Emissions in GTAP 10 Power Database.
Greenhouse Gasa. Electricityb. Coal Gas Oil Gdt P_c All sectors
ALL REGIONS
BC Black Carbon 116.26 455.69 7.03 68.10 22.27 1,301.20 5,172.16
CH4 Methane 399.47 48,478.74 9,374.64 30,390.90 4,320.37 29,016.99 349,254.12
CO Carbon monoxide 7,653.39 62,006.64 737.88 1,609.75 1,803.51 176,607.36 589,581.86
N2O Nitrous oxide 276.78 42.72 6.70 1.62 21.52 123.83 9,703.72
NH3 Ammonia 119.23 1,093.50 18.36 7.20 57.74 2,271.08 48,394.66
NMVOC Nonmethane volatileorganic compounds 848.37 21,917.83 1,425.88 6,253.62 889.75 30,335.85 148,090.09
NOx Nitrogen oxides 31,248.35 414.85 176.03 444.67 510.42 13,418.21 124,108.36
OC Organic carbon 114.95 360.86 3.14 15.57 9.17 3,402.44 11,730.09
PM 10 Particulate matter 10 4,735.51 6,029.13 31.95 285.34 95.22 14,299.98 61,694.69
PM 2.5 Particulate matter 2.5 2,747.57 664.14 17.56 208.67 109.02 1,905.19 38,430.99
SO2 Sulfur dioxide 47,116.05 2,768.84 251.12 578.32 660.57 4,179.52 107,260.32
Domestic
CO2 (Coal) Carbon Dioxide 7,384.52 117.40 0.00 0.07 0.24 126.95 9,922.34
CO2 (Oil) Carbon Dioxide 109.17 0.02 0.57 18.36 6.34 3.15 162.26
CO2 (Gas) Carbon Dioxide 841.67 0.17 146.88 140.28 147.73 119.68 1,920.53
CO2 (P_c) Carbon Dioxide 514.92 22.45 19.79 37.04 10.27 417.36 6,106.04
CO2 (Gdt) Carbon Dioxide 1,029.21 0.15 2.57 37.06 62.57 5.43 2,049.98
Imported
CO2 (Coal) Carbon Dioxide 1,801.02 9.82 0.00 0.01 0.02 8.41 2,283.06
CO2 (Oil) Carbon Dioxide 25.48 0.01 0.09 8.00 1.54 1.02 39.86
CO2 (Gas) Carbon Dioxide 719.25 0.05 15.40 32.19 51.72 63.71 1,339.53
CO2 (P_c) Carbon Dioxide 199.27 4.50 2.18 4.17 2.29 119.18 2,060.77
CO2 (Gdt) Carbon Dioxide 16.41 0.06 0.12 1.83 0.78 1.91 81.65
USA
BC Black Carbon 10.68 1.86 0.35 3.28 1.64 50.19 214.95
CH4 Methane 62.63 2,196.14 315.78 2,294.23 926.33 5,393.56 23,878.48
CO Carbon monoxide 853.89 287.51 10.73 230.13 464.86 24,947.11 51,287.90
N2O Nitrous oxide 46.04 0.06 0.09 0.15 8.36 60.54 940.35
NH3 Ammonia 13.99 0.28 0.20 0.47 14.35 156.98 3,918.77
NMVOC Nonmethane volatileorganic compounds 82.26 749.27 51.99 373.11 275.41 2,890.09 11,202.73
NOx Nitrogen oxides 3,675.30 11.48 10.14 30.01 199.90 1,963.68 14,536.59
OC Organic carbon 6.08 0.49 0.08 1.37 3.36 139.98 393.24
PM 10 Particulate matter 10 369.87 9.81 0.99 18.46 13.03 484.36 2,430.83
PM 2.5 Particulate matter 2.5 219.30 6.03 0.88 14.31 2.92 72.59 1,585.78
SO2 Sulfur dioxide 7,232.48 16.60 22.86 95.05 240.94 117.00 9,768.14
Domestic
CO2 (Coal) Carbon Dioxide 1,528.46 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1,599.35
CO2 (Oil) Carbon Dioxide 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.51 0.00 0.98
CO2 (Gas) Carbon Dioxide 74.76 0.01 6.76 20.65 49.85 8.71 231.01
CO2 (P_c) Carbon Dioxide 24.23 6.19 3.06 7.45 6.60 66.76 1,202.05
CO2 (Gdt) Carbon Dioxide 437.45 0.09 0.24 0.79 22.28 0.84 853.34
Imported
CO2 (Coal) Carbon Dioxide 8.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.68
CO2 (Oil) Carbon Dioxide 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.09
CO2 (Gas) Carbon Dioxide 12.38 0.00 1.71 5.62 3.57 15.17 69.18
CO2 (P_c) Carbon Dioxide 3.16 0.49 0.21 0.49 0.89 11.70 145.38
CO2 (Gdt) Carbon Dioxide 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 10.22
a. Greenhouse gases abbreviations: The non-CO2 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are reported for three types of non-CO2
gases; CH4 - methane, N2O - nitrous oxide, and the group of fluorinated gases (F-gases) for the year 2014.
The databases EDGAR v5.0 and EDGAR v4.2 are the source for non-agricultural emissions.
b. Sectors abbreviations: Coal - mining and agglomeration of hard coal, lignite and peat, Gas - extraction of natural gas,
service activities incidental to oil and gas extraction excluding surveying, Oil - extraction of crude petroleum, service
activities incidental to oil and gas extraction excluding surveying, Gdt - Gas manufacture, distribution, P_c - Petroleum &
Coke, manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products.
Conversion factors - https://www.epa.gov/energy/greenhouse-gas-equivalencies-calculator
Source: GTAP 10 Database.
Table VI.3 shows the emissions of the following pollutants reported in the
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GTAP database: black carbon (BC), carbon monoxide (CO), ammonia (NH3),
methane (CH4), non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOCs), nitrogen
oxides (NOx), nitrous oxide (N2O), organic carbon (OC), particulate matter 10
(PM10), particulate matter 2.5 (PM2.5), and sulfur dioxide (SO2) (Chepeliev,
2020a; Chepeliev et al., 2020b). The emissions factors for quantifying the
emissions for each pollutant and industry are from the International Institute of
Applied System Analysis Greenhouse Gas and Air Pollution Interactions and
Synergies (IIASA GAINS)-based model (Gidden et al., 2019) and from the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Emissions Factors Database
11 (IPCC, 2020).
VI.5. Conclusions
This chapter describes the data and models that will be used to perform
illustrative calculations in the following chapters. The GTAP standard model is a
canonical model used to analyze general equilibrium policies. Because of their
advantage of having a database consistent with several countries’ national
accounts, the GTAP data and models are a good representation of a canonical
environmental model for analyzing various policies. Using the GTAP model and
the database will provide a good complement for the conclusions in the previous
chapters.
Both, the GTAP model, and the GTAP data are useful for analysing
environmental policies. The GTAP model is publicly available and open source.
The model contains variables to resemble the economic relationship, adding
those extra layers will represent a good test for the conclusions of the previous
11https://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/EFDB/main.php
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chapters. The idea is to confirm the previous findings based on GTAP data and to
provide a more nuanced picture.
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CHAPTER VII
HARMONIZED AND UNILATERAL POLICIES: ILLUSTRATIVE CALCULATIONS
FROM THE CANONICAL MODEL
The aim of this chapter is to use the canonical model to provide further
insights into the results of the theoretical model presented in Chapter IV. The
simulations presented in Chapter V are not calibrated to real-world parameters.
The goal of using real-world data is to understand the general equilibrium effects
of emission reductions and to learn how different environmental regulations
interact with economic variables.
In this chapter, the representations of production technology, consumer
preferences, and trade were adopted from the standard GTAP model. The first
section describes the elements used to compare environmental regulations, such
as the database, database changes, selection of commodities, and aggregations.
The second section describes the implementation of the policy and the
alternative scenarios of comparison. The third section presents the results and
discussion. The last section provides the conclusion. The comparison performed
is about the efficacy of policies in terms of maximizing the aggregated equivalent
variation (EV) minus the damages caused by the emissions across regions. The
real gross domestic product (RGDP) is also presented as a comparison variable.
Both variables lead to equivalent results. The simulation exercise focuses on two
hypothetical cases: the first case involving regulating all economic sectors and
the second case involving regulating the electricity production sector and
targeting fossil fuel power generation.
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The comparison is made using two regions, the United States (USA) and
the rest of the world (ROW), and six aggregated commodities (food,
manufacturing, services, electricity generation based on fossil fuels, electricity
generation based on renewable sources, and electricity transmission and
distribution). The scenario comparison is similar to the cases presented in
Chapter IV. There are two harmonized cases and two unilateral cases for each
regulatory instrument: cap and trade (C&T) and intensity standards (IS).
VII.1. Country and Commodity Aggregation
The sectors in the GTAP power database are presented in Table VII.1. To
aggregate the data, I used the 76 commodity classifications and their descriptors
given in Table B.1. I aggregated the database into six commodities to make it
easier to analyze the effects of environmental regulations. Region aggregation
was straightforward; I isolated the USA as one region and grouped the other
regions together as the ROW. The aggregation of the countries is considered less
harmful than the aggregation of the commodities. The most common concern is
the aggregation bias, which refers to the possibility of bias in the simulation
results due to aggregation (Britz and van der Mensbrugghe, 2016; Cleveland
et al., 2000; Miller and Shao, 1990).
Britz and van der Mensbrugghe (2016)’s contribution is important because
their research highlights the relevance of using disaggregated pre-model
estimation to construct the baseline so that the aggregation bias can be reduced.
Other studies have discussed the aggregation of elasticities for CGE models and
its consequences, highlighting the importance of preserving sectorial detail
(Horridge, 2018). The aggregation bias becomes more relevant when
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implementing sector-specific policies. However, the aggregation in this chapter
facilitates the analysis of the conclusions in Chapter V when looking at the
effects of a “clean” sector versus a “dirty” one. Another advantage of an
aggregated model is that it is easy to calibrate and converge.
For the case of regulating the fossil fuel electricity power generation, it is
important to note that there will be strong linkages across industries because the
fossil fuel sector is also categorized as part of the manufacturing sector. Fossil
fuels are also present in the accounts of GTAP as extractive industries, such as
the coal, oil, and gas production industries (see Table B.1; the GTAP database
contains accounts for extractive industries such as oil, coal, gas, petroleum
products, and gas manufacture and distribution).
I expect that when a regulatory policy is imposed on fossil fuel power
generation, the general equilibrium effects will manifest in the manufacturing
industry. The regulation of the fossil fuel industry will affect the manufacturing
industry even when the manufacturing industry remains unregulated, and will
have implications on the international trade of commodities, especially in
unilateral cases. In Chapter VIII, I will present a disaggregated manufacturing
sector to provide more insight into the general equilibrium effects. I also expect
strong linkages across power generation technologies. The fossil fuel generation
category includes the coal, gas, and oil generation technologies while the
renewable category includes the hydro, solar, and wind generation technologies.
Other relevant accounts are nuclear power generation and transmission and
electricity distribution.
Table VII.1 summarizes the information on the aggregation used for the
illustrative calculations in this chapter. The 76 sectors and 141 regions in the
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GTAP database were reduced to six sectors and two regions.
Table VII.1. Sector and Regions in the Aggregation Of Chapter VII
Economic Sectors
Food Agriculture and food processing
Mnfc Manufacturing (includes coal, oil and gas manufacturing)
Serv Services
Power Generation
Fos Coal, gas, oil
Ren Nuclear, wind, hydro, solar,other
TnD Transmission and Distribution of Electricity
Regions
USA United States
ROW Rest of the World
VII.2. Constraints on Emissions
Table VII.2 shows the illustrative notation for implementing the
constraints of emissions in the canonical model. The top panel shows Scenario 1,
in which the regulation is applied to all economic sectors. The cases of Scenario 1
correspond to the cases presented in Chapter IV: the harmonized1 and unilateral
policy cases. Each policy has two cases: the C&T case and the IS case. Similarly,
the bottom panel presents the constraints of emissions of Scenario 2. The only
difference between Scenario 1 and 2 is that Scenario 2 regulates emissions from
fossil fuel power generation. For each scenario, there are four simulations, as in
Chapter V: the harmonized C&T case, the unilateral C&T case, the harmonized
IS case, and the unilateral IS case.
1Somebody can think about regulating global emissions in the harmonized case of Scenario 1.
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Table VII.2. Implementation of Environmental Regulations in the CGE Model






































































As presented in Chapter V, the harmonized C&T case will regulate the
emissions for all regions and economic sectors, and the harmonized IS case will
regulate the emissions for all regions and economic sectors divided by the total
output (xs). In GTAP, xs is the total supply of a product in the economy that
includes imported and domestic goods. In the unilateral case, the regulation
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applies only to the USA. In Table VII.2, emisBAU represents the baseline value of
emissions. The percentage of emission reduction is represented as pol. For the
unilateral regulation case, the set r is replaced with USA because the regulation
is applied only in the USA. For the regulation of fossil fuel power generation, the
set a is replaced with fos to indicate that only the fossil fuel electricity
generation is regulated.
VII.3. Illustrative Calculations
In this section, I will discuss several simulations to illustrate the
application of environmental regulations in the canonical model. I will report
simulations that illustrate the importance of targeting regulations to set carbon
prices globally, and the importance of complete regulation. The Scenario 1 and 2
results are suitable for aiding in the understanding of the environmental policies’
role. In these simulations, I consider the economic impact of the unilateral
regional carbon price and compare C&T systems with IS systems. For illustrative
purposes, I will focus only on the results for the USA and ROW. The top panel of
Table VII.3 contains the change (as a simple difference) in emissions with respect
to the baseline. The lower panel contains the change in output with respect to
the baseline.
The regulatory policy separates the results in each panel of Table VII.3:
BAU, C&T, and IS. To construct Table VII.3, for each case, I solved the model to
find the policy value that reports the higher value of the aggregated equivalent
variation minus the emissions priced by the social cost of carbon reported by the
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Table VII.3. Welfare and Emissions Scenario Comparison based onGTAP 10 -Power
Database (Social Cost of Carbon $36 per metric ton of CO2)

















BAU ROW 0.00 60.14 33.54 0.00 0.506 5.472 4.852 9.730 0.015 0.035 20.612
BAU USA 0.00 17.20 11.98 0.00 0.106 0.464 1.405 2.067 0.001 0.001 4.044
BAU World2 0.00 77.34 45.53 0.00 0.612 5.937 6.257 11.798 0.016 0.036 24.656
Scenario: Regulating emissions from all economic sectors Change with respect the BAU
Harmonized Policies
C&T ROW 2.20 1.26% 2.01% 32.06 0.000 0.118 -0.053 -0.518 0.000 0.000 -0.453
C&T USA 2.20 0.98% 1.00% 32.06 0.000 0.012 -0.015 -0.086 0.000 0.000 -0.089
C&T World 2.20 1.20% 1.74% 32.06 0.000 0.130 -0.068 -0.604 0.000 0.000 -0.542
IS ROW 2.10 1.26% 2.00% 31.81 0.000 -0.089 0.002 -0.345 0.000 0.000 -0.433
IS USA 2.10 0.97% 1.00% 31.81 0.000 0.062 -0.001 -0.146 0.000 0.000 -0.085
IS World 2.10 1.19% 1.74% 31.81 0.000 -0.028 0.001 -0.491 0.000 0.000 -0.518
Unilateral Policies
C&TU ROW NA 1.18% 1.63% NA -0.001 -0.257 -0.032 -0.030 0.006 0.025 -0.291
C&TU USA 8.30 0.78% 1.75% 58.86 0.001 -0.048 -0.002 -0.287 0.000 0.001 -0.336
C&TU World 2.54 1.09% 1.66% NA -0.001 -0.305 -0.034 -0.318 0.006 0.025 -0.626
ISU ROW NA 1.19% 1.65% NA -0.001 -0.024 -0.108 -0.001 0.006 0.025 -0.070
ISU USA 8.20 0.83% 1.73% 58.26 0.001 0.067 -0.005 -0.395 0.000 0.001 -0.732
ISU World 1.77 1.11% 1.67% NA -0.001 0.043 -0.113 -0.397 0.006 0.025 -0.802
Scenario: Regulating emissions from power generation Change with respect the BAU
Harmonized Policies
C&TFOS ROW 4.40 1.18% 1.78% 31.50 0.000 -0.011 0.002 -0.898 0.000 0.000 -0.907
C&TFOS USA 4.40 0.72% 1.23% 31.50 0.000 -0.067 -0.100 -0.011 0.000 0.000 -0.178
C&TFOS World 4.40 1.08% 1.63% 31.50 0.000 -0.078 -0.098 -0.908 0.000 0.000 -1.085
ISFOS ROW 3.80 1.18% 1.81% 33.79 0.000 -0.014 0.002 -0.772 0.000 0.000 -0.783
ISFOS USA 3.80 0.71% 1.11% 33.79 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.153 0.000 0.000 -0.154
ISFOS World 3.80 1.07% 1.63% 33.79 0.000 -0.013 0.002 -0.925 0.000 0.000 -0.937
Unilateral Policies
C&TFOSU ROW NA 1.18% 1.63% NA -0.001 -0.023 -0.008 -0.002 0.006 0.025 -0.003
C&TFOSU USA 18.20 0.79% 1.77% 56.75 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.737 0.000 0.001 -0.736
C&TFOSU World 3.00 1.09% 1.67% NA -0.001 -0.022 -0.010 -0.739 0.006 0.025 -0.739
ISFOSU ROW NA 1.19% 1.63% NA -0.001 -0.033 -0.064 -0.002 0.006 0.025 -0.104
ISFOSU USA 18.10 0.84% 1.77% 57.45 0.001 -0.222 -0.002 -0.510 0.000 0.001 -0.332
ISFOSU World 3.25 1.11% 1.67% NA -0.001 -0.255 -0.066 -0.511 0.006 0.025 -0.435
a. Policy Abbreviations: BAU - Business as Usual, C&T - Cap and Trade, IS - Intensity Standard. Subscript U denotes
unilateral regulations, in those cases only USA regulates emissions. Cases labeled with ’FOS’ denote that the regulation
was applied only to the fossil fuel electricity generation.
b. For the C&T scenarios, emissions reductions is the % of emissions reductions with respect to the BAU. For the IS
scenarios, the emissions is the % of emissions reductions per output with respect to the BAU scenario. World emissions
reductions is the total % of emissions reductions with respect to the BAU.
c. Welfare is equivalent variation minus the social cost of carbon at reported by EPA for 2015 $36 per metric ton CO2eq .
See https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climatechange/social-cost-carbon_.html
d. CO2eq: carbon dioxide equivalent units. Mt. Ton: metric tons.
e. Sectors and regions abbreviations: ROW - Rest of the World, USA - United States, Food & Agric. - Food and Agriculture,
Manuf. & Transp. - Manufacturing and Transportation, Serv. - Services, Elec. Fos. - Fossil power generation,
Elec. Ren.- Renewable power generation, Elec. TnD. - Electricity Transmission and Distribution, NA - not available,
World represents the geographic coverage in the GTAP 10 database and not necessarily means
a complete representation of the globe. Total emissions might not correspond to the overall global emissions registered
in 2014 but to the sectors and regions registered in the GTAP database.
Source: Own elaboration based on GTAP 10 database.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for 2015 $36 per metric ton of CO23. This




Table VII.4. Welfare and Emissions Scenario Comparison based onGTAP 10 -Power
Database (Social Cost of Carbon USD $100 per metric ton of CO2)

















BAU ROW 0.00 58,819.32 31,483.38 0.00 0.506 5.472 4.852 9.730 0.015 0.035 20.612
BAU USA 0.00 16,943.71 11,580.19 0.00 0.106 0.464 1.405 2.067 0.001 0.001 4.044
BAU World 0.00 75,763.03 43,063.57 0.00 0.612 5.937 6.257 11.798 0.016 0.036 24.656
Scenario: Regulating emissions from all economic sectors Change with respect the BAU
Harmonized Policies
C&T ROW 4.20 3.71 13.58 100.97 0.000 -0.295 -0.053 -0.518 0.000 0.000 -0.866
C&T USA 4.20 3.22 9.34 100.97 -0.001 -0.068 -0.015 -0.086 0.000 0.000 -0.170
C&T World 4.20 3.60 12.44 100.97 -0.001 -0.362 -0.068 -0.604 0.000 0.000 -1.036
IS ROW 5.10 3.60 13.44 95.84 0.000 -0.708 0.002 -0.345 0.000 0.000 -1.051
IS USA 5.10 2.90 9.27 95.84 0.000 -0.060 -0.001 -0.146 0.000 0.000 -0.206
IS World 5.10 3.45 12.32 95.84 0.000 -0.767 0.001 -0.491 0.000 0.000 -1.257
Unilateral Policies
C&TU ROW NA 3.71 13.58 NA -0.001 -0.257 -0.032 -0.030 0.006 0.025 -0.291
C&TU USA 10.70 3.22 9.34 131.49 0.001 -0.145 -0.002 -0.287 0.000 0.001 -0.433
C&TU World 2.93 3.60 12.44 NA -0.001 -0.402 -0.034 -0.318 0.006 0.025 -0.723
ISU ROW NA 3.60 13.44 NA -0.001 -0.024 -0.108 -0.001 0.006 0.025 -0.104
ISU USA 7.40 2.90 9.27 135.84 0.001 0.100 -0.005 -0.395 0.000 0.001 -0.299
ISU World 1.64 3.45 12.32 NA -0.001 0.076 -0.113 -0.397 0.006 0.025 -0.403
Scenario: Regulating emissions from power generation Change with respect the BAU
Harmonized Policies
C&TFOS ROW 6.30 3.71 13.58 106.01 0.000 -0.011 0.002 -1.289 0.000 0.000 -1.299
C&TFOS USA 6.30 3.22 9.34 106.01 0.000 -0.067 -0.100 -0.087 0.000 0.000 -0.255
C&TFOS World 6.30 3.60 12.44 106.01 0.000 -0.078 -0.098 -1.377 0.000 0.000 -1.553
ISFOS ROW 12.50 3.60 13.44 116.52 0.000 -0.014 0.002 -2.565 0.000 0.000 -2.576
ISFOS USA 12.50 2.90 9.27 116.52 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.505 0.000 0.000 -0.506
ISFOS World 12.50 3.45 12.32 116.52 0.000 -0.013 0.002 -3.070 0.000 0.000 -3.082
Unilateral Policies
C&TFOSU ROW NA 3.71 13.58 NA -0.001 -0.023 -0.008 -0.002 0.006 0.025 -0.003
C&TFOSU USA 16.90 3.22 9.34 145.32 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.684 0.000 0.001 -0.683
C&TFOSU World 2.79 3.60 12.44 NA -0.001 -0.022 -0.010 -0.686 0.006 0.025 -0.687
ISFOSU ROW NA 3.60 13.44 NA -0.001 -0.033 -0.064 -0.002 0.006 0.025 -0.070
ISFOSU USA 14.80 2.90 9.27 146.47 0.001 -0.222 -0.002 -0.376 0.000 0.001 -0.599
ISFOSU World 2.71 3.45 12.32 NA -0.001 -0.255 -0.066 -0.378 0.006 0.025 -0.668
a. Policy Abbreviations: BAU - Business as Usual, C&T - Cap and Trade, IS - Intensity Standard. Subscript U denotes
unilateral regulations, in those cases only USA regulates emissions. Cases labeled with ’FOS’ denote that the regulation
was applied only to the fossil fuel electricity generation.
b. For the C&T scenarios, emissions reductions is the % of emissions reductions with respect to the BAU. For the IS
scenarios, the emissions is the % of emissions reductions per output with respect to the BAU scenario. World emissions
reductions is the total % of emissions reductions with respect to the BAU.
c. Welfare is equivalent variation minus the social cost of carbon assumed at $100 per metric ton CO2eq .
d. CO2eq: carbon dioxide equivalent units. Mt. Ton: metric tons.
e. Sectors and regions abbreviations: ROW - Rest of the World, USA - United States, Food & Agric. - Food and Agriculture,
Manuf. & Transp. - Manufacturing and Transportation, Serv. - Services, Elec. Fos. - Fossil power generation,
Elec. Ren.- Renewable power generation, Elec. TnD. - Electricity Transmission and Distribution, NA - not available,
World represents the geographic coverage in the GTAP 10 database and not necessarily means
a complete representation of the globe. Total emissions might not correspond to the overall global emissions registered
in 2014 but to the sectors and regions registered in the GTAP database.
Source: Own elaboration based on GTAP 10 database.
welfare. Policymakers generally assume an exogenous carbon price and describe a
given policy’s effects on the overall economy. However, a given carbon price will
result in an equilibrium that is probably not the optimum. In this chapter, a
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welfare maximizer equilibrium is reported with its associated endogenous carbon
price. The amount of emission reduction is given by the policy that maximizes
the overall welfare.
As I did in Chapter V, I solved the model for every possible value of the
policy to identify the equilibrium that would report the higher welfare. Table
VII.3 I reports the maximum RGDP and maximum EV value minus the damages
caused by the emissions. The subscript “U” denotes unilateral cases. The
sectorial regulation is indicated by “FOS”; for example, C&TFOSU refers to the
unilateral C&T regulation applied to fossil fuel for electricity generation.
Here, “harmonized” refers to all regions implementing coordinated
regulatory policies. It does not necessarily mean complete regulations; some of
the sectors in Scenario 2 remain unregulated in both regions. The relative prices
play an essential role in the solution of the model. The carbon price and
emissions are endogenous for all cases. It is important to note that unilateral
cases correspond to a setup where the carbon price is determined locally whereas
harmonized cases determine the global carbon price.
In Table VII.3, the EV values are larger for the C&T harmonized cases than
for the IS harmonized cases. This is true for both the regulation of all economic
sectors and the regulation of fossil fuel for power generation. The welfare values
for the harmonized cases are larger than those for the unilateral cases. The RGDP
values are also larger for the C&T harmonized cases than for the unilateral cases.
The resulting carbon price is lower for the harmonized cases.
The largest change in emissions is achieved with IS cases. The result is
consistent with those of Chapter V: the IS cases report the largest welfare values
for unilateral regulation. In the GTAP-Power 10 database, the average emission
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reduction amounts compared to the baseline range from 2 to 4% in the
harmonized cases and from 8 to 18% in the unilateral cases. The results of the
GTAP staandard model suggest that the optimal policy depends on whether or
not countries coordinate environmental regulations in both cases (i.e., regulating
all economic sectors and regulating only the fossil fuel power generation sector),
the same conclusions as in Chapter V. In the end, electricity power generation
can be seen as a global technology because most countries tend to use the same
technologies to produce electricity. Furthermore, global companies incur similar
costs when producing electricity.
The bottom panel of Table VII.3 presents the results of production. The
results change dramatically for the unilateral cases. The production in
manufacturing and services is reduced more significantly in the unilateral cases
than in the harmonized cases in the ROW. Gains in the ROWmanifest in the
electricity sector, producing more of the “dirty” and “clean” goods in the
electricity sector when the USA regulates the power industry.
Table VII.4 serves as a sensitivity analysis presenting the case of $100 as a
social cost of carbon. A different baseline is obtained, when a larger social cost of
carbon is used to discount emissions from the aggregated equivalent variation,
therefore the equilibrium results are different as the ones presented in Table
VII.3. The results show larger endogenous carbon prices, and depending on the
economic sector and policy, larger emissions reductions. Table VII.4 has the
purpose to illustrate the role of the social cost of carbon, the results of the rest of
the chapter rely on the case of $36 as a social cost of carbon.
Table VII.6 shows that the distribution of the production factors is altered
equally for the C&T and IS cases. However, the C&T case has less effects on the
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capital reductions in the manufacturing sector and fossil fuel industry than the IS
case.
Table VII.7 shows the reductions of the capital and labor production
factors in the renewable energy and fossil fuel industries. The ROW reduces the
capital investments in the renewable energy sector when the USA implements
unilateral regulations in the fossil fuel industry. The increments of capital and
skilled labor in the fossil fuel industry are smaller in relation to the reductions of
capital investments in the renewable energy sector.
The IS unilateral regulation has effects on the production factors in the
country or region that regulates them. Table VII.7 shows that the labor
reductions in the fossil fuel sector will go to the manufacturing sector and that
there will be a reduction in capital in the countries that do not regulate. The
effects of production factors are distributed equally in most cases.
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Table VII.5. Output Scenario Comparison based on GTAP 10 -Power Database (So-
cial Cost of Carbon USD 36 per metric ton of CO2)
Outputb. ($ Million)










BAU ROW 9,207.85 43,785.28 69,001.42 1,264.67 470.76 611.01 124,340.99
BAU USA 1,375.26 7,507.71 21,831.70 249.54 118.54 74.57 31,157.31
BAU World 10,583.11 51,292.99 90,833.11 1,514.21 589.29 685.58 155,498.30
Change with respect the BAU
Scenario: Regulating emissions from all economic sectors
Harmonized Policies
C&T ROW -1.48 -67.41 42.97 -20.05 -0.11 -0.45 -46.53
C&T USA -2.26 5.47 2.20 -8.28 -0.22 -0.14 -3.24
C&T World -3.74 -61.94 45.17 -28.33 -0.34 -0.59 -49.77
IS ROW -1.51 -68.55 43.71 -20.38 -0.12 -0.46 -47.31
IS USA -2.30 5.58 2.22 -8.42 -0.23 -0.15 -3.29
IS World -3.81 -62.98 45.93 -28.79 -0.34 -0.60 -50.60
Unilateral Policies
C&TU ROW 164.54 -554.68 -455.15 43.09 25.81 42.39 -734.00
C&TU USA 9.40 32.22 -39.66 -21.64 -0.44 -0.32 -20.44
C&TU World 173.95 -522.46 -494.81 21.45 25.37 42.07 -754.44
ISU ROW 164.54 -554.68 -455.15 43.09 25.81 42.39 -734.00
ISU USA 9.40 32.22 -39.66 -21.64 -0.44 -0.32 -20.44
ISU World 173.95 -522.46 -494.81 21.45 25.37 42.07 -754.44
Scenario: Regulating emissions from power generation
Harmonized Policies
C&TFOS ROW -1.44 -65.69 41.88 -19.55 -0.11 -0.44 -45.35
C&TFOS USA -2.20 5.30 2.16 -8.09 -0.22 -0.14 -3.18
C&TFOS World -3.63 -60.39 44.04 -27.64 -0.33 -0.58 -48.53
ISFOS ROW -1.89 -82.04 52.30 -24.23 -0.14 -0.55 -56.53
ISFOS USA -2.79 6.92 2.47 -9.93 -0.27 -0.17 -3.77
ISFOS World -4.67 -75.12 54.77 -34.15 -0.41 -0.72 -60.30
Unilateral Policies
C&TFOSU ROW 165.01 -550.19 -457.89 43.04 25.83 42.41 -731.79
C&TFOSU USA 8.93 30.18 -38.55 -20.90 -0.43 -0.31 -21.08
C&TFOSU World 173.94 -520.01 -496.44 22.14 25.40 42.10 -752.88
ISFOSU ROW 165.01 -550.19 -457.89 43.04 25.83 42.41 -731.79
ISFOSU USA 8.93 30.18 -38.55 -20.90 -0.43 -0.31 -21.08
ISFOSU World 173.94 -520.01 -496.44 22.14 25.40 42.10 -752.88
a. Policy Abbreviations: BAU - Business as Usual, C&T - Cap and Trade, IS - Intensity Standard. Subscript U denotes
unilateral regulations, in those cases only USA regulates emissions. Cases labeled with ’FOS’ denote that the regulation
was applied only to the fossil fuel electricity generation.
b. Sectors and regions abbreviations: ROW - Rest of the World, USA - United States, Food & Agric. - Food and Agriculture,
Manuf. & Transp. - Manufacturing and Transportation, Serv. - Services, Elec. Fos. - Fossil power generation,
Elec. Ren.- Renewable power generation, Elec. TnD. - Electricity Transmission and Distribution, NA - not available,
World represents the geographic coverage in the GTAP 10 database and not necessarily means
a complete representation of the globe. Total emissions might not correspond to the overall global emissions registered
in 2014 but to the sectors and regions registered in the GTAP database.
Source: Own elaboration based on GTAP 10 database.
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Table VII.6. Effects on Production Factors
Food and Agriculture Manufacturing and Transportation Services
Casea. Region Capital Land Skilled Labor Capital Natural Skilled Labor Capital Skilled Labor
labor resources labor labor
BAU ROW 1,170.930 610.195 266.671 1,190.634 6,014.433 949.233 1,425.523 1,425.523 18,155.578 7,932.808 7,147.003
BAU USA 171.203 46.803 106.477 112.595 689.126 102.926 605.549 605.549 3,329.279 5,129.207 3,172.335
Change with respect the BAU
Scenario: Regulating emissions from all economic sectors
Harmonized Policies
C&T ROW -0.227 0.000 -0.085 -0.192 -9.959 0.000 -2.636 -2.636 12.310 3.287 5.334
C&T USA -0.285 0.000 -0.201 -0.213 0.693 0.000 0.403 0.403 1.475 -0.100 -0.100
IS ROW -0.232 0.000 -0.087 -0.196 -5.129 0.000 -2.681 -2.681 12.520 3.343 5.425
IS USA -0.291 0.000 -0.205 -0.217 0.706 0.000 0.412 0.412 1.497 -0.103 -0.104
Unilateral Policies
C&TU ROW 188.117 -0.606 54.928 198.561 -46.992 -0.962 -7.182 -7.182 -147.379 -50.060 -133.892
C&TU USA 1.323 -0.047 0.796 0.801 3.345 -0.103 2.703 2.703 -4.157 -9.111 -7.971
ISU ROW 188.117 -0.606 54.928 198.561 -42.992 -0.962 -7.182 -7.182 -135.379 -50.060 -133.892
ISU USA 1.323 -0.047 0.796 0.801 3.345 -0.103 2.703 2.703 -4.157 -9.111 -7.971
Scenario: Regulating emissions from power generation
Harmonized Policies
C&TFOS ROW -0.220 0.000 -0.083 -0.186 -9.705 0.000 -2.569 -2.569 11.997 3.204 5.198
C&TFOS USA -0.278 0.000 -0.196 -0.207 0.673 0.000 0.391 0.391 1.442 -0.095 -0.094
ISFOS ROW -0.290 0.000 -0.107 -0.247 -12.122 0.000 -3.208 -3.208 14.978 3.999 6.498
ISFOS USA -0.353 0.000 -0.248 -0.263 -4.134 0.000 0.516 0.516 1.744 -0.145 -0.157
Unilateral Policies
C&TFOSU ROW 188.194 -0.606 54.949 198.633 -46.317 -0.962 -7.005 -7.005 -148.138 -50.262 -134.258
C&TFOSU USA 1.256 -0.047 0.755 0.760 3.138 -0.103 2.525 2.525 -4.046 -8.899 -7.707
ISFOSU ROW 188.194 -0.606 54.949 198.633 -46.317 -0.962 -7.005 -7.005 -148.138 -50.262 -134.258
ISFOSU USA 1.256 -0.047 0.755 0.760 3.138 -0.103 9.525 9.525 -4.046 -8.899 -7.707
a. Policy Abbreviations: BAU - Business as Usual, C&T - Cap and Trade, IS - Intensity Standard. Subscript U denotes
unilateral regulations, in those cases only USA regulates emissions. Cases labeled with ’FOS’ denote that the regulation
was applied only to the fossil fuel electricity generation.
Source: Own elaboration based on GTAP 10 database.
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Table VII.7. Effects on Production Factors
Fossil Power Generation Renewable Power Generation Transmission and Distribution
Casea. Region Capital Skilled Labor Capital Skilled Labor Capital Skilled Labor
labor labor labor
BAU ROW 124.295 30.263 34.533 270.604 25.922 26.481 139.550 73.281 26.481
BAU USA 52.530 2.106 8.056 72.796 4.256 7.172 6.074 11.074 7.172
Change with respect the BAU
Scenario: Regulating emissions from all economic sectors
Harmonized Policies
C&T ROW -1.967 -0.486 -0.544 -0.061 -0.012 -0.004 -0.096 -0.068 -0.004
C&T USA -1.740 -0.071 -0.270 -0.133 -0.010 -0.016 -0.010 -0.022 -0.016
IS ROW 3.001 -0.494 -0.553 -0.062 -0.012 -0.004 1.902 -0.069 -0.004
IS USA -1.768 -0.072 -0.275 -0.135 -0.010 -0.016 -0.010 -0.023 -0.016
Unilateral Policies
C&TU ROW 1.234 0.273 -0.023 -15.115 -1.663 -1.945 -7.819 -4.589 -1.945
C&TU USA -4.547 -0.183 -0.706 -0.262 -0.017 -0.034 -0.022 -0.046 -0.034
ISU ROW 1.234 0.273 -0.023 -15.115 -1.663 0.055 -7.819 -4.589 0.055
ISU USA -4.547 -0.183 -0.706 -0.262 -0.017 -0.034 -0.022 -0.046 -0.034
Scenario: Regulating emissions from power generation
Harmonized Policies
C&TFOS ROW -1.918 -0.474 -0.531 -0.060 -0.012 -0.004 -0.094 -0.067 -0.004
C&TFOS USA -1.699 -0.069 -0.264 -0.129 -0.009 -0.016 -0.009 -0.022 -0.016
ISFOS ROW -2.377 -0.587 -0.658 -0.072 -0.015 -0.005 -0.117 -0.083 -0.005
ISFOS USA -2.085 -0.085 -0.324 3.839 -0.012 -0.020 -0.012 -0.027 -0.020
Unilateral Policies
C&TFOSU ROW 1.229 0.272 -0.024 -15.107 -1.661 -1.944 -7.815 -4.586 -1.944
C&TFOSU USA -4.392 -0.177 -0.682 -0.256 -0.017 -0.033 -0.022 -0.045 -0.033
ISFOSU ROW 1.229 0.272 -0.024 -18.107 -1.661 -1.944 -7.815 -4.586 -1.944
ISFOSU USA -4.392 -0.177 -0.682 1.744 -0.017 -0.033 -0.022 -0.045 -0.033
a. Policy Abbreviations: BAU - Business as Usual, C&T - Cap and Trade, IS - Intensity Standard. Subscript U denotes
unilateral regulations, in those cases only USA regulates emissions. Cases labeled with ’FOS’ denote that the regulation
was applied only to the fossil fuel electricity generation.
Source: Own elaboration based on GTAP 10 database.
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VII.4. Conclusions
The study results presented in this chapter provide further insights on the
results presented in the previous chapters. Unilateral regulation will cause
emissions to leak to the sectors and countries that are not regulated. The policy
values are important because they show how the regulation interacts with the
overall economy. The results of the GTAP model suggest important general
equilibrium effects on labor and capital markets. The hypothetical case of
regulating the fossil fuel industry unilaterally in the USA shows that the country
that regulates will implicitly pay higher endogenous carbon prices than in the
harmonized cases. Unilateral and incomplete regulation is costly in that it will
lead to larger carbon endogenous prices and to the factor re-allocation of capital
and labor to the unregulated industries and regions. Harmonized policies across
regions and sectors are always preferred because such policies report larger
overall welfare. Furthermore, the choice of the regulatory instrument determines
the size of the effects. IS has proven to be a superior instrument to a C&T
mechanism for incomplete and unilateral regulation cases. The conclusions
presented in this chapter should be considered carefully. While the results
represent the best estimates that can be made with the available tools, there may
be cases like the ISFOSU where the model did not reach its maximum even with
the total emission reductions. 5
5For example, in the case of the IS, fossil fuel may require a parameter value greater than 100
to converge toward a maximum. Those cases are unfeasible to implement in a comparative statics
model because one cannot tell exactly where the maximum is.
119
CHAPTER VIII
DYNAMIC CGE: EMISSIONS REGULATIONS APPLIED TO THE ELECTRICITY
SECTOR
In this chapter, I present a dynamic formulation of the GTAP model
(van der Mensbrugghe, 2018). The model is recursive-dynamic. The baseline is
calibrated to the published forecast of GDP and population data from the
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis – Socio-Economic Pathways
(Riahi et al., 2017). The process of constructing the baseline is described in detail
in Britz and Roson (2019a). The simulation results mostly rely on the baseline,
and so it is crucial to have a consistent baseline with the policies to be analyzed.
The primary data source utilized in this chapter is the same as the
database described in Chapter VII (GTAP-Power database with the CO2 and air
pollution emissions modules). Country aggregation was performed, taking into
account the classification of primary energy producers and exporters (as in Peters
(2016a)) and also accounting for the fact that the regions represented in the data
have a better quality of data.
This chapter’s model addresses a slightly different question than the one
addressed in previous chapters. This chapter will assess the effectiveness of the
regulations in achieving carbon targets in the power sector by 2050. Therefore,
the research question is; given the policy, what is the best regulatory instrument
(in terms of maximizing overall welfare minus the global emissions multiplied by
the social cost of carbon) for achieving the net-zero target for electricity
generation? The model is used to compare environmental regulations in terms of
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the resulting economic outcomes (Real Gross Domestic Product and equivalent
variation) to achieve emissions targets for power generation.
There is great interest among policymakers in what is known as the ’clean
generation mix’ or ’net-zero emissions’ for electricity generation. There are
multiple papers relating to the achievement of carbon targets in the future
(Matthews et al., 2018). The aim of this target is for the energy mix to come
entirely from renewable sources by 2050. A dynamic setting is useful in this
context because it allows analysis of targets such as this. Furthermore, the
harmonized cases takes into account targets set by several nations, making it a
cross-country analysis.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) set the climate
target to 1.5 °C and “concluded that global emissions need to reach net-zero
around the mid-21st century to give a reasonable chance of limiting warming to
1.5 °C”(Gasser and Luderer, 2018; International Carbon Action Partnership,
2020). This chapter uses a simulation exercise to examine the mid-century
net-zero emissions policy in the energy sector. As in the previous chapter,
emissions corresponding to extractive industries such as coal, gas, and oil are
discussed. However, the regulation will only be applied to the electricity sector.
The first section of this chapter covers the aggregation of commodities and
countries; the second section explains the policies represented in the chapter;
the third section presents a discussion of the model, the fourth section presents
the results. The last section provides a conclusion.
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VIII.1. Commodity and Region Aggregation
In this chapter, energy goods are aggregated to greater detail to account
for each power generating technology. Table VIII.1 presents the results of the
aggregation.
The more disaggregated dataset presented in this chapter retains all
regions and markets from the GTAP-Power 10 database. The accounts of oil
(crude oil), coal (coal), p_c (petroleum and coal products), and gas (natural gas
extraction) are presented together with a full disaggregation of the energy sector.
The variables and the notation presented in Chapter VII are valid for the
discussion in the present chapter; as mentioned in Chapter VI, a significant
advantage of Britz and van der Mensbrugghe (2018a) is that it created uniform
notation that allows for model comparison. Table VIII.1 presents the sector and
country aggregation used for the analysis.




En_Int_Ind Energy Intensitive Industries
Gas Natural Gas Extraction
Oil Crude Oil
















CHINA China + HKG
EUx European Union + others
EXAs SE Asian Exporters
EXLA Latin American Exporters
IND India
JPN Japan




XE Rest of Europe
ZAF South Africa
RoW Rest of the World
Other includes biomass, solar thermal, geothermal, bio-gas, biomass, solid waste incineration, etc.
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VIII.2. Constraints on Emissions
The constraints on emissions differ from those in the previous chapter due
to the dynamics of the model. To achieve annual environmental targets, a new
equilibrium is found with a proportion of emissions that have to be contributed
by the end of the period when the target is achieved.
Table VIII.2 presents the constraints on emissions for the environmental
targets that correspond to the illustrative calculations. In Table VIII.2, the
cumulative yearly reductions represent the environmental target to get to 100%
emissions reductions for 2050. Note that each period in the economy will behave
differently (or not) depending on how the relative prices respond to the next
period’s economic conditions. Since the model is larger –relative to the model
presented in the previous chapter– and includes more years, countries, and
sectors than in the previous chapter, the approach is slightly different. All
emissions from fossil fuel electricity generation are reduced by the end of the
period (2050); in 2050, the sum of emissions from fossil fuel sources will be
reduced by 100% 1.
Table VIII.2 presents similar notation as in Table VII.2. The description of
the variables is presented in Table VI.2 and emisBAU refers to the baseline
emissions. pol is a parameter that denotes the end period (100% emissions
reduction from power generation) target to be distributed over the years.
1Because themodel will not report feasible solutions for all the cases to achieve 100% emissions
reductions for power generation, the feasible solution for this chapter is the one that reports the
largest possible emissions reductions from power generation for each case. See Table VIII.4 for a
detail of the emissions covered in the model
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Table VIII.2. Implementation of Environmental Regulations in the Dy-
namic CGE Model








emisBAU (r, fos) ∗
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1− pol ∗ (t−1)(T−1)
)
Unilateral policies
C&TFOSU emis(USA, fos) = emisBAU (USA, fos) ∗ (1− pol ∗
(







∗ (1− pol ∗
(
1− pol ∗ (t−1)(T−1)
)
VIII.3. Illustrative Calculations Dynamic Version
Several papers focus on emissions reduction targets that result in
international cooperation agreements, such as the United Nations International
Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) (European Comission, 2015). In the recent years
several countries have compromised on emission reductions targets for power
generation (either percentage of emissions reductions from a baseline or a limit
to emissions to the country’s GDP). These international agreements are
sub-optimal cooperation measures to curve carbon emissions because
participation is voluntary, and the targets are determined unilaterally by each
country. As discussed in the previous chapters, lack of coordination does not
guarantee that the countries that produce a significant quantity of emissions will
participate and does not ensure that the global target is the one that maximizes
overall welfare. Furthermore, countries that decide not to participate could
benefit from the overall reduction of emissions without reducing emissions
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themselves.
The version of the model used in this chapter is called GRDEM developed
by Britz and van der Mensbrugghe (2018a) 2. The constructed model is based on
CES formulations (similarly to standard GTAP) using constant returns to scale.
Therefore, the total product is not defined by the model but by the cost
minimization problem (Britz and Roson, 2019a). The results of this chapter are
based on a Constant Demand Elasticity specification for the household demand.
The representative household for each region receives income and distributes it
among savings and consumption by maximizing a social welfare function. These
standard assumptions can be changed in different versions of the GTAP model.
There are several choices for final demand, including different specifications such
as Constant Demand Elasticity (CDE), the Cobb Douglas function, linear
expenditure system, the estimated modified implicit directly additive demand
system (MAIDADS) with nonlinear Engel curves, or the AIDAD system (which
requires parameters to be estimated econometrically) (Britz and Roson, 2019a).
More specifically, in the simulations presented in the tables below, I assess
the economic impact of unilateral and harmonized regulatory policies imposed on
electricity generation in the U.S. and the rest of the regions in the model. The
growth variables used to develop the dynamic scenarios are GDP growth and
population growth, which are exogenously imputed. The GDP and population
parameters are extracted from the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways -
Sustainability Scenario (Riahi et al., 2017)3.
The main architecture of the dynamic canonical model is flexible enough
2To implement the simulations, I used CGEBox (Britz and Roson, 2019a)
3See https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/SspDb/dsd?Action=htmlpage&page=80
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to accommodate a variety of cases for the analysis of environmental regulations4
is a flexible CGE tool based on GTAP data (Britz and van der Mensbrugghe,
2018a). The model’s main structure is based on a set of canonical assumptions
found in various CGE models (Britz and van der Mensbrugghe, 2018a). As
described in Chapter VI, these assumptions refer to competitive markets for
products and factors, cost minimization for the firm with production function
based on constant returns to scale, and zero profit conditions. Revenues for the
firms are obtained from selling goods in the market. Households maximize utility
subject to budget constraints. In addition, there is a global bank that collects
savings globally and allocates investments, this is a structure that serves as a
closure in most of the models (van der Mensbrugghe, 2018).
The model presented in this chapter is an adaptation of the model
proposed by (Britz and Roson, 2019b); A GTAP-Based Recursive Dynamic CGE
Model for Long-Term Baseline Generation and Analysis (GRDEM). The selection of
the model makes it possible to analyze the effects of the regulations in a recursive
dynamic setting in an economy calibrated with real data. The behavioral
parameters were estimated econometrically whenever possible using the
techniques presented (see (Roson and Britz, 2018b) and Appendix C). GRDEM
allows the calibration of different elasticity parameters and it is more flexible
than the standard GTAPinGAMS version (Lanz and Rutherford, 2016) described in
the previous chapter. GRDEM uses a recursive dynamic structure (2015-2050) for
the long-term baseline calibration, the intertemporal equilibirum is composed of
a sequence of several static equilibria. The first-year equilibrium in the sequence
4For a detailed specification of all the features see CGEBox documentation in https://www.
ilr.uni-bonn.de/em/rsrch/cgebox/cgebox_e.htm
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is the benchmark year. In each period, the model is solved for a different
equilibrium given the parameters and equations assumed for each period (Dixon
et al., 2013). For the benchmarking case, it is assumed that the economy is on a
balanced growth path. In the steady-state, all quantity variables grow at the same
rate, and prices remain constant.
VIII.4. Simulation Results
Since different assumptions will lead to a different equilibrium, four cases
were analyzed in detail: i) harmonized C&T on emissions to power generation
industries5, C&TFOS; ii) unilateral C&T system on emissions to power
generation (where the United States reduces emissions for electricity generation
to zero by 2050), ISFOS; iii) harmonized intensity standard regulation to power
generation industries, C&TFOSU ; and iv) unilateral intensity standard
regulation to power generation industries, ISFOSU .
The following Table VIII.3 shows the effects of the policies on GDP. The
baseline scenario corresponds to GDP resulting from maximizing welfare minus
the social cost of carbon, penalized at $36 per metric ton of CO2, whcih is an
important assumption imposed to the model. Emissions were constrained from
the United States electric power generation from fossil fuels to fall by 100%
gradually. In the first two cases, harmonized cases, C&TFOS and ISFOS,
emissions are reduced the most, and we observe an overall improvement of GDP
to 2050 . Furthermore, all countries and regions will grow by 2050. In the third
and fourth cases, unilateral cases, C&TFOSU and ISFOSU , the regulation was
5Themodel reports feasible solution of emissions reductions in all regions up to the closest value
to end period target of 100%of emissions reductions to 2050 (see Table VIII.4 for the resulting value
of emissions after applying the constraints). For the subsequent scenarios, the results correspond
to the case where overall emissions are reduced for electricity generation.
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Table VIII.3. Real GDP Effects: Socioeconomic Pathways Sustainability Scenario
Region BAU C&TFOS ISFOS C&TFOSU ISFOSU







Canada 1,767.48 0.71 0.78 -4.69 -3.48
Central Asia 440.63 3.15 3.09 -1.63 3.25
China + Hong Kong 10,396.78 1.34 2.00 -3.93 -3.73
European Union 19,660.90 0.40 0.16 -4.19 -4.08
India 1,981.14 3.42 3.17 -3.28 -2.21
Japan 4,566.41 0.86 0.85 -5.41 -4.95
Latin American Exporters 3,011.78 1.21 1.00 -4.55 -3.85
Middle East and North Africa 3,416.19 2.06 1.98 -4.07 -3.45
Nigeria 566.59 0.85 0.36 -4.92 -1.20
Rest of Europe 1,145.51 1.92 1.32 -5.53 -3.69
Russia 1,995.37 2.41 1.87 -3.31 -2.28
South Africa 335.90 4.96 4.19 4.79 4.50
South Asian Exporters 1,388.86 2.09 1.92 -3.43 -1.90
United States 17,207.51 0.37 0.12 -4.22 -4.10
Rest of the World 9,486.85 1.40 1.31 -1.75 0.58
Carbon Price: $/Mt.CO2eq 0.00 72.27 70.77 100.32 101.17
The baseline GDP corresponds to 2014 GTAP values minus the social cost of carbon at $36 per metric ton
(Mt.) of CO2.
applied to the emissions from the power sector from the United States in the case
of C&TFOSU and to the ratio of domestic emissions per output ISFOSU , which
reduces the ratio of emissions per output from the power generation sector (See
Table VIII.3). Because the emissions reduced overall are smaller in the unilateral
cases, the overall growth is compromised by the drastic measure imposed by one
country and one industry to reduce overall emissions from power generation
unilaterally.
Table VIII.4 presents the emissions reported by the model by case after
applying the constraints. Because the target is set to reduce emissions from the
power generation to 2050 by 100%, the exercise can be thought of as a net-zero
emissions case in the electricity sector, highlighting not the need for the right
instrument to achieve that target, but more importantly, highlighting the need of
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coordination across regions and industries to achieve that target. All countries
will reduce emissions from fossil fuels to zero in the harmonized scenarios, C&P
and IS, overall welfare will improve by 2050 in all regions, and the endogenous
carbons prices by 2050 would be lower as compared to the unilateral cases (see
last row of Table VIII.3). Therefore, what is interesting about this exercise,
besides learning which regulatory instrument performs better in achieving the
highest welfare is that the question about the regulatory mechanism becomes
less relevant and inconclusive because it is exogenously determined when the
goal is to chieve the largest possible amount of emissions reductions. The
relevant question, in this case, is about the feasibility of implementing
coordinated and harmonized policies to avoid negative effects in overall welfare.
Since the policy is an exogenously determined target, several economic
relationships have to change to accommodate the target in terms of production,
demand, and trade. Rich countries will not benefit from unilateral emissions
reductions because their GDP would be penalized for the social cost of carbon to
maximize overall welfare. In addition, reducing the emissions from fossil fuels in
the power sector will have consequences to extractive industries that are not
targeted by the regulation, such as coal mining, gas extraction, and so on.
It is interesting to note the changes in GDP to the BAU scenario in the
unilateral cases. Most of the effect will reflect in the United States case of the
C&T. The most significant change occurred in regions such as China, the
European Union, Canada, and Latin America. The reductions in output are
because achieving a clean energy mix in these countries is more costly because
they have fewer possibilities for substitution.
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Table VIII.4. Emissions by sector and scenario (Millions metric tons)
Priv.
cons. Economic Sectors














Prod. TnD Coal Gas Oil Other
BAUa.
ROW 905 42 200 155 1,196 8 35 96 103 0 1,536 522 18 1
USA 2,210 295 3,302 770 4,159 147 247 376 760 61 7,205 1,955 675 19
World 3,115 337 3,502 925 5,355 155 282 472 864 61 8,741 2,478 693 20
C&TFOSa.
ROW 724 37 116 119 1,172 2 5 10 52 0 77 1 0 0
USA 1,658 292 1,816 554 3,743 22 47 64 532 55 72 2 3 13
World 2,381 328 1,932 674 4,915 24 52 74 584 55 149 3 3 14
ISFOSa.
ROW 796 40 128 131 1,289 2 5 11 57 0 84 1 0 1
USA 1,873 330 2,052 626 4,230 25 53 72 601 62 81 2 3 15
World 2,669 370 2,180 757 5,519 27 58 83 658 62 166 3 3 16
C&TFOSU
a.
ROW 1,086 46 240 170 1,292 8 42 106 112 0 1,689 564 22 1
USA 1,658 292 1,816 554 3,743 22 47 64 532 55 72 2 3 13
World 2,743 338 2,056 725 5,035 30 89 169 644 55 1,762 566 24 14
ISFOSU
a.
ROW 1,411 60 312 221 1,679 11 55 137 145 0 2,196 733 28 1
USA 1,823 321 1,997 610 4,118 24 52 70 585 60 79 2 3 15
World 3,235 381 2,310 831 5,797 35 107 207 730 60 2,276 735 31 16
a. Scenario abbreviation: C&T - Cap and Trade, IS - Intensity Standard. Subscript U denotes unilateral regulations.
Only USA regulates emissions in unilateral cases.
’FOS’ denotes that the regulation was applied to fossil fuel electricity generation.
Economic sectors abbreviations: Agric. - Agriculture, Serv. - Services.
Energy related industries abbreviations: Gas Extrac. - Natural gas extraction, Oil Produc. - Refined Oil Products.
Electricity abbreviations: TnD - Transmission and Distribution. Other - Biomass and other renewable sources.
Other abbreviations: Priv. Cons.- Private consumption,
Nuclear, Solar, Wind, Hydro do not report emissions for the baseline.
Source: Own elaboration based on GTAP 10 database.
China was positively affected by harmonized policies. Their RGDP showed
growth from 1.34% to 2.00% in the harmonized cases. The United States also
obtained positive results in terms of RGDP due to the harmonized C&T
implementation. Their RGDP grew by 0.37%, and in the case of the intensity
standard, the effects were smaller; the RGDP growth to the BAU scenario in the
United States was 0.12%. This percentages are small in terms of economic
growth, however the real GDP outcome is favorable in relation to the unilateral
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cases, and the harmonized results are considerable because of the effects of the
social cost of carbon in the overall welfare.
It is important to look at other measures, such as the equivalent variation
(EV), which measure welfare changes associated with changes in prices. With
income unchanged, the "change in wealth at current prices would have the same
effect on consumer welfare as that of the change in prices" (Mas-Colell. et al.,
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Figure VIII.1. Changes in EV wrt the baseline
The measure of equivalent variation showed a reduction of 3.84% for the
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United States in the unilateral cap and trade case, and a reduction of 3.05% in the
unilateral intensity standard case. China reported a reduction of 2.92% in the
unilateral cap and trade case and a reduction of 2.82% in the unilateral intensity
standard case. Only South Africa reported increments of RGDP and EV in all
scenarios.
From the results, there is some indication that the IS unilateral regulation
might be more effective in reducing the negative effects in both the power sector
and the wider economy of uncoordinated policies. Leakage is lower in the
intensity standard unilateral scenario because of the reduced negative effects in
the United States power sector, leaving less room for countries such as China to
take up the global shortfall in fossil fuel supply (see Table VIII.4). Therefore, IS
may be effective in both mitigating economic losses from emissions reduction
and reducing leakage to other countries. However, when the target is determined
exogenously, the efficacy of the regulatory instrument can be greatly questioned.
Leakage was lower in the IS scenario because it involved the targeted reduction of
fossil fuel power generation (such as coal) without affecting the total United
States power output.
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Table VIII.5. Output ($ Million)
Casea. Coalb. Gas Hydro Nuclear Oil Solar Wind Other TnD
BAU ROW 582.17 460.10 226.85 119.66 264.41 26.91 61.40 653.11 59.88
BAU USA 148.91 80.58 20.83 69.73 20.37 2.27 19.82 74.54 5.85
Change with respect to BAU
ROW
Harmonized
C&TFOS −576.35 −455.50 −1.00 0.25 −261.76 5.45 5.05 1.85 0.15
ISFOS −564.71 −432.51 0.75 0.37 −256.47 4.17 5.12 2.18 0.19
Unilateral
C&TFOS −147.42 −79.78 0.04 0.16 −20.17 3.80 2.00 −0.18 0.01
ISFOS −148.91 −80.58 0.10 0.28 −20.37 3.90 1.78 −0.30 0.02
USA
Harmonized
C&TFOS −147.42 −79.78 0.04 0.16 −20.17 3.80 2.00 −0.18 0.01
ISFOS −148.91 −80.58 0.10 0.28 −20.37 3.90 1.78 −0.30 0.02
Unilateral
C&TFOSU −110.20 −59.63 −1.57 −1.53 −4.48 14.20 2.16 −4.99 0.37
ISFOSU −101.26 −54.80 −0.62 −0.43 −3.67 15.20 1.95 −6.04 0.25
Case Agriculture En_Int_Ind Oth_Ind Services Coal Gas Oil Oil_Pcts
BAU ROW 4,173.33 15,033.02 27,694.89 68,366.35 461.93 732.83 2,152.76 3,289.99
BAU USA 404.75 1,898.56 5,487.84 21,735.23 74.24 141.57 286.91 685.08
Change with respect to BAU
ROW
Harmonized
C&TFOS 0.89 −9.91 −23.13 16.82 0.92 1.85 0.29 2.41
ISFOS 1.23 −14.34 −46.51 18.09 0.96 1.36 2.75 4.79
Unilateral
C&TFOSU −222.92 4,903.21 1,727.68 −903.40 −233.96 125.70 −135.20 −223.44
ISFOSU −221.42 7,773.64 4,401.14 −905.50 −282.79 143.37 −135.15 −223.44
USA
Harmonized
C&TFOS 0.94 2.75 −9.95 −1.04 −51.97 1.02 −1.13 2.91
ISFOS 0.98 4.81 −6.65 −19.65 −148.91 1.13 0.97 1.83
Unilateral
C&TFOSU −12.06 −96.48 −332.85 −36.10 −63.11 −120.33 −243.88 −582.32
ISFOSU −13.02 −95.18 −335.15 −38.50 −67.56 −128.83 −261.09 −623.42
a. Case abbreviations. C&T: Cap and Trade, IS: Intensity Standard, Subscript U denotes unilateral regulations.
Only USA regulates emissions in those cases.
All cases labeled with ’FOS’ means the regulation was only applied to the fossil fuel electricity generation industry.
b. Sectors abbreviations. En_Int_Ind: Energy Intensive Industries, Oth_Ind: Other Industries, Coal: Coal Mining,
Gas: Gas Extraction, Oil: Crude Oil, Oil_Pcts: Refined Oil Products, and TnD.: Electricity: Coal, Gas, Hydro, Nuclear,
Oil, Solar, Wind, Other, TnD - Transmission and Distribution.
Source: Own elaboration based on GTAP 10 database.
Changes in welfare were analyzed alongside with production and factors
demands. Table VIII.5 contain illustrative results for the United States and Rest
of the World. In most cases, coal electricity output decreased to null values
because of regulation. In the case of harmonized policies, coal, gas, and oil
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reduced their usage for the production of electricity because of the regulation.
The most extreme change required to achieve the net-zero target comes from
coal, gas, oil sectors power generation in the United States and the Rest of the
World. In the case of the United States, there was an important increment of
solar power, and small increment in wind power to compensate for the changes in
energy demand. These results depend on the elasticity of substitution parameters
for energy goods. There is not enough flexibility in the GTAP model to substitute
fossil and renewable energy, so additional assumptions for the elasticity
parameters are implemented in the model to represent the electricity sector in
GTAP (see Figure VI.2 in Chapter VI).
The regulation of fossil energy also affected sectors such as coal, gas, and
oil. In extractive industries that are energy-intensive, the output was reduced in
most of the cases (most importantly with the intensity standard case and the
unilateral regulation case; see Table VIII.5). The intensity standard unilateral
regulation had an effect on most variables of the economy due to the association
with output. Since the carbon price is endogenous; it is not associated with a
specific sector of the economy only through emissions, so the firms will not pay
carbon fees directly as other factors of production, and emissions could leak to
unregulated sector locally and internationally.
In terms of production factors, capital was greatly decreased in the case of
the harmonized regulation in the power sector generation in the fossil fuel
industry (see Table VIII.6). The results indicate that the United States and the
Rest of the World would invest more capital in the fossil fuel industry only if the
regulatory framework was unilateral. However, in the case of harmonized
regulation, the investments in capital in fossil fuel generation are reduced
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significantly, mainly in the coal industry. In such cases, countries such as India
and China increased capital investments in fossil fuels for electricity generation
because of the implementation of unilateral policies. The model don’t include
any assumption about the representation of the competing costs to produce
electricity by technology, which makes difficult to appropriately conclude about
the future investments in fossil fuel and renewable generation. GTAP, in general,
would treat the electricity sector as any other commodity, more detailed
assumptions about the cost structure by technology, and assumptions about
electricity generation capacity associated to different economic sector and
regions, would facilitate the analysis of capital investments.
The model projects that skilled labor decreases in the electricity sector
overall, but increases greatly in solar generation in the United States, especially
in the case of intensity standards and unilateral regulations. This was mainly
because of the output effect, since output was reduced fewer workers were
needed, this is true for both skilled and unskilled labor. The reduction was much
larger in the traditional fossil fuels industry than in the renewable sector. The
results of changes in output and production factors are presented in Table ?? for
selected sectors. Energy-intensive industries are affected by the regulation,
mainly in the unilateral case.
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Table VIII.6. Production Factors Electricity (Percentage Change 2050 to 2015)
Casea. Coalb. Gas Hydro Nuclear Oil Solar Wind Other TnD
Capital
Rest of the World
CAPFOS −99.15 −96.77 0.30 0.22 −98.23 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.34
ISFOS −99.45 −98.01 0.34 0.32 −99.50 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.41
CAPFOSU −18.01 −20.01 −6.71 −7.11 −20.00 −7.45 −7.23 −7.57 −6.96
ISFOSU −12.00 −12.42 −6.71 −7.11 −12.00 −7.45 −7.23 −7.57 −6.96
United States
C&TFOS −82.57 −82.11 −1.02 0.24 −81.29 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.31
ISFOS −79.04 −81.44 −3.59 0.42 −74.02 0.43 0.42 0.43 0.53
C&TFOSU −4.43 −10.04 −8.48 0.73 −7.41 49.25 17.38 −11.69 −7.13
ISFOSU −7.30 −10.87 0.20 0.39 −12.41 98.50 22.27 −4.81 −6.27
Skilled Labor
Rest of the World
CAPFOS −99.98 −95.55 0.20 0.17 −99.97 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.22
ISFOS −99.51 −98.00 0.19 0.20 −99.50 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.22
CAPFOSU −20.70 −20.00 −6.54 −6.88 −22.22 −6.72 −7.11 −6.99 −6.89
ISFOSU −12.01 −12.00 −6.54 −6.88 −11.01 −6.72 −7.11 −6.99 −6.89
United States
C&TFOS −82.04 −82.00 0.16 0.17 −82.00 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.21
ISFOS −82.05 −80.00 0.35 0.30 −80.00 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.37
C&TFOSU −86.66 −5.88 −6.93 −6.38 −6.81 1,532.64 26.25 −9.68 −6.60
ISFOSU −80.59 −8.71 −6.93 −6.38 −9.61 1,277.54 28.77 −9.68 −6.60
Unskilled Labor
Rest of the World
CAPFOS −99.00 −96.00 0.19 0.17 −99.00 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.22
ISFOS −99.50 −98.00 0.21 0.22 −99.50 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.26
CAPFOSU −20.00 −20.00 −6.37 −6.69 −20.00 −6.75 −6.92 −6.93 −6.74
ISFOSU −12.00 −12.00 −6.28 −6.69 −12.00 −6.69 −6.92 −1.57 −6.46
United States
C&TFOS −82.00 −77.44 0.17 0.17 −82.00 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.22
ISFOS −80.00 −88.17 0.35 0.30 −80.00 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.37
C&TFOSU −4.77 −5.80 −6.81 −6.30 −6.71 −15.65 −7.04 −9.53 −6.53
ISFOSU 2.15 10.48 44.66 −2.47 −9.16 −2.53 −5.41 −1.85 −6.44
a. Case abbreviations. C&T: Cap and Trade, IS: Intensity Standard, Subscript U denotes unilateral regulations.
Only USA regulates emissions in those cases.
All cases labeled with ’FOS’ means the regulation was only applied to the fossil fuel electricity generation industry.
b. Sectors abbreviations. En_Int_Ind: Energy Intensive Industries, Oth_Ind: Other Industries, Coal: Coal Mining,
Gas: Gas Extraction, Oil: Crude Oil, Oil_Pcts: Refined Oil Products, and TnD.: Electricity: Coal, Gas, Hydro, Nuclear,
Oil, Solar, Wind, Other, TnD - Transmission and Distribution.
Source: Own elaboration based on GTAP 10 database.
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Table VIII.7. Production Factors Other Sectors (Percentage Change 2050 to 2015)
Casea. Agricultureb. En_Int_Ind Oth_Ind Services Coal Gas Oil Oil_Pcts
Capital
Rest of the World
CAPFOS 0.04 −0.10 −0.08 0.02 0.08 0.00 −0.14 0.07
ISFOS 0.05 −0.16 −0.17 0.03 0.22 0.24 0.12 0.14
CAPFOSU −5.66 −5.23 −4.69 −4.61 −7.22 −9.31 −6.86 −6.40
ISFOSU −5.58 −5.21 −4.69 −4.61 −7.21 −9.27 −6.86 −6.23
United States
C&TFOS 0.24 0.14 −0.15 −0.01 0.23 0.51 −0.04 0.40
ISFOS 0.35 0.28 −0.12 −0.05 0.56 0.97 0.49 0.31
C&TFOSU −8.04 −4.97 −6.32 −3.43 −0.87 −9.41 −8.19 −5.79
ISFOSU −7.22 0.39 −6.28 −3.42 −0.86 −9.36 −8.17 −4.12
Skilled Labor
Rest of the World
CAPFOS 0.03 −0.12 −0.06 0.01 0.15 0.05 −0.10 0.06
ISFOS 0.05 −0.11 −0.10 0.01 0.23 0.17 0.12 0.10
CAPFOSU −5.77 −5.53 −5.16 −5.25 −7.04 −8.44 −7.04 −6.26
ISFOSU −5.77 −5.53 −5.16 −5.25 −7.04 −8.44 −7.04 −6.26
United States
C&TFOS 0.21 0.11 −0.08 0.00 0.20 0.43 −0.07 0.28
ISFOS 0.31 0.21 −0.05 −0.01 0.49 0.75 0.44 0.23
C&TFOSU −7.66 −5.20 −6.08 −1.30 −1.53 −8.48 −7.81 −5.74
ISFOSU −7.64 −4.58 −6.03 −1.07 −1.21 −8.04 −7.56 −5.50
Unskilled Labor
Rest of the World
CAPFOS 0.01 −0.03 −0.04 0.01 0.13 0.06 0.19 0.02
ISFOS 0.03 −0.05 −0.12 0.03 0.25 0.17 0.18 0.13
CAPFOSU −5.31 −5.35 −4.63 −5.35 −19.99 −8.79 −5.79 −6.55
ISFOSU −5.31 −5.35 −4.63 −5.35 −19.99 −8.79 −5.79 −6.55
United States
C&TFOS 0.22 0.11 −0.08 0.01 0.20 0.43 0.07 0.29
ISFOS 0.31 0.21 −0.06 0.01 0.49 0.75 0.44 0.22
C&TFOSU −7.62 −5.13 −6.01 −1.96 −1.50 −8.43 −7.78 −5.67
ISFOSU −9.30 −5.52 −6.15 −1.58 −1.08 −8.20−14.21 −9.47
a. Case abbreviations. C&T: Cap and Trade, IS: Intensity Standard, Subscript U denotes unilateral regulations.
Only USA regulates emissions in those cases.
All cases labeled with ’FOS’ means the regulation was only applied to the fossil fuel electricity generation industry.
b. Sectors abbreviations. En_Int_Ind: Energy Intensive Industries, Oth_Ind: Other Industries, Coal: Coal Mining,
Gas: Gas Extraction, Oil: Crude Oil, Oil_Pcts: Refined Oil Products, and TnD.: Electricity: Coal, Gas, Hydro, Nuclear,
Oil, Solar, Wind, Other, TnD - Transmission and Distribution.
Source: Own elaboration based on GTAP 10 database.
138
VIII.5. Conclusions
Chapter VIII presents an alternative perspective of environmental
regulations analysis. In the real world, environmental targets are implemented
unilaterally and by sector. Then it is enormously difficult to evaluate and
determine the effects of such policies. When setting the environmental target,
governments or policymakers decide on several economic variables that, in one
way or another, will interact with those targets in a dynamic setting.
Another critical point is the maturity of the industries that are expected to
substitute the polluting industries. When setting environmental targets in power
generation, there is great expectation that the renewables will fill in the gaps left
by the polluting sectors. This is not necessarily the case, more traditional
technologies have competitive advantage in terms of readiness to respond to an
increased demand for electricity, for example, natural gas would replace coal
power plants and not necessarily wind turbine. General equilibrium dynamic
effects are usually ignored, if the clean sector is not competitive, the preferred
option is to reduce the demand for even renewable technologies and substitute
consumption with imported products regardless of their environmental quality.
The local economy can be significantly affected by the lack of coordination of
environmental targets with other countries and sectors.
About the comparison of regulatory instruments, the results indicate a
slightly better scenario for the Intensity Standards because the effects on output,
labor, and capital are not as severe as in the Cap and Trade scenarios. Still, the
results are inconclusive because there are so many intervening factors. When the
target is determined exogenously, the questions shift significantly to the
importance of coordinated policies and not too much about the regulatory
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instrument because C&T and IS can be equivalent depending on the policy’s
value, as seen in the previous chapters. The results presented in this chapter
indicate what could happen in the economy if certain conditions are imposed.
The most critical assumption is that the current and future economic conditions
and technologies are appropriately represented, the results rely significantly on
the elasticity of substitution between fossil fuels and renewable industries not
only for power generation but for all sectors that consume electricity as an input.
Suppose the same value of elasticity of substitution is applied to the entire
electricity generation sectors. In that case, the industry’s substitution effects will
become less relevant, and the effects across industries will become more relevant.
Another limitation for the analysis is that the model presented in this chapter
treats electricity as any other commodity, and then doesn’t include modules for
capacity expansion or electricity dispatch. The model doesn’t consider the
possibility of carbon offsets due to technological improvements or new




In this dissertation I explored the general equilibrium effects of
environmental regulations, comparing two polices, cap and trade and intensity
standards. The objective was to evaluate the efficacy of such policies in terms of
maximizing overall welfare.
In Chapter IV, I presented the theory behind a simple general equilibrium
model for simplifying the comparison of environmental policies. The model in
Chapter IV describes the cap and trade regulatory mechanism and the emissions
per output regulatory mechanism through simple economic relationships, in
great detail. The main objective is to analyze whether under leakage, one
regulation performs better in terms of maximizing overall welfare. I conclude
that under certain conditions – the separability of inputs in a concave production
function and emissions leakage – the optimal policy should regulate emissions
per unit of output as opposed to imposing a cap on emissions. Applying the main
model of this dissertation, unilateral cap and trade policies are not able to
replicate the first best, and more importantly, they can be an inferior instrument
for regulating emissions than a unilateral intensity standard policy. This finding
might explain why local policies that regulate emissions per output remain in
place when there is leakage and a lack of coordination among agents. More
notably, the results of Chapter V, show that the superiority of the cap and trade
mechanism, relative to intensity standards previously established in the
literature is confirmed only for the value of the policy that maximizes overall
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welfare. It is entirely possible, that the policy value target is set to any other value
if determined exogenously. The latter emphasizes the importance of the choice of
the target and the need for the implementation of coordinated approaches.
Chapter VII and VIII presented illustrative calculations based on GTAP
data. In Chapter VII, the results reveal important general equilibrium effects on
the endogenous variables of interest for the analysis, such as carbon price,
emissions reductions, and effects on labor and capital markets. The hypothetical
case of reducing emissions unilaterally in the U.S. indicates that country that
engages in regulation would implicitly pay higher endogenous carbon prices than
in the harmonized cases. Unilateral and incomplete regulation is costly, both in
terms of facing larger carbon endogenous prices and in terms of factor
reallocation of capital and labor to unregulated industries and regions.
Harmonization of policies is always preferred as such policies elicit larger overall
welfare. Furthermore, the choice of regulatory instrument is directly correlated
to the size of the effects. Intensity standards have proven to be superior to cap
and trade for incomplete and unilateral regulation cases.
Chapter VIII presented an alternative perspective of the analysis of the
environmental regulations. In the real world, it is common to encounter
environmental targets being implemented unilaterally and by sector. When
setting environmental targets exogenously, there is great expectation that the
clean industries will fill the gaps created by the more polluting sectors, but
general equilibrium effects are ignored. If the clean sector is not competitive, the
preferred option is to reduce the demand for clean goods and to substitute
consumption with imported products, regardless of their environmental quality.
Local economies, can be significantly affected by a lack of coordination of
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environmental targets with other countries or sectors. Regarding the efficacy of
establishing environmental targets, the results indicate a better scenario for the
intensity standards because the effects on output, labor, and capital are not as
severe as in the cap and trade scenarios. Nevertheless, the results are
inconclusive, as there are numerous intervening factors. One critical assumption
in Chapter VII and Chapter VIII is that technological substitution is adequately
represented for fossil fuel and renewables. The results rely significantly on the
elasticity of substitution between fossil fuels and renewables not only for power
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APPENDIX A
A THEORETICAL MODEL OF EMISSIONS TRADING AND INTENSITY
STANDARDS
Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1
The BAU equilibrium is characterized by the optimization in equation (2).
The proof of lemma 1 consists in exploring if solving the welfare
maximization function in equation (A1) yields the same results as solving the
system of equations consisting of the FOCs from the consumer and producer
problems (A2) and (A4). If this is the case, the BAU equilibrium is characterized
by this optimization. The following maximization program defines the



































qic (Kic, Lic)− qDic
)
∀i, c. (A1)
Solving the consumer and producer problems yields the same FOCs as



































Equation (A3) is equivalent to equation (6) because the shadow prices in





















Equations (A5) and (A6) are equivalent to equations (4) and (5), the
shadow prices in equations (4) and (5) represent the actual prices of capital and
labor for the production of Good 1 and Good 2.
Proof of Lemma 2
The harmonized C&T equilibrium is characterized by the optimization in
equation (12).
To show that there is a solution to the harmonized C&T scenario the



























(qic (Kic, Lic)− qDic ) + λe (e− e2(K2A, L2A + e2(K2B, L2B)) ∀i, c
(A7)
By solving the consumer and producer problems, the same solution as the
BAU case is found for Country B. For Country A, the profit maximizing condition
for Good 2 changes slightly to the following:
max
K2c, L2c,
P2q2c (K2c, L2c)− wcL2c − rK2c − λee2c(K2c,L2c) ∀c (A8)
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where P2 in equations (A9) and (A10) is equivalent to λq2 in equations (13) and
(14).
Proof of Lemma 3
The unilateral C&T equilibrium is characterized by the optimization in
equation (16).
The solution to the unilateral C&T scenario is the Lagrangian function
defined in equation (A11). The solution of the BAU case applies to Country B in



























(qic (Kic, Lic)− qDic ) + λeA (e2A − e2(K2A, L2A)) ∀i, c. (A11)
On the other hand, by solving the consumer and producer problems, the
same solution as that of the BAU case is found for Country B.





P2q2A (K2A, L2A)− wAL2A − rK2A − λeAe2(K2A,L2A) (A12)























where P2, r, and wA in equation (A13) and (A14) are equivalent to λq2, λK , and λLA
in equations (17) and (18).
Proof of Proposition 2
The harmonized C&T equilibrium can attain the first best. The unilateral
C&T equilibrium cannot attain first best due to leakage.
In equation (A13) and (A14) I obtained a solution where only Country A





2A) + eB (K2B, L2B), where the values ofK2B and L2B correspond to the
BAU values and are not set to the optimal levels. Therefore, unilateral regulation
cannot necessarily attain the first best even when regulating with the cap and
trade mechanism. In this case the total amount of emissions is larger than in the
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first best case. See Table V.5
Proof of Lemma 4
The harmonized IS equilibrium is characterized by the optimization in
equation (20).
The Lagrangian function of the harmonized IS case is defined in equation





































qic (Kic, Lic)− qDic
)
+λe (IS (q2A (K2A,L2A) + q2B (K2B,L2B))− e2A (K2A, L2A)− e2B (K2B, L2B)) ∀i, c.
(A15)
The FOCs of the maximization problem for Country A are the same as
equations (21) and (22).
Similar to the previous case, the consumer and producer problems yield
the same solution as the BAU case for Country B. For Country A, the profit
maximizing condition for Good 2 changes to the following:
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Producer problem for good 2:
max
K2c, L2c
P2q2c (K2c,L2c)− wcL2c − rK2c −µe (e2c(K2c,L2c)− IScq2c (K2c,L2c)) ∀c.
(A16)
























where P2, r, wc, and µe in equation (A17) and (19) are equivalent to λq2, λK , λLc,
and λe in equation (21) and (22), respectively.
Proof of Lemma 5
The unilateral IS equilibrium is characterized by the optimization in
equation (23).
The Lagrangian function of the unilateral IS case is defined in equation
(A24). This is similar to the harmonized case above, but emissions in Country B
are not constrained. The solution of the BAU case applies to Country B in the






































fic (Kic, Lic)− qDic
)
+λe (IS2Aq2A (K2A,L2A)− e2A (K2A, L2A)) ∀i, c
(A19)
The FOCs of the maximization problem for Country A are the same as
equations (3) to (10). The main difference is the derivatives with respect toK2A
and L2A of the production function of Country A.
Similar to the unilateral C&T case, the consumer and producer problems
will yield the same solution as the BAU case for Country B. For Country A, the
profit maximizing condition for Good 2 changes to the following:
Producer problem for good 2:
max
K2A, L2A
P2q2A (K2A, L2A)− wAL2A − rK2A −µeA (ISAq (K2A, L2A)− e2A(K2A,L2A))
(A20)
In Country A, the maximization of the production function of Good 2 with
























where P2, µeA, r, and wA in equations (A21) and (A22) are equivalent to λq2, λeA,
λK , and λLA in equations (24) and (25), respectively.
Proof of Proposition 3
The harmonized IS equilibrium cannot attain the first best, and the
unilateral C&T equilibrium cannot attain first best.
The Lagrangian function is defined as the problem presented in equation







































qic (Kic, Lic)− qDic
)
∀i, c (A23)























The values ofK∗2c and L∗2c are the solutions of the system of equations




, which is the emissions
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function and the production function of Good 2 evaluated at the optimal values.






2c), and the damage of














2c) is globally concave, then an equilibrium allocation exists







is continuous because it is the summation of two






is a compact subset. Because
qDic is contained in an interval, the lower bound of the interval is zero, and the
upper bound is qDic (K,L). Thus, qDic is a compact set, closed and bounded.
Therefore, the solution of (1) exits as a global max of Uc in its domain, by the
Weierstrass theorem (Theorem 30.1 in (Simon and Blume, 1994, p. 823)).
I cannot obtain an explicit solution for the optimal values of capital and
labor, and the solution will depend on the parameters and functional form
assumed for the utility function and the production function.
The solution to the harmonized C&T scenario is given by the system of
equations above in equations (A9) and (A10), and the solution to the harmonized
IS case is given by (A13) and (A14). For the unilateral case, the solution for the
C&T scenario is given by equations (A17) and (A18), and for the unilateral IS case
by equations (A21) and (A22).
I will have to compare the overall welfare function evaluated at the
optimal values of the variables to conclude about which regulatory mechanism is
superior. I will utilize numerical methods in Chapter V to perform a comparison
across cases presented in Chapter IV.
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MATLAB Code for Chapter IV





HARMONIZED AND UNILATERAL POLICIES: ILLUSTRATIVE CALCULATIONS
FROM THE CANONICAL MODEL
Sector in GTAP-Power
Table B.1. Definitions of sectors in GTAP 10 Power Database.
Sector Description Sector Description
Agriculture and Forestry Energy-Intensive Industries
pdr Paddy rice gdt Gas manufacture, distribution
wht Wheat p_c Petroleum, coal products
gro Cereal grains nec chm Chemical products
bph Basic pharmaceuticals rpp Rubber and plastic products
v_f Vegetables, fruit, nuts nmm Mineral products nec
osd Oil seeds i_s Ferrous metals
c_b Sugar cane, sugar beet nfm Metals nec
pfb Plant-based fibers fmp Metal products
ocr Crops nec mvh Motor vehicles and parts
ctl Cattle, sheep, goats, horses otn Transport equipment nec
oap Animal products nec ele Electronic equipment
rmk Raw milk eeq Electrical equipment
ome Machinery and equipment afs Accommodation and food services
whs Warehousing and support activities rsa Real estate activities
wol Wool, silk-worm cocoons omf Manufactures nec
edu Education, silk-worm cocoons hht Human health and social work
frs Forestry Energy Use
fsh Fishing coa Coal
Other Industries oil Oil
omn Minerals nec gas Gas
cmt Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horse Electricity
omt Meat products nec TnD Transmission and distribution
vol Vegetable oils and fats NuclearBL Nuclear base load
mil Dairy products CoalBL Coal base load
pcr Processed rice GasBL Gas base load
sgr Sugar WindBL Wind base load
ofd Food products nec HydroBL Hydro base load
b_t Beverages and tobacco products OilBL Oil base load
tex Textiles OtherBL Other base load
wap Wearing apparel GasP Gas peak load
lea Leather products HydroP Hydro peak load
lum Wood products OilP Oil peak load
ppp Paper products, publishing SolarP Solar peak load




Table C.1. Main characteristics of the baseline
Variable All sectors Economic sectors Energy related sectors Electrical power generation
Variable All sectors Agriculture Energy Intensitive Industries Other Industry Services Coal Mining Crude Oil Natural Gas Extraction Refined Oil Products Coal Gas Hydro Nuclear Oil Solar Wind Other TnD
Rest of the World
Output 122,743.6 4,177.5 14,963.0 27,536.2 67,174.9 457.0 2,081.3 718.4 3,215.6 570.4 448.5 223.7 122.9 262.5 27.3 61.6 59.5 643.5
Intermediate demand 67,534.2 1,628.1 10,881.7 19,827.2 29,744.9 188.8 484.0 247.6 2,988.6 422.7 381.9 57.9 47.8 229.1 8.6 20.3 30.7 344.3
Intermediate input taxes 2,280.6 -6.8 463.7 486.5 1,246.1 4.5 7.6 2.2 6.1 17.8 29.0 1.2 0.5 13.1 0.0 0.2 1.5 7.3
Factor taxes 5,188.7 -0.3 287.1 730.6 4,025.1 9.2 51.5 19.6 12.8 5.3 2.7 6.6 7.2 1.9 0.9 2.2 2.0 24.2
Factor demand 48,459.2 2,557.8 3,347.5 6,532.3 32,761.0 260.9 1,551.4 454.6 225.8 132.8 41.0 158.5 63.1 18.8 17.7 38.7 25.5 271.9
Intermediate demand 67,534.2 1,628.1 10,881.7 19,827.2 29,744.9 188.8 484.0 247.6 2,988.6 422.7 381.9 57.9 47.8 229.1 8.6 20.3 30.7 344.3
Agriculture 2,692.9 442.4 57.1 1,910.2 280.2 0.9 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6
Energy Intensitive Industries 13,686.6 208.7 6,145.0 3,683.8 3,386.1 41.1 65.9 16.2 45.5 14.9 3.0 8.4 11.2 2.8 1.0 2.8 5.3 44.8
Other Industry 15,767.2 403.3 1,001.5 9,052.5 5,023.7 38.7 108.3 42.8 18.2 14.2 2.9 7.7 6.5 2.5 1.0 3.4 2.9 37.3
Services 27,522.5 409.0 2,296.2 4,701.0 19,146.8 86.1 264.7 128.9 107.9 58.6 21.4 30.6 22.2 14.1 5.8 11.2 12.3 205.7
Coal Mining 480.8 1.5 71.1 11.7 9.4 3.8 0.0 1.7 96.3 285.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Crude Oil 2,027.7 0.0 6.4 0.6 0.4 0.0 5.3 1.7 1,987.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Natural Gas Extraction 712.5 2.8 126.4 46.5 66.2 0.0 19.9 38.4 94.1 0.0 318.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Refined Oil Products 2,820.9 85.6 604.0 60.3 1,228.9 5.4 8.1 6.3 595.2 2.5 19.4 0.0 0.0 179.3 0.0 0.0 8.6 17.2
TnD 488.6 19.4 157.4 98.1 157.1 3.7 2.9 2.8 11.8 13.1 4.0 3.1 2.0 1.0 0.2 0.8 0.4 10.8
Nuclear (B) 86.1 2.7 23.4 17.2 32.9 0.5 0.3 0.3 1.9 1.6 0.9 0.6 1.7 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 1.6
Coal (B) 459.3 23.8 162.8 92.4 122.7 4.8 2.0 2.1 10.5 19.5 3.0 3.0 1.5 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.3 9.0
Gas (BP) 329.8 11.2 91.3 63.8 126.6 1.2 3.6 3.6 9.2 4.0 5.3 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.2 6.8
Wind (B) 45.4 1.9 13.1 9.1 16.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 1.1 1.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.8
Hydro (B) 167.6 5.9 57.7 33.3 53.1 1.2 1.3 1.1 3.3 3.7 1.1 1.8 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 2.9
Oil (BP) 181.8 8.4 49.7 33.1 70.7 0.7 1.0 0.9 4.6 2.9 1.7 0.9 0.4 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.1 5.7
Other (B) 44.0 1.0 12.9 9.5 15.9 0.2 0.2 0.3 1.2 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.8
Solar (P) 20.5 0.5 5.6 4.1 8.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3
Land 609.6 609.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Capital 25,845.9 618.0 1,971.3 3,423.7 17,912.7 87.1 884.3 258.9 177.2 85.7 31.9 139.5 47.0 8.9 15.9 31.9 20.5 131.5
NatlRes 948.3 109.0 68.6 0.0 0.0 106.6 533.1 131.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SkLab 9,745.6 92.2 428.6 1,113.5 7,861.4 12.7 65.5 31.9 16.0 22.3 3.6 7.7 9.7 5.1 0.8 4.0 2.0 68.6
UnSkLab 11,309.9 1,129.0 879.0 1,995.2 6,986.9 54.6 68.4 32.8 32.7 24.8 5.5 11.3 6.4 4.7 0.9 2.8 3.0 71.8
USA
Output 31,128.1 404.4 1,896.9 5,482.9 21,714.3 74.2 286.7 141.5 684.7 148.8 80.5 20.8 69.6 20.4 2.3 19.8 5.8 74.5
Intermediate demand 14,123.3 246.8 1,172.8 3,527.8 8,138.0 33.5 70.9 62.7 630.6 88.4 61.0 2.7 23.8 17.6 0.4 5.5 1.9 39.0
Intermediate input taxes 195.1 -3.7 17.3 19.5 158.0 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.4 1.2 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Factor taxes 1,520.2 -9.1 64.7 186.1 1,250.0 1.9 9.6 4.0 2.7 2.6 0.6 0.7 2.7 0.1 -0.7 0.7 0.2 3.2
Factor demand 14,570.4 169.1 625.1 1,709.0 11,566.1 32.0 192.6 69.0 33.4 49.2 11.6 16.8 47.3 1.6 2.5 13.7 3.7 27.8
Intermediate demand 14,123.3 246.8 1,172.8 3,527.8 8,138.0 33.5 70.9 62.7 630.6 88.4 61.0 2.7 23.8 17.6 0.4 5.5 1.9 39.0
Agriculture 294.9 39.1 1.9 224.5 29.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Energy Intensitive Industries 1,601.1 20.5 538.0 607.5 409.0 6.4 9.9 2.0 5.3 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.8
Other Industry 3,131.0 61.1 134.9 1,524.2 1,390.0 7.9 5.9 2.0 1.1 1.0 0.3 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.3
Services 7,652.6 110.4 376.8 1,112.0 5,820.3 16.3 48.5 45.8 38.7 19.4 5.1 1.3 17.7 1.8 0.3 4.2 0.9 33.2
Coal Mining 63.1 1.5 1.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 2.0 58.1
Crude Oil 518.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 518.4 0.0
Natural Gas Extraction 124.8 0.3 19.2 9.7 21.3 0.0 3.1 7.6 20.2 43.4
Refined Oil Products 441.3 12.4 58.5 4.8 298.3 1.7 2.0 2.8 38.5 6.5 15.2 0.7 0.0
TnD 50.1 0.5 7.1 7.5 28.7 0.2 0.2 0.3 1.1 1.6 1.0 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.6
Nuclear (B) 46.4 0.5 6.6 6.9 26.6 0.2 0.2 0.3 1.0 1.5 0.9 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.6
Coal (B) 98.9 1.0 14.0 14.7 56.7 0.4 0.5 0.7 2.2 3.1 1.9 0.4 1.5 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.1 1.2
Gas (BP) 53.7 0.6 7.6 8.0 30.8 0.2 0.3 0.4 1.2 1.7 1.0 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.7
Wind (B) 13.1 0.1 1.9 2.0 7.5 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Hydro (B) 14.6 0.2 2.1 2.2 8.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Oil (BP) 13.5 0.1 1.9 2.0 7.7 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Other (B) 3.9 0.0 0.6 0.6 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Solar (P) 1.5 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Land 46.8 46.8
Capital 4,316.6 61.0 201.0 472.5 3,290.5 8.8 90.9 42.9 17.9 41.8 9.6 16.4 38.4 0.9 2.4 12.1 3.3 6.1
NatlRes 102.8 3.6 3.7 14.9 70.6 10.0
SkLab 5,852.7 46.5 163.3 475.3 5,117.0 4.3 16.1 6.9 5.9 1.5 0.4 0.1 3.7 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.1 11.0
UnSkLab 4,251.5 11.1 257.1 761.2 3,158.5 4.0 15.1 9.1 9.5 6.0 1.5 0.4 5.2 0.5 0.1 1.2 0.3 10.7
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Estimates of Emissions Elasticities
The purpose of this section is to serve as a sensitivity analysis and to
propose a more realistic estimate of the elasticities parameters contained in the
GTAP database. The behavioral parameters of the model are determinants for the
baseline calibration. These elasticities determine how a variable will respond
when changing another variable or the degree of substitutability between
domestic and imported input.
In this section the model is sequentially re-estimated and two changes are
made (assuming new values of the trade elasticities and new values for the share
of emissions). The second exercise is particularly important because postulating
a functional form and estimate of elasticities for emissions will provide better
estimates of the changes in the economic variables of the economy.
To estimate emissions elasticities, the work of Shapiro and Walker (2018)
was used. Shapiro presented the estimates of elasticities of substitution for
emissions for the manufacturing sector. The formulation used is Exploiting the
structural developments in recent geographic literature makes it straightforward
to estimate the elasticity parameters. This is because the results of this exercise
rely on the value of the parameters of elasticity of substitution across regions for
all energy goods. The elasticity of substitution for the energy goods was
estimated using fixed effects and maximum likelihood gravity regressions. The
dataset includes global coverage of bilateral trade and transport costs for the
energy goods (See Table C.3).
Shapiro and Walker (2018, p.3833) defined emissions intensity as a
function of the abatement cost and a productivity variable. In its simplest
formulation, the form of emissions is (Copeland and Taylor, 2004):
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e(ϕ) = (1− a(ϕ))
(1−α)
α q (A26)
The intensity of emissions in A26 is given by the abatement cost estimated
as a direct function of the cost. A dataset was constructed based on data from the
United States Energy Information Administration EIA -860 annual reports EIA
(2020b), and facility level data from egrid of the EPA Agency (2020a) that related
the cost of equipment for abatement of the companies in the form EIA (860) to
facility data from the EPA.
As Shapiro and Walker (2018) explains, the exponent sign has to be
positive because the intensity decreases with the abatement cost. The dataset
was combined with data from the County Business Patterns survey to account for
economic activity at the county level. To measure the product, the EIA 860 From
reports the gross load values of electricity associated to abatement cost for each
of the facilities. The data was only available from 2013 to 2019, so a panel for that
time span was constructed.
As Shapiro and Walker (2018) reports, the estimates can be contaminated
by three issues: measurement error due to the quality of the data, reverse
causality, and the likelihood that the abatement costs reduce because fewer
polluting industries are in the market. Therefore, it was necessary to control for
economic variables and instrumental variables using the EPA classification of the
county for the air quality standards contained in the Green Book (Agency, 2020b).
To control for the measurement error, aggregated data was used when possible; if
a plant exited the sample then the total gross load of electricity remained. This
specification of pollution is consistent with the case presented in the GTAP
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database. This is a Cobb-Douglas production with constant returns to scale, so
the shares are constant.
The elasticity is valid for the United States and is based on a representative
number of firms across the whole country. It is representative of the electricity
generation sector; generalization of the values should be done with caution since
the values are based on the economic condition of the United States.
Table C.2 reports the values of the elasticities for three different pollutants
in the data related to plant emissions.
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Table C.2. Emissions Elasticities from Electricity Generation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CO2 EI CO2 EI ln CO2 st ln CO2 st
Log equipment abatement cost -0.0045∗∗∗ -0.0003 0.1250∗∗∗ 0.0668∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0089) (0.0253)
Primary Fuel Coal -0.5140∗∗∗ -0.0885 1.9350∗∗∗ 1.1860∗
(0.0263) (0.1080) (0.2060) (0.5370)
Primary Fuel Gas -0.9820∗∗∗ -0.3810∗∗ -0.0965 -0.9030
(0.0265) (0.1360) (0.2070) (0.5870)
Primary Fuel Oil -0.6550∗∗∗ -0.0379 -1.9080∗∗∗ -2.526∗∗∗
(0.0282) (0.1340) (0.2210) (0.5320)
Constant 1.6010∗∗∗ 1.0950∗∗∗ 11.9900∗∗∗ 13.3100∗∗∗
(0.0284) (0.1110) (0.2220) (0.5640)
Observations 7,784 7,784 7,784 7,784
Include fixed effects No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SO2 EI SO2 EI ln SO2 ln SO2
Log equipment abatement cost -0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0001 -0.0037 0.0198
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0115) (0.0356)
Primary Fuel Coal 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0027∗ 6.026∗∗∗ 5.323∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0013) (0.2680) (1.3530)
Primary Fuel Gas -0.0001 0.0005 -0.8390∗∗ -1.4680
(0.0002) (0.0013) (0.2700) (1.3930)
Primary Fuel Oil 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0028 -0.2860 -0.7940
(0.0003) (0.0016) (0.2830) (1.4650)
Constant 0.0024∗∗∗ -0.0007 2.119∗∗∗ 2.660
(0.0003) (0.0012) (0.2890) (1.3680)
Observations 7,898 7,898 7,898 7,898
Include fixed effects No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NOx EI NOx EI ln NOx ln NOx
Log equipment abatement cost -0.0020∗∗∗ -0.0577 -0.0037 0.0198
(0.0001) (0.0053) (0.0115) (0.0356)
Primary Fuel Coal 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.0023∗ 6.0260∗∗∗ 5.3230∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0009) (0.2680) (1.3530)
Primary Fuel Gas -0.0001 0.00004 -0.8390∗∗ -1.4680
(0.0003) (0.0009) (0.2700) (1.3930)
Primary Fuel Oil 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0021 -0.2860 -0.7940
(0.0003) (0.0011) (0.2830) (1.4650)
Constant 0.0024∗∗∗ -0.0028 2.1190∗∗∗ 2.6600
(0.0003) (0.0009) (0.2890) (1.3680)
Observations 7,944 7,944 7,898 7,898
Model controls No Yes No Yes
Include fixed effects
Trade elasticities
The numerical exercise in Chapter VII and Chapter VIII presents an update
of the trade elasticities included in the GTAP database. Econometric estimation of
170
Armington functions and COMTRADE data were used to compute the Armington
elasticities for the 65 groupings of goods in the database. This was done for the
electricity sector and other energy-intensive industries. To match the sectors in
GTAP, products were aggregated using the concordances file maps to the six-digit
harmonized system (2007) sectors to the original 65-sector GTAP sectoral
classification (See (Aguiar, 2016)). This update guaranteed that the parameters
for the calibration were been chosen in such a way that they resembled current
trade relations between countries (see Table C.2 and Table C.4).
Most CGE models that rely on GTAP data use the values of the parameters
reported by Hertel and Van der Mensbrugghe (2016), which are selected based on
a review of international cross-sectional studies of various industries and
countries. It must be noted the relatively small substitution in the parameters of
primary production and the greatest degree of substitutability (1.68) arises in the
trade and transport sectors (Hertel and Van der Mensbrugghe, 2016, p. 3).
However, estimates of domestic-imported σD value are in the order of 17.20 for
gas and 5.20 for oil. It is interesting to compare this to the study by Commission
(1992), where the authors reported a value of 0.31. The value is high compared to
Huntington et al. (2017), where the values of income price elasticities for highly
industrialized economies varied widely by country (between 0.24 and 1.75,
averaging 0.94 for all countries) (Huntington et al., 2017, p. 1). A study from 2010
reported estimates of approximately -37.82 for gasoline products (Balistreri et al.,
2010, p. 175).
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Table C.3. Trade Elasticities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PANEL RE PANEL FE PPML RE PPML FE
Coal (COA)
Log GDP exp 0.156*** -0.114 0.028*** -0.029
(0.043) (0.106) (0.010) (0.026)
Log GDP imp 0.445*** 0.915*** 0.093*** 0.152***
(0.039) (0.105) (0.009) (0.025)
Observations 15,563 15,563 15,563 14,541
Panel 3,296 3,296 3,296 2,274
Electricity (ELY)
Log GDP exp -3.798* 1.049 -0.259 0.065
(2.078) (3.718) (0.483) (1.026)
Log GDP imp 0.944 1.970 0.062 0.498
(2.048) (2.807) (0.543) (0.950)
Observations 336 336 336 262
Panel 177 177 177 103
Gas(GAS)
Log GDP exp -0.522*** 0.478** -0.095*** 0.038
(0.080) (0.222) (0.015) (0.041)
Log GDP imp 0.595*** 0.760*** 0.108*** 0.111***
(0.069) (0.202) (0.014) (0.039)
Observations 6,264 6,264 6,264 5,603
Panel 1,709 1,709 1,709 1,048
Gas manufacture, distribution(GDT)
Log GDP exp -0.040 0.383 -0.018 0.211
(0.088) (0.442) (0.047) (0.245)
Log GDP imp 0.223*** 0.338 0.103*** 0.144
(0.065) (0.325) (0.035) (0.174)
Observations 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,244
Panel 738 738 738 317
Oil (OIL)
Log GDP exp -0.443*** 0.322*** -0.064*** 0.019
Standard errors in parentheses




(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PANEL RE PANEL FE PPML RE PPML FE
(0.052) (0.118) (0.009) (0.020)
Log GDP imp 0.663*** 0.115 0.096*** 0.015
(0.049) (0.132) (0.009) (0.023)
Observations 13,272 13,272 13,272 12,254
Panel 3,010 3,010 3,010 1,992
Petroleum, coal products (P_C)
Log GDP exp 0.403*** 0.162*** 0.066*** 0.016
(0.018) (0.047) (0.004) (0.010)
Log GDP imp 0.489*** 0.507*** 0.080*** 0.078***
(0.015) (0.042) (0.003) (0.009)
Observations 84,491 84,491 84,491 81,935
Panel 12,986 12,986 12,986 10,430
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimates of Trade Elasticities
The purpose of this section is to describe the procedure utilized to
estimate trade elasticities consistent with GTAP data. Elasticities are important
because of the need of reflecting actual trading patterns. Need to reflect different
trade responses for each sector.
The main data to estimate trade responses came from the UN
COMTRADE(Comtrade, 2020). The trade data includes re exports and re imports
to be consistent with GTAP database. The database was downloaded as a bulk1.
and aggregated to match the concordance 2 in GTAP 10 database that corresponds
to the GTAP data. The file includes about 5,052 unique trade items that are





The mapping uses six digit Harmonized System (2007) sectors to the
original 65 GTAP sectoral classification. Also available in TASTE, a program to
adapt detailed trade and tariff data to GTAP related purposes 3. The distance
between trade partners is readily available at the Centre d’Études Prospectives et
d’Informations Internationales (CEPII)4.
The standard specification of a gravity model was used to estimate the
elasticities (CEPII, 2020). The gravity equation simply related trade (exports and
imports), GDP of importers and exporters, and distance between trade partners.
Because distance is a fixed effect, it will differentiate out in the estimation. I
constructed a panel data set and estimated two main specification, a logarithm
specification of trade, GDP, and distance using Fixed Effects and Random Effects
panel data estimation, and a excess of zeros specification of the Poisson form (a
Zero-inflated Poisson regression) (Motta, 2019).
The time spam of the estimation is from 2007 to 2018 to account for the
latest trade patterns. The typical logarithm gravity equation is:
lnXpt = lnGDPmt + lnGDPxt +Dp + ln εpt (A27)
whereXp are trade flows for trade pair P . It can be imports or exports, t is the
subscript that refers to the year.M is the subscript that refers to importers andX
to exporters. ε is the error term.
A recent effort of structural estimation was made available trade
elasticities for the GTAP database(Soderbery, 2018). Soderbery (2018) used time




database. Table C.4 presents the results of the estimates of elasticities for all
items in GTAP database. The following Table C.3 presents the estimates of trade
elasticities that where replaced in the GTAP database to calibrate the baseline.
Table C.4. Trade Elasticities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PANEL RE PANEL FE PPML RE PPML FE
Beverages and tobacco products (B_T)
Log GDP exp 0.553*** 0.201*** 0.122*** 0.050***
(0.011) (0.027) (0.003) (0.010)
Log GDP imp 0.387*** 0.618*** 0.078*** 0.109***
(0.009) (0.024) (0.003) (0.009)
Observations 105,872 105,872 105,872 103,456
Panel 14,542 14,542 14,542 12,130
Sugar cane, sugar beet (C_B)
Log GDP exp 0.124 0.944** 0.030 0.284*
(0.105) (0.393) (0.043) (0.165)
Log GDP imp 0.085 -0.020 0.037 -0.010
(0.106) (0.415) (0.045) (0.183)
Observations 1,625 1,625 1,625 1,353
Panel 570 570 570 298
Standard errors in parentheses




(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PANEL RE PANEL FE PPML RE PPML FE
Meat: cattle,sheep,goats,horse (CMT)
Log GDP exp 0.277*** -0.595*** 0.061*** -0.106***
(0.021) (0.052) (0.006) (0.018)
Log GDP imp 0.336*** 0.952*** 0.070*** 0.170***
(0.017) (0.047) (0.005) (0.016)
Observations 37,375 37,375 37,375 35,841
Panel 6,358 6,358 6,358 4,824
Coal (COA)
Log GDP exp 0.156*** -0.114 0.028*** -0.029
(0.043) (0.106) (0.010) (0.026)
Log GDP imp 0.445*** 0.915*** 0.093*** 0.152***
(0.039) (0.105) (0.009) (0.025)
Observations 15,563 15,563 15,563 14,541
Panel 3,296 3,296 3,296 2,274
Chemical,rubber,plastic prods (CRP)
Log GDP exp 0.987*** 0.385*** 0.188*** 0.066***
(0.008) (0.019) (0.002) (0.006)
Log GDP imp 0.648*** 0.553*** 0.110*** 0.079***
(0.008) (0.018) (0.002) (0.006)
Observations 177,105 177,105 177,105 174,380
Panel 22,100 22,100 22,100 19,375
Cattle,sheep,goats,horses (CTL)
Log GDP exp 0.274*** -0.559*** 0.063*** -0.105***
(0.026) (0.076) (0.008) (0.027)
Log GDP imp 0.331*** 0.712*** 0.074*** 0.137***
(0.023) (0.062) (0.007) (0.021)
Observations 23,002 23,002 23,002 21,913
Panel 4,133 4,133 4,133 3,044
Electronic equipment (ELE)
Log GDP exp 0.955*** 0.347*** 0.210*** 0.065***
(0.010) (0.025) (0.003) (0.008)
Standard errors in parentheses




(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PANEL RE PANEL FE PPML RE PPML FE
Log GDP imp 0.596*** 0.754*** 0.112*** 0.120***
(0.009) (0.023) (0.002) (0.007)
Observations 143,416 143,416 143,416 140,376
Panel 19,421 19,421 19,421 16,384
Electricity (ELY)
Log GDP exp -3.798* 1.049 -0.259 0.065
(2.078) (3.718) (0.483) (1.026)
Log GDP imp 0.944 1.970 0.062 0.498
(2.048) (2.807) (0.543) (0.950)
Observations 336 336 336 262
Panel 177 177 177 103
Metal products (FMP)
Log GDP exp 0.891*** 0.257*** 0.205*** 0.054***
(0.009) (0.023) (0.003) (0.008)
Log GDP imp 0.548*** 0.758*** 0.106*** 0.126***
(0.008) (0.022) (0.002) (0.007)
Observations 138,954 138,954 138,954 135,946
Panel 18,884 18,884 18,884 15,877
Forestry (FRS)
Log GDP exp 0.230*** -0.133*** 0.054*** -0.035**
(0.014) (0.038) (0.005) (0.015)
Log GDP imp 0.502*** 0.933*** 0.128*** 0.192***
(0.015) (0.039) (0.005) (0.015)
Observations 48,692 48,692 48,692 46,826
Panel 8,243 8,243 8,243 6,378
Fishing (FSH)
Log GDP exp 0.260*** -0.190*** 0.069*** -0.033**
(0.014) (0.041) (0.005) (0.016)
Log GDP imp 0.531*** 0.822*** 0.140*** 0.181***
(0.015) (0.043) (0.005) (0.017)
Observations 47,058 47,058 47,058 45,234
Standard errors in parentheses




(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PANEL RE PANEL FE PPML RE PPML FE
Panel 7,859 7,859 7,859 6,035
Gas(GAS)
Log GDP exp -0.522*** 0.478** -0.095*** 0.038
(0.080) (0.222) (0.015) (0.041)
Log GDP imp 0.595*** 0.760*** 0.108*** 0.111***
(0.069) (0.202) (0.014) (0.039)
Observations 6,264 6,264 6,264 5,603
Panel 1,709 1,709 1,709 1,048
Gas manufacture, distribution(GDT)
Log GDP exp -0.040 0.383 -0.018 0.211
(0.088) (0.442) (0.047) (0.245)
Log GDP imp 0.223*** 0.338 0.103*** 0.144
(0.065) (0.325) (0.035) (0.174)
Observations 1,665 1,665 1,665 1,244
Panel 738 738 738 317
Cereal grains nec (GRO)
Log GDP exp 0.424*** -0.074 0.087*** -0.009
(0.025) (0.063) (0.007) (0.018)
Log GDP imp 0.261*** 0.424*** 0.058*** 0.074***
(0.022) (0.059) (0.006) (0.017)
Observations 33,425 33,425 33,425 31,952
Panel 5,881 5,881 5,881 4,408
Ferrous metals (I_S)
Log GDP exp 0.763*** 0.189*** 0.137*** 0.017*
(0.013) (0.033) (0.003) (0.009)
Log GDP imp 0.634*** 0.681*** 0.105*** 0.094***
(0.012) (0.030) (0.003) (0.008)
Observations 103,238 103,238 103,238 100,487
Panel 14,933 14,933 14,933 12,182
Leather products (LEA)
Standard errors in parentheses




(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PANEL RE PANEL FE PPML RE PPML FE
Log GDP exp 0.679*** 0.358*** 0.168*** 0.059***
(0.010) (0.023) (0.003) (0.009)
Log GDP imp 0.619*** 0.617*** 0.146*** 0.124***
(0.010) (0.023) (0.003) (0.009)
Observations 109,238 109,238 109,238 106,424
Panel 15,565 15,565 15,565 12,752
Wood products (LUM)
Log GDP exp 0.629*** -0.193*** 0.152*** -0.035***
(0.009) (0.021) (0.003) (0.008)
Log GDP imp 0.602*** 1.005*** 0.120*** 0.178***
(0.009) (0.021) (0.003) (0.008)
Observations 128,272 128,272 128,272 125,192
Panel 17,984 17,984 17,984 14,906
Dairy products (MIL)
Log GDP exp 0.373*** -0.587*** 0.083*** -0.096***
(0.017) (0.038) (0.005) (0.014)
Log GDP imp 0.341*** 0.620*** 0.061*** 0.100***
(0.013) (0.031) (0.004) (0.011)
Observations 62,089 62,089 62,089 60,160
Panel 9,431 9,431 9,431 7,502
Motor vehicles and parts (MVH)
Log GDP exp 0.935*** 0.019 0.203*** 0.014
(0.010) (0.026) (0.003) (0.009)
Log GDP imp 0.500*** 0.915*** 0.087*** 0.140***
(0.009) (0.023) (0.002) (0.007)
Observations 129,286 129,286 129,286 125,972
Panel 18,578 18,578 18,578 15,265
Metals nec (NFM)
Log GDP exp 0.651*** 0.242*** 0.110*** 0.032***
(0.014) (0.033) (0.003) (0.009)
Log GDP imp 0.830*** 0.545*** 0.152*** 0.084***
Standard errors in parentheses




(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PANEL RE PANEL FE PPML RE PPML FE
(0.013) (0.031) (0.003) (0.009)
Observations 92,936 92,936 92,936 90,562
Panel 13,175 13,175 13,175 10,801
Mineral products nec (NMM)
Log GDP exp 0.819*** 0.038 0.198*** 0.009
(0.010) (0.023) (0.003) (0.009)
Log GDP imp 0.543*** 0.883*** 0.104*** 0.151***
(0.009) (0.022) (0.003) (0.008)
Observations 116,625 116,625 116,625 113,751
Panel 16,094 16,094 16,094 13,220
Animal products nec (OAP)
Log GDP exp 0.434*** -0.165*** 0.109*** -0.026**
(0.013) (0.034) (0.004) (0.012)
Log GDP imp 0.496*** 0.542*** 0.116*** 0.109***
(0.013) (0.034) (0.004) (0.012)
Observations 64,281 64,281 64,281 62,122
Panel 10,232 10,232 10,232 8,073
Crops nec (OCR)
Log GDP exp 0.410*** 0.289*** 0.082*** 0.044***
(0.010) (0.023) (0.003) (0.009)
Log GDP imp 0.581*** 0.502*** 0.128*** 0.095***
(0.011) (0.024) (0.003) (0.009)
Observations 104,890 104,890 104,890 102,585
Panel 14,476 14,476 14,476 12,172
Food products nec (OFD)
Log GDP exp 0.642*** 0.082*** 0.124*** 0.017**
(0.009) (0.019) (0.002) (0.007)
Log GDP imp 0.557*** 0.627*** 0.097*** 0.097***
(0.008) (0.018) (0.002) (0.007)
Observations 145,109 145,109 145,109 142,492
Standard errors in parentheses




(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PANEL RE PANEL FE PPML RE PPML FE
Panel 18,744 18,744 18,744 16,128
Oil (OIL)
Log GDP exp -0.443*** 0.322*** -0.064*** 0.019
(0.052) (0.118) (0.009) (0.020)
Log GDP imp 0.663*** 0.115 0.096*** 0.015
(0.049) (0.132) (0.009) (0.023)
Observations 13,272 13,272 13,272 12,254
Panel 3,010 3,010 3,010 1,992
Machinery and equipment nec (OME)
Log GDP exp 1.025*** 0.400*** 0.201*** 0.077***
(0.008) (0.019) (0.002) (0.006)
Log GDP imp 0.636*** 0.736*** 0.108*** 0.104***
(0.008) (0.019) (0.002) (0.006)
Observations 182,931 182,931 182,931 180,161
Panel 23,007 23,007 23,007 20,237
Manufactures nec (OMF
Log GDP exp 0.806*** 0.342*** 0.204*** 0.074***
(0.009) (0.022) (0.003) (0.009)
Log GDP imp 0.561*** 0.635*** 0.128*** 0.124***
(0.008) (0.021) (0.003) (0.008)
Observations 132,945 132,945 132,945 129,919
Panel 18,435 18,435 18,435 15,411
Minerals nec (OMN
Log GDP exp 0.483*** 0.229*** 0.091*** 0.036***
(0.014) (0.034) (0.004) (0.010)
Log GDP imp 0.626*** 0.639*** 0.130*** 0.110***
(0.013) (0.032) (0.004) (0.010)
Observations 82,735 82,735 82,735 80,509
Panel 12,063 12,063 12,063 9,837
Meat products nec (OMT
Standard errors in parentheses




(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PANEL RE PANEL FE PPML RE PPML FE
Log GDP exp 0.441*** -0.383*** 0.104*** -0.056***
(0.017) (0.043) (0.005) (0.015)
Log GDP imp 0.353*** 0.699*** 0.070*** 0.128***
(0.014) (0.038) (0.004) (0.013)
Observations 52,150 52,150 52,150 50,254
Panel 8,452 8,452 8,452 6,557
Oil seeds (OSD)
Log GDP exp 0.212*** -0.039 0.049*** -0.011
(0.018) (0.043) (0.005) (0.014)
Log GDP imp 0.386*** 0.260*** 0.100*** 0.058***
(0.018) (0.046) (0.006) (0.015)
Observations 44,898 44,898 44,898 43,155
Panel 7,604 7,604 7,604 5,861
Transport equipment nec (OTN)
Log GDP exp 0.748*** 0.378*** 0.144*** 0.068***
(0.015) (0.041) (0.003) (0.010)
Log GDP imp 0.518*** 0.790*** 0.096*** 0.132***
(0.013) (0.038) (0.003) (0.009)
Observations 98,541 98,541 98,541 95,574
Panel 14,793 14,793 14,793 11,826
Petroleum, coal products (P_C)
Log GDP exp 0.403*** 0.162*** 0.066*** 0.016
(0.018) (0.047) (0.004) (0.010)
Log GDP imp 0.489*** 0.507*** 0.080*** 0.078***
(0.015) (0.042) (0.003) (0.009)
Observations 84,491 84,491 84,491 81,935
Panel 12,986 12,986 12,986 10,430
Processed rice (PCR
Log GDP exp 0.151*** 0.132** 0.034*** 0.016
(0.023) (0.057) (0.007) (0.019)
Log GDP imp 0.061*** 0.257*** 0.017*** 0.047***
Standard errors in parentheses




(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PANEL RE PANEL FE PPML RE PPML FE
(0.020) (0.055) (0.006) (0.018)
Observations 31,322 31,322 31,322 29,891
Panel 5,592 5,592 5,592 4,161
Paddy rice (PDR)
Log GDP exp 0.007 0.009 0.001 -0.007
(0.027) (0.080) (0.009) (0.030)
Log GDP imp 0.141*** 0.628*** 0.044*** 0.152***
(0.025) (0.082) (0.009) (0.032)
Observations 16,668 16,668 16,668 15,565
Panel 3,566 3,566 3,566 2,463
Plant-based fibers (PFB)
Log GDP exp -0.187*** 0.066 -0.039*** 0.014
(0.022) (0.061) (0.006) (0.021)
Log GDP imp 0.249*** 0.342*** 0.064*** 0.064***
(0.026) (0.064) (0.008) (0.022)
Observations 23,807 23,807 23,807 22,440
Panel 4,782 4,782 4,782 3,415
Paper products, publishing (PPP)
Log GDP exp 0.860*** 0.270*** 0.202*** 0.056***
(0.010) (0.023) (0.003) (0.009)
Log GDP imp 0.503*** 0.633*** 0.096*** 0.104***
(0.009) (0.021) (0.003) (0.008)
Observations 125,487 125,487 125,487 122,610
Panel 17,056 17,056 17,056 14,183
Sugar (SGR)
Log GDP exp 0.024 0.100 0.001 0.009
(0.022) (0.063) (0.006) (0.018)
Log GDP imp 0.176*** 0.377*** 0.037*** 0.068***
(0.019) (0.057) (0.005) (0.015)
Observations 40,017 40,017 40,017 38,305
Standard errors in parentheses




(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PANEL RE PANEL FE PPML RE PPML FE
Panel 7,132 7,132 7,132 5,420
Textiles (TEX)
Log GDP exp 0.795*** 0.462*** 0.171*** 0.072***
(0.009) (0.020) (0.003) (0.007)
Log GDP imp 0.651*** 0.634*** 0.130*** 0.105***
(0.009) (0.020) (0.003) (0.007)
Observations 138,509 138,509 138,509 135,690
Panel 18,485 18,485 18,485 15,669
Vegetables, fruit, nuts (V_F)
Log GDP exp 0.472*** 0.028 0.105*** 0.004
(0.011) (0.024) (0.003) (0.009)
Log GDP imp 0.554*** 0.767*** 0.113*** 0.131***
(0.011) (0.025) (0.003) (0.009)
Observations 93,052 93,052 93,052 90,529
Panel 13,467 13,467 13,467 10,944
Vegetable oils and fats (VOL)
Log GDP exp 0.436*** 0.105*** 0.089*** 0.019*
(0.016) (0.035) (0.004) (0.011)
Log GDP imp 0.344*** 0.410*** 0.069*** 0.071***
(0.014) (0.034) (0.004) (0.011)
Observations 70,212 70,212 70,212 68,151
Panel 10,483 10,483 10,483 8,427
Wearing apparel (WAP)
Log GDP exp 0.681*** 0.531*** 0.161*** 0.088***
(0.009) (0.021) (0.003) (0.008)
Log GDP imp 0.650*** 0.753*** 0.148*** 0.147***
(0.009) (0.021) (0.003) (0.009)
Observations 125,272 125,272 125,272 122,325
Panel 17,427 17,427 17,427 14,481
Wheat (WHT)
Standard errors in parentheses




(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PANEL RE PANEL FE PPML RE PPML FE
Log GDP exp 0.353*** -0.113 0.058*** -0.019
(0.040) (0.113) (0.009) (0.027)
Log GDP imp 0.004 0.498*** -0.002 0.066***
(0.035) (0.094) (0.008) (0.021)
Observations 17,092 17,092 17,092 16,007
Panel 3,568 3,568 3,568 2,484
Wool, silk-worm cocoons (WOL)
Log GDP exp 0.054 0.149 0.010 0.028
(0.035) (0.092) (0.012) (0.034)
Log GDP imp 0.314*** 0.374*** 0.080*** 0.073**
(0.036) (0.099) (0.013) (0.036)
Observations 8,848 8,848 8,848 8,106
Panel 2,078 2,078 2,078 1,337
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Model Statistics for Chapters VII and VIII
For model documentation and GAMS scripts please refer to CGEBox. Britz and
van der Mensbrugghe (2018a) describe in detail how to use and implement simulations




MODEL STATISTICS (CHAPTER VII)
BLOCKS OF EQUATIONS 116 SINGLE EQUATIONS 610
BLOCKS OF VARIABLES 78 SINGLE VARIABLES 610
NON ZERO ELEMENTS 2,854 NON LINEAR N-Z 1,671
DERIVATIVE POOL 20 CONSTANT POOL 1,175
MODEL STATISTICS (CHAPTER VIII)
Preprocessed model has 18664 constraints and 18664 variables
with 115114 Jacobian elements, 77906 of which are nonlinear.
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